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[ISW] 러시아 공세 캠페인 평가, 2024년 3월 11일

by Summa posted Mar 12, 2024
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```html 요약

요약

  • 우크라이나 군사 감시관은 ISW의 이전 평가와 일치하는 러시아 군 병력 생성 및 국방 산업 기반(DIB) 역량에 대한 평가를 제공했습니다.
  • 러시아의 국방 산업 기반(DIB) 생산량 증가는 노동력 부족, 무기 및 장비 비축 감소, 제재로 인해 더 이상 획득할 수 없는 군수 및 2중 용도 품목을 완전히 보상할 수 없는 상황으로 인해 중장기적으로 지속 가능하지 않을 가능성이 큽니다.
  • 북한의 러시아로의 무기 이전은 2024년 2월 중순 이후 중단된 후 다시 시작된 것으로 보입니다.
  • 우크라이나 군 소식통은 러시아군이 자포리자 방향에서 화학 물질이 장착된 수류탄을 점점 더 많이 사용하고 있으며, 러시아가 가입한 화학무기 금지 조약(CWC)을 위반할 가능성이 있다고 지적했습니다.
  • 몰도바 외무부(MFA)는 러시아가 러시아 대통령 선거 기간 동안 친러 몰도바 분리 지역인 트란스니스트리아에 투표소를 운영할 것이라는 주장에 대응하여 몰도바 주재 러시아 대사 올렉 바스네초프를 소환했습니다.
  • 러시아, 중국, 이란은 3월 11일부터 15일까지 오만만에서 합동 해상 안보 벨트-2024 해군 훈련을 실시할 예정입니다.
  • 러시아 외무부(MFA)는 서방이 아르메니아를 러시아에 대항하는 도구로 사용하려 한다고 주장했으며, 이는 아르메니아가 러시아와의 안보 관계에서 거리를 두려는 노력을 비판하는 정보 작전에서 주목할 만한 확대입니다.
  • 블라디미르 푸틴 러시아 대통령은 3월 11일 대선을 앞두고 러시아 정보 공간에 대한 통제력을 강화하기 위해 러시아 당국이 "외국 요원"으로 간주하는 행위자를 추가로 제한할 수 있도록 하는 법안에 서명했습니다.
  • 프랑스는 우크라이나에 서방 군인을 파견할 가능성이 있는 국가 연합을 구축할 준비가 된 것으로 알려졌습니다.
  • 러시아군은 최근 크레민나, 바흐무트, 도네츠크 시 근처에서 진격을 확인했습니다.
  • 블라디미르 푸틴 러시아 대통령은 다양한 사회적 혜택을 약속하면서 러시아 군인과 그 가족을 돌보기 위한 노력을 계속하고 있습니다.

