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[ISW] 러시아 공세 캠페인 평가, 2024년 4월 28일

by Summa posted Apr 29, 2024
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Key Takeaways

주요 요점:

  • 아브디이프카 북서쪽에서 최근 러시아군이 전진하면서 우크라이나군은 아브디이프카 서쪽 전선을 따라 다른 제한된 전술적 위치에서 철수했지만, 이러한 철수는 아직 러시아군의 빠른 전술적 이득을 촉진하지 못했습니다. 러시아군은 가까운 시일 내에 이 지역에서 더 깊은 작전상 중요한 침투를 달성할 가능성이 낮습니다.
  • 아브디이프카 북서쪽의 돌출부를 러시아가 계속 안정화하면서 러시아 사령부는 포크로프스크에서 보고된 작전 목표를 향해 서쪽으로 계속 전진할지 아니면 북쪽으로 이동하여 차시프 야르 주변의 러시아 작전과 보완적인 공세 작전을 수행할지 선택해야 합니다.
  • 시르스키는 또한 하르키우 시에 대한 미래의 러시아 공세 작전 위협으로 인해 우크라이나가 도시 방어에 추가 병력과 장비를 배치하고 있다고 지적했지만, ISW는 러시아군이 도시를 점령하는 데 필요한 병력이 부족하다고 계속 평가하고 있습니다.
  • 우크라이나 47기계화여단은 우크라이나군이 최전선에서 미국 제공 M1A1 에이브럼스 전차를 철수했다는 최근 보도를 부인했습니다.
  • 3월 22일 크로커스 시청 테러 공격 이후 러시아와 러시아에 입국하는 이주민에 대한 통제력을 높이려는 최근 러시아의 노력은 러시아와 타지키스탄 간의 관계를 긴장시키고 있는 것으로 보입니다.
  • 러시아 당국은 지난 며칠 동안 러시아에서 서방 출판물을 위해 일하는 여러 러시아 언론인을 체포했는데, 이는 러시아에 대한 신뢰할 수 있는 보도를 할 수 있는 서방 및 독립 러시아 언론의 능력을 제한하려는 지속적인 노력의 일환일 가능성이 큽니다.
  • 러시아군은 최근 스바토베 근처에서 약간 진격했습니다.
  • 영국군 참모총장인 레오 도허티는 4월 27일 영국이 2022년 2월 24일 본격적인 침공이 시작된 이후 러시아군이 45만 명의 사상자를 냈다고 평가했다고 밝혔습니다.
### 분류: 전쟁, 정치, 외교 ### 관련된 주요국가: 러시아, 우크라이나, 영국 ### 향후 전망: 러시아군은 아브디이프카 북서쪽에서 계속 전진할 것으로 예상되며, 우크라이나군은 하르키우 시를 방어하기 위해 추가 병력과 장비를 배치할 것으로 예상됩니다. 러시아는 또한 서방 및 독립 러시아 언론의 능력을 제한하기 위한 노력을 계속할 것으로 예상됩니다.

[원문]

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Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment

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Riley Bailey, Angelica Evans, Nicole Wolkov, Grace Mappes, and Frederick W. Kagan


April 28, 2024, 7:20pm ET

Click here to see ISW's interactive map of the Russian invasion of Ukraine. This map is updated daily alongside the static maps present in this report.


Click here to see ISW’s 3D control-of-terrain topographic map of Ukraine. The use of a computer (not a mobile device) is strongly recommended for accessing this data-heavy tool.


Click here to access ISW’s archive of interactive time-lapse maps of the Russian invasion of Ukraine. These maps complement the static control-of-terrain maps that ISW produces daily by showing a dynamic frontline.

