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[ISW] 러시아 공세 캠페인 평가, 2024년 5월 25일

by Summa posted May 26, 2024
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Key Takeaways

주요 요점:

  • 우크라이나와 러시아 소식통은 우크라이나군이 하르키우 북부 오블라스트에서 점점 더 전술적 주도권을 놓고 경쟁하고 있으며, 러시아군이 이 지역에서 방어적인 작전을 수행하고 있다고 밝혔지만, 러시아군은 이 지역에서 공세 작전을 강화하기 전에 북부군을 보고된 계획된 최종 병력 수준에 가깝게 만들려고 시도할 가능성이 높습니다.
  • 러시아의 공세 작전이 조기에 시작된 것은 하르키우 북부 오블라스트에서 러시아의 성공을 훼손한 것으로 보입니다.
  • 러시아군은 러시아 영공에서의 보호 구역을 계속 활용하여 하르키우 시를 파괴적인 효과로 공격하고 있으며, 이는 도시를 탈주시키고 우크라이나인의 사기를 떨어뜨리기 위한 노력의 일환일 가능성이 높습니다.
  • 러시아의 전자전(EW) 역량은 우크라이나와 러시아가 기술적 공격-방어 경쟁을 계속하면서 2023년 우크라이나에서 일부 서방 무기 시스템의 효과에 영향을 미친 것으로 알려졌습니다.
  • 아나톨리 안토노프 주미 러시아 대사는 5월 25일 뉴스위크와의 인터뷰에서 우크라이나 대통령 볼로디미르 젤렌스키의 정통성을 단호하게 거부하고 평화 협상을 위한 러시아의 극대주의적 조건을 설명했습니다.
  • 러시아는 북한의 탄약 공급에 대한 대가로 북한의 국방 산업 기반(DIB)을 개발하는 데 도움을 줄 가능성이 높으며, 미국 관리들은 러시아가 북한에 군사 장비, 무기 또는 기술을 공급하고 있을 수 있다고 보고합니다.
  • 러시아군은 최근 도네츠크 시 근처에서 진격을 확인했습니다.
  • 러시아 국방부(MoD)는 2년 연속으로 연례 "육군 게임" 국제 대회를 취소했으며, 이에 따라 비판적인 러시아 초민족주의 밀블로거들 사이에서 축하 분위기가 조성되었습니다.
### 분류: 군사, 정치, 외교 ### 관련된 주요국가: 우크라이나, 러시아, 미국 ### 향후 전망: 러시아와 우크라이나 간의 전쟁은 장기화될 가능성이 높으며, 러시아는 우크라이나의 저항에 직면하여 점점 더 극단적인 조치를 취할 수 있습니다. 러시아는 또한 북한과의 관계를 강화하여 국제 사회의 제재를 우회하고 군사력을 강화하려고 할 수 있습니다.

[원문]

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Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment

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Riley Bailey, Christina Harward, Angelica Evans,

Grace Mappes, and Frederick W. Kagan


May 25, 2024, time 7:20pm ET 

Click here to see ISW's interactive map of the Russian invasion of Ukraine. This map is updated daily alongside the static maps present in this report.


Click here to see ISW’s 3D control-of-terrain topographic map of Ukraine. The use of a computer (not a mobile device) is strongly recommended for accessing this data-heavy tool.


Click here to access ISW’s archive of interactive time-lapse maps of the Russian invasion of Ukraine. These maps complement the static control-of-terrain maps that ISW produces daily by showing a dynamic frontline.

Ukrainian and Russian sources stated that Ukrainian forces are increasingly contesting the tactical initiative in northern Kharkiv Oblast and characterized Russian operations in the area as defensive, although Russian forces are likely attempting to bring the Northern Grouping of Forces up closer to its reported planned end strength before possibly intensifying offensive operations in the area. The Ukrainian General Staff reported on May 24 that Ukrainian forces are pushing Russian forces back from Ukrainian defenses in northern Kharkiv Oblast. Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky stated that Ukrainian forces established "combat control" over an unspecified section of the border where Russian forces had initially crossed into northern Kharkiv Oblast following the start of Russian offensive operations on May 10. A Ukrainian commander operating in the Lyptsi direction (north of Kharkiv City) stated that Ukrainian forces have completely stopped Russian offensive operations in the Strilecha-Hlyboke direction (north of Lyptsi) and that Ukrainian forces are now focused on regaining territory in the area. The commander stated that Ukrainian forces are successfully pushing Russian forces out of captured positions but that Russian forces are saturating the area with manpower and equipment to prevent Ukrainian forces from seizing the tactical initiative. A prominent Kremlin-affiliated milblogger claimed that Russian forces have partially transitioned to the defensive in northern Kharkiv Oblast after consolidating captured positions and are currently focused on destroying reserves that Ukrainian forces have concentrated near Kharkiv City. The milblogger assessed that Ukrainian forces would have to launch counterattacks in the area at the end of May 2024 to push Russian forces out of northern Kharkiv Oblast and that future Russian plans on this axis likely depend on the outcome of Ukrainian counterattacks. Russian forces launched their offensive operation into northern Kharkiv Oblast with limited manpower and have yet to commit significant reserves to the area, leading to a decreasing tempo of Russian advances and offensive operations. This decreasing tempo is likely presenting Ukrainian forces with tactical opportunities to counterattack, although Ukrainian forces are not yet conducting a limited counteroffensive operation that aims to push Russian forces completely out of northern Kharkiv Oblast.