분류: 군사, 정치, 외교 관련된 주요국가: 러시아, 우크라이나, 몰도바 향후 전망: 러시아는 우크라이나에서의 전쟁을 계속할 가능성이 높으며, 서방 국가들은 우크라이나에 대한 지원을 계속할 것입니다. 러시아와 서방 국가들 간의 긴장은 계속될 것으로 예상되며, 이는 글로벌 안보에 부정적인 영향을 미칠 수 있습니다.
```

[원문]

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Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment

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Nicole Wolkov, Angelica Evans, Christina Harward, Karolina Hird, Grace Mappes, and Frederick W. Kagan


March 11, 2024, 6:15pm ET

Click here to see ISW's interactive map of the Russian invasion of Ukraine. This map is updated daily alongside the static maps present in this report.


Click here to see ISW’s 3D control-of-terrain topographic map of Ukraine. The use of a computer (not a mobile device) is strongly recommended for accessing this data-heavy tool.


Click here to access ISW’s archive of interactive time-lapse maps of the Russian invasion of Ukraine. These maps complement the static control-of-terrain maps that ISW produces daily by showing a dynamic frontline.

A Ukrainian military observer offered assessments of Russian force generation and defense industrial base (DIB) capacities that are consistent with ISW’s previous assessments. Ukrainian military observer Kostyantyn Mashovets stated that the Russian military command is aiming to create a “strategic reserve” for offensive operations in spring–summer 2024 but is not planning to equip these newly formed units and formations with the doctrinally required quantities of weapons and equipment due to current Russian DIB production constraints. Mashovets stated that the Russian military command only plans to equip the 27th Motorized Rifle Division — which Russia is reportedly in the process of standing up on the basis of the Central Military District’s existing 21st Motorized Rifle Brigade — with up to 87 percent of its doctrinally required amounts of weapons and equipment by the second and fourth quarters of 2024 and implied that the Russian military command has a similar goal for other new formations and units. Mashovets assessed that it is unlikely that Russian forces will be able to meet this equipment goal by the fourth quarter of 2024 given that many Russian regiments, brigades, and divisions currently operating in Ukraine only have about 30 percent of the doctrinally required amounts of weapons and equipment. Several Western and Ukrainian military officials and analysts noted that Russia’s reported tank production numbers largely reflect restored and modern tanks drawn from storage rather than new production.


Mashovets’ assessment is consistent with ISW’s assessment that the Russian DIB is capable of sustaining Russia’s current tempo of operations, although not likely able to fully support a potential operational or strategic-level offensive operation using a strategic reserve of manpower 2024. Reports that the Russian military is prioritizing creating new underequipped units and formations are consistent with ISW‘s assessment that Russia is prioritizing the quantity of manpower and materiel over the quality of its forces. ISW continues to assess that Russia would have the opportunity to expand its DIB and amass resources if it maintains the theater-wide initiative throughout 2024, thus allowing Russia to set conditions for a future offensive operation using a larger reserve of manpower and equipment.


Mashovets stated that the Russian military command intends to form the bulk of the 27th Motorized Rifle Division from the newly formed 433rd Motorized Rifle Regiment (reportedly staffed by degraded elements of the 21st Separate Motorized Rifle Regiment), 506th Motorized Rifle Regiment, and 589th Motorized Rifle Regiment. Mashovets stated that Russia is currently forming its 433rd, 506th, and 589th motorized rifle regiments at the Totskoye training ground in Orenburg Oblast and the “Trekhizbenovsky“ training ground in occupied Luhansk Oblast and plans to have these units ready for combat by late spring or early summer 2024. These newly formed regiments are likely meant to rapidly deploy to Ukraine to offset frontline losses and are unlikely to be staffed with high-quality recruits or operating at doctrinal end strength. Although Russia likely does not have the capacity to staff and equip these new units near their intended end strength in the near term, the Russian military command almost certainly has long-term intentions to fully equip these and similar units. Mashovets noted that the Russian military command has already been forced to reconsider the formation of a number of units due to “discrepanc[ies]“ between Russia’s force-generation ambitions and realities and that Russia’s ability to deploy its strategic reserves in practice are likely limited “to a certain point.” The Russian military command appears to be prioritizing short-term benefits, such as limited territorial gains, over long-term sustainability and large-scale operationally meaningful undertakings in Ukraine amid ongoing Russian reformation and reconstitution efforts. ISW continues to assess that the Russian military command’s use of ongoing force structure changes to rush newly created and understrength formations into combat in Ukraine will likely constrain the immediate efficacy of these units on the battlefield but is enough to maintain the current pace of operations. The major variable likely to determine the rate at which such partially replenished Russian forces can advance this summer is the availability of materiel to Ukraine, which in turn depends heavily on the continued provision of US military assistance.


Key Takeaways:


  • A Ukrainian military observer offered assessments of Russian force generation and defense industrial base (DIB) capacities that are consistent with ISW’s previous assessments.


  • Russia’s increased defense industrial base (DIB) production is likely not sustainable in the medium and long-term as it will likely suffer from labor shortages, decreased weapons and equipment stockpiles, and an inability to completely compensate for military and dual-use items it can no longer acquire due to sanctions.


  • Transfers of North Korean weapons to Russia by sea have apparently resumed after a pause since mid-February 2024.


  • A Ukrainian military source noted that Russian forces are increasingly using grenades equipped with chemical substances in the Zaporizhia direction, in potential violation of the Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC) to which Russia is a signatory.


  • The Moldovan Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA) has summoned Russian Ambassador to Moldova Oleg Vasnetsov in response to claims that Russia will operate polling stations in pro-Russian Moldovan breakaway region Transnistria during the Russian presidential election.


  • Russia, China, and Iran will hold the joint Maritime Security Belt – 2024 naval exercise in the Gulf of Oman between March 11–15.


  • The Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA) claimed that the West intends to use Armenia as a tool against Russia, a notable escalation in its information operations criticizing Armenian efforts to distance itself from security relations with Russia.


  • Russian President Vladimir Putin signed a bill on March 11 that allows Russian authorities to further restrict actors it deems “foreign agents” to consolidate control over the Russian information space ahead of the presidential election.


  • France is reportedly prepared to build a coalition of countries that are open to potentially sending Western military personnel to Ukraine.


  • Russian forces recently made confirmed advances near Kreminna, Bakhmut, and Donetsk City.



  • Russian President Vladimir Putin continues efforts to cater to Russian servicemembers and their families with the promise of various social benefits.

Click here to read the full assessment.

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The Institute for the Study of War (ISW) is a non-partisan, non-profit, public policy research organization. ISW advances an informed understanding of military affairs through reliable research, trusted analysis, and innovative education. We are committed to improving the nation's ability to execute military operations and respond to emerging threats in order to achieve US strategic objectives.



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