Dear ISW readers,

Welcome to the March installment of The Intel Brief.

Each month, the ISW editorial team distills our research teams' reports and assessments of the war in Ukraine, the Chinese Communist Party's paths to controlling Taiwan and relevant cross–Taiwan Strait developments, and the security challenges in the Middle East to provide you with an understanding in brief of the past month's happenings across our research portfolios.

This Month's Highlights:

• A new essay "Denying Russia’s Only Strategy for Success," by ISW Russia Fellow Nataliya Bugayova and CTP Director Fred Kagan with ISW Russia Deputy Team Lead Kateryna Stepanenko, explores how the Russian strategy that matters most is not Moscow’s warfighting strategy, but rather the Kremlin’s strategy to cause us to see the world as it wishes us to see it and make decisions in that Kremlin-generated alternative reality that will allow Russia to win in the real world.

• An analysis of the Taliban's governance of Afghanistan by Peter Mills examines the internal dynamics of the Taliban's rule, including their approach to girls' education, economic policies, and security challenges. Additionally, the paper outlines three potential scenarios regarding the future of Supreme Leader Hibatullah Akhundzada's power and discusses the implications for US policy.

• A new war studies occasional paper series that explores salient issues in military history and the character of contemporary and future war. Our first essay explores the concept of positional warfare, offered by Soviet military theorist Alexander Svechin in his 1926 work, Strategy and how it relates to the war in Ukraine.

•  A new report from ISW's Johanna Moore and Annika Ganzeveld from AEI’s Critical Threats Project on Iraq's Popular Mobilization Forces, an Iraqi state security service that Iran has infiltrated and uses to wield significant influence in Iraq.

Ukraine

Ukrainian Ground Forces Commander Lieutenant General Oleksandr Pavlyuk stated on March 6 that Ukraine will try to seize the initiative and conduct unspecified counteroffensive actions in 2024.

This Islamic State (IS) claimed responsibility for a mass shooting and bombing at a concert venue in the suburbs of Moscow on the evening of March 22. Russian authorities reported that three to five attackers in camouflage opened fire with automatic weapons and detonated explosives during an event at the “Crocus City Hall” concert venue in Krasnogorsk on the northwestern outskirts of Moscow City, killing at least 139 and injuring at least 180. The Islamic State’s Amaq News Agency published footage on March 23 purportedly filmed from the perspective of the attackers involved in the March 22 Crocus City Hall attack. The footage further supports ISW’s assessment that IS is very likely responsible for the Crocus City Hall attack, despite continued efforts by Kremlin officials and Russian state media to baselessly tie Ukraine to the attack.

Ukrainian shortages of ammunition and other war materiel resulting from delays in the provision of US military assistance may be making the current Ukrainian front line more fragile than the relatively slow Russian advances in various sectors would indicate. Ukrainian prioritization of the sectors most threatened by intensive Russian offensive operations could create vulnerabilities elsewhere that Russian forces may be able to exploit to make sudden and surprising advances if Ukrainian supplies continue to dwindle. Russia’s retention of the theater-wide initiative increases the risks of such developments by letting the Russian military command choose to intensify or initiate operations anywhere along the line almost at will.

Black Sea

Ukrainian forces struck a Black Sea Fleet (BSF) communications center in occupied Sevastopol, Crimea, and reportedly struck an oil depot and at least partially damaged two BSF landing ships on the night of March 23. The Ukrainian General Staff reported on March 24 that Ukrainian forces successfully struck the BSF’s Yamal and Azov Ropucha–class landing ships, a BSF communications center, and several unspecified BSF infrastructure facilities in Sevastopol. A Kremlin-affiliated milblogger claimed that Ukrainian forces launched over 40 Storm Shadow and Neptune missiles, ADM-160 decoy missiles, and drones during the strike. ISW previously assessed that Ukrainian strikes against BSF assets caused the BSF to move some ships away from its main base in Sevastopol and hampered its ability to operate in the western part of the Black Sea. The latest Ukrainian strikes targeting BSF ships, regardless of the extent of the damage caused, will likely continue to deter Russian forces from redeploying ships to Sevastopol and the western Black Sea and complicate the BSF’s ability to maximize its combat capabilities. 

