Dear ISW readers,

Welcome to the April installment of The Intel Brief.

Each month, the ISW editorial team distills our research teams' reports and assessments of the war in Ukraine, the Chinese Communist Party's paths to controlling Taiwan and relevant cross–Taiwan Strait developments, and the security challenges in the Middle East to provide you with an understanding in brief of the past month's happenings across our research portfolios.

This Month's Highlights:

• A new essay, Why You Can’t Be an Iran Hawk and a Russia Dove, by members of ISW’s Russia and Iran teams demonstrates that those concerned with the growth of Iran’s military power, ambitions, and aggression in the Middle East must recognize the degree to which Iran’s fortunes rise and fall with Russia’s.

• A report by Frederick W. Kagan explains how the United States has only two real choices today in the war in Ukraine. It can quickly resume providing military aid to let Ukraine stabilize the front lines near the current locations. Or it can let the Russians defeat the Ukrainian military and drive toward the NATO borders from the Black Sea to central Poland. There is no third option.

• As the debate over providing additional aid to Ukraine continued into April, an analysis in mid-April by Riley Bailey and Frederick W. Kagan examined how the delay exhausted Ukraine’s US-provided air defenses.



• A report by Brian Carter and Frederick W. Kagan examines the Iranian April 13 missile-drone attack on Israel and how the strike package was modeled on those the Russians have used repeatedly against Ukraine to great effect.

Ukraine

Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky signed a law on April 2 that lowers the Ukrainian military’s mobilization age from 27 to 25 years of age. Lowering the mobilization age is one of many measures that Ukraine has been considering to create a sustainable wartime force-generation apparatus. This effort will support the Ukrainian military’s ability to restore and reconstitute existing units and to create new units.

The Kremlin is running an air and information operation to destroy Kharkiv City and create panic among Ukrainians, with the aim of causing mass displacement ahead of a potential Russian offensive. Russian propaganda is amplifying fears about a possible attack on Kharkiv to encourage Ukrainians to flee. ISW believes that the chance of a successful Russian ground offensive against Kharkiv is low, provided Ukraine receives the US military aid soon.

The US House passed a $60 billion supplemental appropriations bill for Ukraine on April 20, which the Senate approved on April 23 and President Biden signed on April 24. However, the logistics of sending US aid to the frontline in Ukraine could delay its impact for several weeks. This gap might allow Russian forces to intensify attacks, potentially worsening the frontline situation. Ukrainian forces may experience setbacks while waiting for the new US assistance, but if the aid arrives promptly, they should be able to stabilize the front and counter the current Russian offensive.

Russian forces are stabilizing their position northwest of Avdiivka and may make further tactical gains. This could prompt Ukrainian troops to retreat to a more defensible line before US military aid arrives. While Russian forces are likely to continue advancing in this area, these gains are unlikely to lead to a significant breakthrough or cause the collapse of Ukrainian defenses. Russian offensives in this sector are primarily seeking tactical opportunities, while the offensive toward Chasiv Yar offers greater potential for operationally significant advances.

Russian forces are focusing on three separate operational-level offensives, allowing them to concentrate their tactical efforts on one sector at a time. Ukrainian Commander-in-Chief Colonel General Oleksandr Syrskyi noted on April 13 that the situation in eastern Ukraine has worsened, with Russian mechanized attacks in the Lyman, Bakhmut, and Pokrovsk (west of Avdiivka) areas. Although the Russian efforts in Lyman, Chasiv Yar, and Pokrovsk each aim for significant objectives, they do not support one another, suggesting that Russian forces are shifting their focus among these operations rather than pursuing all three simultaneously. The push toward Chasiv Yar presents the most immediate potential for operational gains, as capturing the town could allow Russian forces to attack key cities within the Ukrainian defensive line in Donetsk Oblast. Seizing Chasiv Yar would open the path for Russian forces to strike directly at the southern "fortress" cities in the Ukrainian defensive belt.

• In a Briefing Room video on April 3, Russia Researcher Christina Harward detailed Russia’s plans to destabilize Moldova and prevent it from becoming a member of the European Union in a new episode of the ISW Briefing Room. 

• On April 11, Geospatial Researcher Noel Mikkelsen outlined the tactical and strategic significance of the fight for Chasiv Yar, a town situated about five kilometers west of Bakhmut, Russia’s objectives in the campaign, and Ukraine’s prepared defenses for the battle.

• On April 17, George Barros outlined the situation across the frontline in Ukraine, noting that Russian forces currently hold the initiative and can dictate the tempo, timing, and location of Russian offensive operations. 

China-Taiwan

CCP General Secretary Xi Jinping met with former ROC President Ma Ying-jeou on April 10 for the first time since 2015. The Xi-Ma meeting is consistent with a CCP effort to legitimize the Kuomintang (KMT) as its negotiating partner in Taiwan and to promote the Ma administration’s cross-strait policies as its preferred vision of cross-strait relations.

