Christina Harward, Angelica Evans, Grace Mappes, Karolina Hird, and Frederick W. Kagan

April 29, 2024, 6:45pm ET

Click here to see ISW's interactive map of the Russian invasion of Ukraine. This map is updated daily alongside the static maps present in this report.

Click here to see ISW’s 3D control-of-terrain topographic map of Ukraine. The use of a computer (not a mobile device) is strongly recommended for accessing this data-heavy tool.

Click here to access ISW’s archive of interactive time-lapse maps of the Russian invasion of Ukraine. These maps complement the static control-of-terrain maps that ISW produces daily by showing a dynamic frontline.

Russian forces secured additional marginal tactical gains northwest and southwest of Avdiivka as of April 29, but have not made significant advances in the Avdiivka direction over the last 24 hours. Geolocated footage published on April 28 and 29 indicates that Russian forces advanced in western and northeastern Ocheretyne (northwest of Avdiivka), along the rail line to the northwestern outskirts of Ocheretyne, and in Netaylove (southwest of Avdiivka). Russian milbloggers claimed that Russian forces also advanced northwest of Ocheretyne towards Novooleksandrivka in an area 1.2 kilometers wide and 1.7 kilometers deep. A Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces advanced 400–450 meters west of the C051801 (Orlivka-Netaylove) highway between Netaylove and Umanske (west of Avdiivka). ISW has not observed visual confirmation of these claimed Russian advances, however. The Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) officially stated that Russian forces seized Semenivka (west of Avdiivka) following Ukrainian Commander-in-Chief Colonel General Oleksandr Syrskyi’s April 28 statement that Ukrainian forces withdrew from the settlement. Russian milbloggers claimed that Russian forces are conducting clearing operations in Berdychi (west of Avdiivka), and Ocheretyne, Novokalynove, and Keramik (both northwest of Avdiivka and east of Ocheretyne). Fighting also continued northwest of Avdiivka near Kalynove, Arkhanhelske, Novobakhmutivka, Solovyove, Sokil, Novopokrovske, and Novoselivka Persha; and west of Avdiivka near Orlivka and Umanske.

Russian forces have the opportunity to choose among multiple tactical directions for future offensive drives near Avdiivka, but it remains unclear where they will focus their efforts in the near future. Russian milbloggers speculated about which objectives Russian forces may pursue northwest of Avdiivka but offered no clear consensus. Several prominent milbloggers claimed that Russian forces are conducting offensive operations near Keramik to advance towards Arkhanhelske but are also trying to advance west from the Ocheretyne area towards Sokil and southwest towards the Novoprokovske-Novoselivka Persha line. ISW continues to assess that the continued Russian stabilization of their salient northwest of Avdiivka presents the Russian command with a choice of either continuing to push west towards its reported operational objective in Pokrovsk or trying to drive northwards to conduct possible complementary offensive operations with the Russian effort around Chasiv Yar.

Key Takeaways

• Russian forces secured additional marginal tactical gains northwest and southwest of Avdiivka as of April 29, but have not made significant advances in the Avdiivka direction over the last 24 hours.

• Russian forces have the opportunity to choose among multiple tactical directions for future offensive drives near Avdiivka, but it remains unclear where they will focus their efforts in the near future.

• Investigations by both Ukrainian news agencies and Russian opposition outlets suggest that Russia is denying the legal guardians of forcibly deported and adopted Ukrainian children the ability to repatriate these children, further undermining the Kremlin’s claims that the deportation and adoption of Ukrainian children is a necessary humanitarian endeavor.

• NATO Secretary General Jens Stoltenberg stated during an unexpected visit to Kyiv on April 29 that Ukraine’s Western allies must provide long-term, predictable military assistance to Ukraine and signal to the Kremlin that Russia cannot “wait out” Western support for Ukraine.

• The Kremlin is pursuing a hybrid campaign directly targeting NATO states, including using GPS jamming and sabotaging military logistics in NATO members’ territory.

• Telegram recently temporarily blocked chatbots meant to facilitate civilian reports on Russian military activity to official Ukrainian channels, including some channels run by Ukrainian security services.

• Russian forces recently made confirmed advances near Avdiivka and Donetsk City.

• Ukrainian officials continue to report that Russian authorities are coercing Ukrainians in occupied Ukraine to join the Russian military.

Click here to read the full assessment.

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