In a Briefing Room video on March 8, Russia Deputy Team Lead and Analyst Kateryna Stepanenko explained the Kremlin's recent changes to prisoner recruitment schemes aimed at keeping convicts fighting in Ukraine for longer periods of time.

China-Taiwan

The Kuomintang initiated a legislative inquiry into the Kinmen capsizing incident to determine the liability of Taiwan’s Coast Guard Administration. This supports the efforts of the Chinese Communist Party to vilify and undermine domestic Taiwanese support for the Democratic Progressive Party. KMT-aligned independent legislator May Chin convened the Legislative Yuan’s Internal Affairs Committee on March 4, summoning Coast Guard and government officials to testify regarding the law enforcement process and subsequent handling of the incident. Chin favors closer relations with the PRC and has a history of meeting with CPP officials, prompting accusations from DPP members that she is under the CCP’s influence.

Taiwan’s Ministry of National Defense (MND) announced that it redefined its criteria for a “first strike” against PRC military assets, which now include a “first move” by PLA aircraft and vessels across Taiwan’s territorial boundaries. ROC Defense Minister Chiu Kuo-cheng told Taiwan’s Legislative Yuan that Taiwan reserves the right to take military countermeasures if enemy military planes or ships enter Taiwan’s territorial waters or airspace and Taiwan fails to expel them by interception, identification, and warning. Chiu also described the security situation in the Taiwan Strait to legislators and explained that it is “on the brink” of escalating to a heightened threat alert level. He referenced recent events that have contributed to escalating tensions, including the PRC’s explicit denial of the median line in the Taiwan Strait and the death of two PRC fishermen near Kinmen, whose boat capsized while they fled from Taiwan’s Coast Guard. Chiu also said that the PRC has increased the frequency of its air and naval missions near Taiwan and that these missions take place closer to Taiwan than before. He said he did not expect war to break out, however.

The PRC had its first public diplomatic meeting with a Hamas official and its first diplomatic visits to Israel and the West Bank since Hamas’ attack on Israel on October 7. PRC MFA envoy Wang Kejian met with the head of Hamas’ political bureau Ismail Haniyeh in Doha, Qatar on March 17. This was the first meeting between PRC and Hamas officials that the PRC has publicly acknowledged since the war in Gaza began in October 2023. Hamas claimed that Wang called Hamas “part of the Palestinian national fabric” and said the PRC is “keen on relations with it.” The PRC readout simply said Wang and Haniyeh “exchanged views on the Gaza conflict.” The PRC has not publicly criticized Hamas since the war began. MFA Spokesperson Lin Jian said on March 19 that the PRC supports the Palestinian Authority in governing all Palestinian territories and called for “internal reconciliation” among all political factions in Palestine, however.

Middle East Security Project

Israel–Hamas War

A series of senior Axis of Resistance officials have met with senior Iranian officials—including the supreme leader—in March, likely to coordinate and prepare plans for their reaction to a wider Israeli operation into southern Lebanon. Iran and the Axis of Resistance use periodic meetings between senior officials to coordinate responses to new developments in the region. Iranian Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps Quds Force Commander Esmail Ghaani spent much of October 2023 in Beirut for meetings with Lebanese Hezbollah leader Hassan Nasrallah to help coordinate “a possible broader confrontation with Israel,” for example. The Syrian defense minister, Kataib Hezbollah secretary general, Palestinian Islamic Jihad secretary general, and Hamas Political Bureau chairman each met with senior Iranian leaders, including Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei, in Tehran between March 17 and 28.

Israeli forces continued operations near al Shifa Hospital, Gaza City. The IDF said on March 24 that it confirmed 480 of the 800 detainees it detained at al Shifa Hospital are linked to Palestinian Islamic Jihad or Hamas. The IDF 401st Brigade (162nd Division) and Israeli special operations forces seized weapons, destroyed militia infrastructure, and engaged Palestinian fighters in the al Shifa Hospital area over the past 24 hours. Palestinian militias conducted at least nine attacks targeting Israeli armor and infantry near al Shifa Hospital. Hamas targeted three Israeli tanks with explosively formed penetrators (EFPs) and rocket-propelled grenades south of al Shifa Hospital on March 23.

We appreciate your continued support and enthusiasm for the Institute for the Study of War.



Best regards,

Adam Grace

ISW Media and Publishing Associate

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