Xi Jinping praised “Mr. Ma” for upholding the “1992 Consensus,” opposing Taiwanese independence, and promoting the peaceful development of cross-strait relations and exchanges. Ma, no longer a Taiwanese government or party official, met with Xi informally, with the KMT's approval. During his trip, Ma asserted that Taiwanese people value Chinese culture and identity, emphasizing the need for peaceful dispute resolution.

Chinese Defense Minister Dong Jun and US Secretary of Defense Lloyd Austin held their first meeting since November 2022. Dong downplayed US concerns about the South China Sea, calling the situation "generally stable." The PRC had cut off military talks with the US after House Speaker Nancy Pelosi's August 2022 visit to Taiwan, agreeing to resume them after the November 2023 summit between President Joe Biden and Xi Jinping in San Francisco. The CCP often uses military exchanges as a bargaining chip to influence US actions.

Senior US officials stated that China is providing Russia with equipment to boost military production for the war in Ukraine. On April 12, they revealed that China is selling Russia machine tools, drone and turbojet engines, cruise missile technology, microelectronics, and nitrocellulose for ammunition. They also noted that Chinese and Russian entities are jointly developing drones in Russia and that China has given Russia satellite imagery that aided its war effort.

Middle East Security Project

Israel-Iran Strikes

Iran's Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps (IRGC) Aerospace Force launched a significant drone and missile attack on Israel from Iranian territory on April 13. This was the first direct attack from Iran on Israel, involving hundreds of drones, including Shahed-136 attack drones, along with cruise and ballistic missiles. The Iranian Supreme National Security Council approved the attack, which was supervised by the IRGC Aerospace Force and the Armed Forces General Staff. The IRGC announced the start of operation “True Promise,” with the attack occurring in at least three waves over several hours.

Several countries, including the United States, the United Kingdom, Israel, and Jordan, intercepted these drones and missiles outside of Israeli airspace. Israeli Defense Forces (IDF) spokesperson Brig. Gen. Daniel Hagari stated that Iran had launched over 200 drones and missiles toward Israel. The Iranian Permanent Mission to the United Nations indicated that the operation was in response to an April 1 Israeli airstrike targeting IRGC officials in Damascus.

Israel carried out airstrikes against an Artesh (Iran's conventional armed forces) Air Force base in Esfahan City, Iran, on April 18 in retaliation for Iran's April 13 drone and missile attack on Israel. Western and Israeli media reported that Israeli aircraft fired at least three missiles targeting an Artesh airbase in Esfahan from unspecified airspace outside Iran.

Satellite imagery from commercial firm Hawkeye360 indicated that the strike might have damaged an S-300PMU2 surface-to-air missile battery's target engagement radar. Iran received the S-300 system from Russia in 2016. Iranian state media and social media suggested that the target was the Eighth Shekari Artesh Air Force Base. A senior US official told ABC News that the strike hit an Artesh radar site that is part of the air defense system protecting the Natanz Nuclear Complex, Iran's primary uranium enrichment facility located about 170 kilometers north of Esfahan. The International Atomic Energy Agency and other sources confirmed that no Iranian nuclear facilities were damaged in the strike.

Israel-Hamas War

The Israeli Defense Forces (IDF) continued operations in the central Gaza Strip. The operations continue as the Israeli War Cabinet met on April 21 to discuss Israeli hostages in Gaza and ongoing ceasefire negotiations.

As of April 29, Hamas is considering a new Egyptian ceasefire proposal that involves releasing 20 to 33 living Israeli hostages. Egyptian officials presented the proposal to Hamas on April 26 after meetings in Egypt and Israel between Egyptian intelligence officials, the IDF chief of staff, and the head of Shin Bet.

Unnamed Israeli officials indicated that the proposal includes several Israeli concessions, such as discussing a "full return of displaced Palestinians to their homes in northern Gaza" and withdrawing the IDF from the Netzarim corridor, the only part of the Gaza Strip where Israeli forces are currently present.

The Israeli War Cabinet agreed to lower the number of hostages demanded because Hamas claimed it doesn't have 40 living hostages who are elderly, female, or injured. This adjustment came after some Israeli assessments suggested that some of the 40 hostages Israel originally demanded might have died in Hamas captivity. British Foreign Secretary David Cameron mentioned that the proposal could lead to the release of "thousands" of Palestinian prisoners. The proposal also includes a second phase focusing on a "period of sustained calm," but details of this are unclear. An anonymous Hamas official said on April 28 that Hamas had "no material problems with the current deal proposal."

We appreciate your continued support and enthusiasm for the Institute for the Study of War.

Best regards,

Adam Grace

ISW Media and Publishing Associate

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