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[ISW] 러시아 공세 캠페인 평가, 2024년 2월 3일

by 맘씨 posted Feb 04, 2024
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[요약]

주요 요점:

  • 러시아는 미국이 이라크, 시리아, 예멘에서 이란 지원 대리인의 공격을 사전에 차단하기 위해 공습을 감행함에 따라 이란에 대한 지원을 강화하고 있다.

  • 크렘린은 2월 3일 이라크, 시리아, 예멘에서 이란 지원 민병대 거점에 대한 미국의 보복 공습을 비난했다.

  • 미국은 1월 28일 이란 지원 이라크 민병대의 드론 공격으로 요르단 북동부에서 미군 3명이 사망한 후 2월 2일과 3일에 이라크, 시리아, 예멘의 목표물에 대한 일련의 보복 공습을 감행했다.

  • 마리아 자하로바 러시아 외무부 대변인은 이 공습을 "미국-영국의 노골적인 침략 행위"라고 비난했으며, 이는 미국의 정책이 "공격적인 성격"과 "국제법을 완전히 무시"하고 있음을 보여준다고 주장했다.

  • 자하로바는 미국의 공습이 중동에서 갈등을 더욱 심화시키기 위해 "특별히 고안"되었다고 주장했다.

  • 자하로바는 영국이 공습에 가담한 것을 비난했고, 영국은 도발적인 미국의 정책을 지원하는 데 있어 "아직 답변해야 할 것"이라고 주장했다.

  • 러시아 국영 언론은 공습의 여파에 대해 광범위하게 보도했고, 이란, 이라크, 시리아의 국가 보도와 공습에 대한 비난을 증폭시켰다.

  • 러시아는 2월 5일에 예정된 미국의 공습과 관련하여 유엔 안전보장이사회 회의를 요청했다.

  • 러시아는 중동에서 합법적인 미국의 활동을 훼손하기 위해 국제법을 무기화하는 경우가 많다.

  • 크렘린은 2월 3일 모스크바에서 동원된 군인들의 아내들이 시위를 한 것을 검열하여 러시아 군인들을 지지하고 정권에 반대하는 더 광범위한 사회 운동이 다시 부상하는 것을 억제하려고 했다.

  • 러시아 "귀향길" 사회 운동의 회원들은 2022년 9월 블라디미르 푸틴 러시아 대통령이 부분 동원령을 발표한 이후로 정부에 반대하는 시위를 조직해 왔다.




[원문]
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Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment

Support ISW

Grace Mappes, Angelica Evans, Karolina Hird,

Kateryna Stepanenko, and Fredrick W. Kagan


February 3, 2024, 7:50pm ET 

Click here to see ISW's interactive map of the Russian invasion of Ukraine. This map is updated daily alongside the static maps present in this report.


Click here to see ISW’s 3D control-of-terrain topographic map of Ukraine. The use of a computer (not a mobile device) is strongly recommended for accessing this data-heavy tool.


Click here to access ISW’s archive of interactive time-lapse maps of the Russian invasion of Ukraine. These maps complement the static control-of-terrain maps that ISW produces daily by showing a dynamic frontline.

The Kremlin is doubling down on its support for Iran as the US conducts strikes to preempt attacks by Iranian-back proxies in Iraq, Syria, and Yemen against American and other targets. The Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA) condemned the US retaliatory strikes against Iranian-backed militia positions in Iraq, Syria, and Yemen on February 3. The US launched a series of retaliatory airstrikes against targets in Iraq, Syria, and Yemen on February 2 and 3 following a January 28 drone strike by an Iranian-backed Iraqi militia that killed three US servicemembers in northeastern Jordan. Russian MFA Spokesperson Maria Zakharova condemned the strikes as a “blatant act of American-British aggression” and claimed that they demonstrate US policy’s “aggressive nature” and “complete disregard for international law.” Zakharova claimed that the US airstrikes are “specifically designed” to further inflame the conflict in the Middle East. Zakharova criticized the United Kingdom (UK) for participating in the strike and claimed that the UK “has yet to answer” for its “zeal” in supporting provocative US policy. Russian state media reported extensively on the strike’s aftermath and amplified Iranian, Iraqi, and Syrian state reporting and condemnations of the strike. Russia requested a United Nations Security Council (UNSC) meeting in connection with the US strikes, which is scheduled for February 5. Russia frequently weaponizes its invocation of international law to undermine legitimate US activities in the Middle East.


The Kremlin censored a protest by wives of mobilized soldiers in Moscow on February 3 likely to suppress any possible resurgence of a broader social movement in support of Russian soldiers and against the regime. Members of the Russian “Way Home” social movement laid flowers at the Tomb of the Unknown Soldier in Moscow before holding a protest at the nearby Manezhnaya Square to commemorate the 500th day since Russian President Vladimir Putin began partial mobilization in September 2022. Russian state media outlets largely did not cover the protest but did report that the Moscow Prosecutor’s Office warned against attending an unspecified protest in Moscow on February 3, very likely referring to the Way Home protest. Russian opposition media outlets covered the protest in detail, however, estimating that roughly 200 people attended, and reported that Moscow police detained 27 individuals, most of whom were Russian and foreign journalists. The opposition outlets reported that authorities later released the detained individuals without charges and that some of the Way Home members protested outside of the police station for the release of all detained individuals. Russian police allowed Way Home protestors to later go to Putin’s campaign headquarters and handwrite appeals to Putin to bring mobilized personnel home, but the headquarters only allowed small groups of demonstrators inside and severely limited media access. Russian law enforcement likely deliberately detained journalists rather than protestors to limit reporting of the event while depriving the Way Home organization of a platform on which to martyr itself in the information space over the arrests of its members.


Key Takeaways:


  • The Kremlin is doubling down on its support for Iran as the US conducts strikes to preempt attacks by Iranian-back proxies in Iraq, Syria, and Yemen against American and other targets.


  • The Kremlin censored a protest by wives of mobilized soldiers in Moscow on February 3 likely to suppress any possible resurgence of a broader social movement in support of Russian soldiers and against the regime.


  • Soviet leadership experienced first-hand the influence that social movements of relatives of Russian soldiers wielded in the late 1980s and early 1990s, and the Kremlin likely aims to preemptively censor and discredit similar movements before they can garner similar influence.


  • Putin may have learned from the Soviet Union’s prior failure to completely censor soldiers’ relatives and changed tactics, instead using limited censorship and discreditation to keep these movements from building momentum.


  • Russian milbloggers continued to fixate on a recent unsuccessful Russian mechanized assault near Novomykhailivka, Donetsk Oblast and highlight divisions it caused within the Russian information space, which are indicative of wider issues with the Russian military’s ability to adapt in Ukraine.


  • Ukrainian actors conducted a drone strike against the Lukoil oil refinery in Volgograd Oblast on February 3.


  • Ukrainian strikes reportedly temporarily slowed Russia’s production of Lancet loitering munitions.


  • Russian state media confirmed the appointment of two new officials to senior positions in military-adjacent civilian organizations.


  • Russian forces made confirm advances near Bakhmut amid continued positional engagements along the frontline.


  • Russian soldiers imprisoned for refusing to fight in Ukraine are reportedly dying in Russian detention.


  • Russian authorities continue efforts to militarize Ukrainian youth through the school system.


Click here to read the full assessment.

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