The disparate Russian elements currently operating in northern Kharkiv Oblast and the Russian military's apparent hesitance to commit available reserves to fight suggests that Russian forces are likely attempting to bring the Northern Grouping of Forces up to its reported planned end strength before intensifying offensive operations and pursuing subsequent phases of the offensive operation in northern Kharkiv Oblast. Russian forces reportedly had roughly 35,000 personnel in the international border area as a part of the Northern Grouping of Forces when they started offensive operations on May 10, whereas Ukrainian sources had been indicating that the Russian military intends to concentrate a total of 50,000 to 70,000 personnel in the international border area. Russian forces likely launched the offensive operation in northern Kharkiv Oblast earlier than intended with an understrength force hoping to establish a foothold before the arrival of resumed US military aid to the front made that task more difficult. Ukrainian sources have identified elements of the 11th Army Corps [AC], 44th AC, and 6th Combined Arms Army [CAA] as the main elements of the Northern Grouping of Forces, and limited elements of these formations have participated in the offensive operation and have reportedly suffered significant casualties. Zelensky stated in an interview published on May 25 that Russian forces have suffered an eight-to-one casualty ratio in northern Kharkiv Oblast in the past two weeks, although these losses do not appear to have forced the Russian military to commit significant reserves from the 11th AC, 44th AC, or 6th CAA to sustain Russian offensive operations in the area.


Instead, Russian forces appear to be relying on limited elements of units that are part of various different force groupings in eastern Ukraine. Limited elements of the 47th Tank Division's 153rd Tank Regiment and 272nd Motorized Rifle Regiment (1st Guards Tank Army [GTA], Moscow Military District [MMD]) and limited elements of the 2nd Motorized Rifle Division's 1st Motorized Rifle Regiment (1st GTA, MMD) are reportedly operating near Vovchansk (northeast of Kharkiv City). Elements of the 47th Tank Division and the 2nd Motorized Rifle Division are currently heavily committed to intensified Russian offensive operations along the Kupyansk-Svatove line, and Ukrainian military observer Kostyantyn Mashovets previously reported that the Russian Western Grouping of Forces is "leasing" limited elements to the Northern Grouping of Forces. Elements of a battalion of the 98th Airborne (VDV) Division's 217th VDV Regiment are reportedly operating in a border area in Kursk Oblast, even though elements of the 217th VDV Regiment and other elements of the 98th VDV Division are participating in intensified assaults on Chasiv Yar's eastern outskirts. Russian forces have either been attacking with an understrength 217th VDV Regiment in the Chasiv Yar area for some time or have recently transferred a battalion of the regiment to the Northern Grouping of Forces.


Russian forces are likely holding back reserves of the 11th AC, 44th AC, and 6th CAA in order to establish the Northern Grouping at closer to its intended end strength. The Russian military command may be waiting to intensify offensive operations and pursue a second phase of the operation because its plans require a grouping of 50,000 to 70,000 personnel strong. Russian forces likely intend to launch the second phase of their offensive operation in northern Kharkiv Oblast following their intended seizure of Vovchansk, although positional fighting and possible Ukrainian counterattacks could require Russian forces to conduct another wave of intensified assaults in the area to complete the seizure of the settlement. Russian forces currently aim to establish a "buffer zone" in northern Kharkiv Oblast and advance to within tube artillery range of Kharkiv City, and it is unclear which goal a second phase of the operation will support or if Russian forces have a more ambitious operational objective in mind. The Northern Grouping of Forces, even at the upper limit of its reported end strength, will lack the necessary manpower needed to conduct a successful operation to envelop, encircle, or seize Kharkiv City.


Key Takeaways:


  • Ukrainian and Russian sources stated that Ukrainian forces are increasingly contesting the tactical initiative in northern Kharkiv Oblast and characterized Russian operations in the area as defensive, although Russian forces are likely attempting to bring the Northern Grouping of Forces up closer to its reported planned end strength before possibly intensifying offensive operations in the area.


  • The likely premature start of Russian offensive operations appears to have undermined Russian success in northern Kharkiv Oblast.


  • Russian forces continue to leverage their sanctuary in Russian airspace to strike Kharkiv City to devastating effect, likely as part of efforts to depopulate the city and demoralize Ukrainians.


  • Russian electronic warfare (EW) capabilities reportedly impacted the effectiveness of select Western weapon systems in Ukraine in 2023 as Ukraine and Russia continue to compete in a technical offense-defense race.


  • Russian Ambassador to the US Anatoly Antonov categorically rejected Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky's legitimacy and outlined Russia's maximalist conditions for peace negotiations during an interview with Newsweek on May 25.


  • Russia is likely helping North Korea develop its defense industrial base (DIB) in exchange for North Korean munitions supplies, and US officials reportedly assess that Russia may also be supplying North Korea with military equipment, weapons, or technology.


  • Russian forces recently made confirmed advances near Donetsk City.


  • The Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) has canceled its annual "Army Games" international competition for the second year in a row, prompting celebration among critical Russian ultranationalist milbloggers.


Click here to read the full assessment.

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ISW is a tax-exempt organization under section 501(c)(3) of the Internal Revenue Code. Donations are tax-deductible to the extent permitted by law.

The Institute for the Study of War (ISW) is a non-partisan, non-profit, public policy research organization. ISW advances an informed understanding of military affairs through reliable research, trusted analysis, and innovative education. We are committed to improving the nation's ability to execute military operations and respond to emerging threats in order to achieve US strategic objectives.



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