Recent Russian gains northwest of Avdiivka have prompted Ukrainian forces to withdraw from other limited tactical positions along the frontline west of Avdiivka, although these withdrawals have yet to facilitate rapid Russian tactical gains. Russian forces remain unlikely to achieve a deeper operationally significant penetration in the area in the near term. Ukrainian Commander-in-Chief Colonel General Oleksandr Syrskyi reported on April 28 that Ukrainian forces withdrew from Berdychi (northwest of Avdiivka) and Semenivka (west of Avdiivka) to positions further west in order to preserve Ukrainian personnel. Syrskyi acknowledged that Russian forces are making tactical advances northwest of Avdiivka, and Ukrainian officials reported that Russian forces have deployed up to four brigades to their tactical penetration in the Ocheretyne (northwest of Avdiivka) area. Russian forces have committed roughly a reinforced division’s worth of combat power (comprised mainly of four Central Military District [CMD] brigades) to the frontline northwest of Avdiivka to stabilize a small salient in the area and pursue a wider penetration of the Ukrainian defense along the frontline west of Avdiivka. Russian forces have not made relatively rapid tactical gains west of Ocheretyne, Solovyove (northwest of Avdiivka), Berdychi, and Semenivka following Ukrainian withdrawals from limited tactical positions in the area, however, suggesting that Ukrainian forces maintain positions and capabilities in the area that are slowing further westward Russian advances for the moment. Russian forces will likely continue to make tactical gains in the Avdiivka direction in the coming weeks, and Ukrainian commanders may decide to conduct additional withdrawals if Russian forces threaten other Ukrainian tactical positions in the area. The next line of defensible settlements in the area is some distance from the Ukrainian defensive line that Russian forces have been attacking since the seizure of Avdiivka in mid-February 2024, although Ukrainian forces may be able to use defensible windbreaks in fields immediately west of the current frontline to slow future Russian attacks. The complete Ukrainian withdrawal to reportedly fortified positions further west of Avdiivka would likely allow Russian forces to make relatively rapid advances through these fields, although the advances would likely be rapid only if Ukrainian forces do not try to hold positions in the fields.


Syrskyi added that Ukrainian forces are committing elements of brigades that have undergone rest and reconstitution to stabilize the situation in the Avdiivka direction. The arrival of reconstituted Ukrainian reinforcements will likely allow Ukrainian forces to slow Russian tactical gains and possibly stabilize the front. Ukrainian forces have struggled with under-resourcing and are facing a reported one-to-three manpower disadvantage northwest of Avdiivka, but have nonetheless prevented more than a division’s worth of Russian combat power from making the types of advances that these force and materiel disparities should in principle have allowed Russian forces to achieve. The arrival of Ukrainian reinforcements and additional materiel will force the Russian command to either accept that a near-term wider or deeper penetration is unlikely or commit additional reserves to the area to continue pursuing tactical gains. Russian forces currently have opportunities to achieve operationally significant gains near Chasiv Yar and are preparing reserves to support a large-scale offensive effort expected this summer. The immediate commitment of additional Russian reserves to an opportunistic tactical penetration in the Avdiivka area, where Russian forces are far away from operationally significant objectives, may consume manpower that otherwise could support operationally significant gains in the Chasiv Yar area or that were intended for use in summer 2024. Russian forces will likely have to replenish and reinforce attacking units and decrease the tempo of offensive operations west of Avdiivka if they do not commit additional reserves, which would likely constrain Russia’s ability to make additional rapid tactical advances in the area.


Key Takeaways


  • Recent Russian gains northwest of Avdiivka have prompted Ukrainian forces to withdraw from other limited tactical positions along the frontline west of Avdiivka, although these withdrawals have yet to facilitate rapid Russian tactical gains. Russian forces remain unlikely to achieve a deeper operationally significant penetration in the area in the near term.


  • The continued Russian stabilization of their salient northwest of Avdiivka presents the Russian command with a choice of continuing to push west towards its reported operational objective in Pokrovsk or trying to drive northwards to conduct possible complementary offensive operations with the Russian effort around Chasiv Yar.


  • Syrskyi also noted that the threat of a possible future Russian offensive operation against Kharkiv City is causing Ukraine to allocate additional forces and equipment to defending the city, although ISW continues to assess that the Russian military lacks the forces necessary to seize the city.


  • The Ukrainian 47th Mechanized Brigade denied a recent report that Ukrainian forces had pulled US-provided M1A1 Abrams tanks from the frontline.


  • Recent Russian efforts to increase control over migrants in and entering Russia following the March 22 Crocus City Hall terrorist attack appear to be straining relations between Russia and Tajikistan.


  • Russian authorities arrested several Russian journalists working for Western publications in Russia within the past several days, likely as part of an ongoing effort to limit Western and independent Russian media’s ability to reliably report on Russia.


  • Russian forces recently marginally advanced near Svatove.


  • The United Kingdom’s (UK) Minister of State for the Armed Forces, Leo Docherty, stated on April 27 that the UK assesses that Russian forces have suffered 450,000 killed and wounded personnel since the start of the full-scale invasion on February 24, 2022.

Click here to read the full assessment.

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ISW is a tax-exempt organization under section 501(c)(3) of the Internal Revenue Code. Donations are tax-deductible to the extent permitted by law.

The Institute for the Study of War (ISW) is a non-partisan, non-profit, public policy research organization. ISW advances an informed understanding of military affairs through reliable research, trusted analysis, and innovative education. We are committed to improving the nation's ability to execute military operations and respond to emerging threats in order to achieve US strategic objectives.



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