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[ISW] 러시아 공세 캠페인 평가, 2024년 6월 1일

by Summa posted Jun 02, 2024
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```html 우크라이나 전쟁 상황 요약

주요 요점:

  • 러시아군은 5월 31일 밤부터 6월 1일 새벽까지 우크라이나 에너지 인프라를 주요 타겟으로 대규모 드론 및 미사일 공격을 감행했습니다.
  • 미국이 우크라이나에 제공한 무기를 사용하여 러시아 영토 내 군사 목표물을 공격하는 것에 대한 미국의 제한에 대한 현재의 불명확성은 러시아가 우크라이나 북부 국경을 넘어 추가적인 공세를 시도하는 것을 억제할 수 있는 기회를 놓치고 있습니다.
  • 각 서방 국가 정부는 우크라이나가 서방에서 제공한 F-16 전투기를 앞으로 사용하는 것에 대해 서로 다른 정책을 규정하고 있습니다.
  • 우크라이나 대통령 볼로디미르 젤렌스키는 일부 우크라이나 예비 여단이 여전히 병력이 부족하다는 것을 인정하고 미국의 안보 지원이 느리게 도착하여 우크라이나가 예비군을 현재 진행 중인 방어 작전에 효과적으로 투입하는 것을 복잡하게 만들고 있다고 말했습니다.
  • 러시아군은 최근 쿠피얀스크, 차시브 야르, 아브디이프카 근처에서 약간 진격했습니다.
  • 러시아 법무부는 동원된 러시아 군인들의 친척들이 모여 친척들의 동원 해제를 요구하는 사회 운동인 "귀향" 사회 운동을 6월 1일에 "외국 요원"으로 지정했습니다.

분류:

  • 군사
  • 정치
  • 외교

관련된 주요 국가:

  • 우크라이나
  • 러시아
  • 미국

향후 전망:

  • 러시아는 우크라이나의 에너지 인프라를 계속 공격할 것으로 예상됩니다.
  • 미국과 우크라이나는 우크라이나가 러시아 영토 내 군사 목표물을 공격하는 것에 대한 제한에 대해 계속 논의할 것입니다.
  • 서방 국가들은 우크라이나에 대한 군사 지원을 계속할 것입니다.
  • 러시아와 우크라이나는 계속해서 영토를 놓고 싸울 것입니다.
```

[원문]

ISW Logo

Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment

Support ISW

Grace Mappes, Angelica Evans, Riley Bailey, Christina Harward, and Frederick W. Kagan


June 1, 2024, 6:00pm ET

Read "‘Ukraine Has Gone Through a Terrible Period’: A Q. and A. With Frederick and Kimberly Kagan," on The New York Times' website.

Click here to see ISW's interactive map of the Russian invasion of Ukraine. This map is updated daily alongside the static maps present in this report.


Click here to see ISW’s 3D control-of-terrain topographic map of Ukraine. The use of a computer (not a mobile device) is strongly recommended for accessing this data-heavy tool.


Click here to access ISW’s archive of interactive time-lapse maps of the Russian invasion of Ukraine. These maps complement the static control-of-terrain maps that ISW produces daily by showing a dynamic frontline.

Russian forces conducted a large-scale drone and missile strike mainly targeting Ukrainian energy infrastructure on the night of May 31 to June 1. Ukrainian Air Force Commander Lieutenant General Mykola Oleshchuk reported on June 1 that Russian forces launched 47 Shahed-136/131 drones and 53 missiles, including 35 Kh-101/555 cruise missiles from aircraft over the Caspian Sea, four Iskander-M ballistic missiles from occupied Crimea, an Iskander-K cruise missile from occupied Crimea, 10 Kalibr cruise missiles from the northeastern Black Sea, and three Kh-59/69 cruise missiles from aircraft over occupied Zaporizhia Oblast. Oleshchuk reported that Ukrainian forces destroyed 46 Shahed drones, 30 Kh-101/555 cruise missiles, the Iskander-K cruise missile, and four Kalibr cruise missiles, and noted that Russian forces have not abandoned their intentions of destroying Ukrainian fuel and energy infrastructure. Ukrainian Air Force Spokesperson Major Ilya Yevlash noted that Russian forces have recently intensified their combined drone and missile strikes against Ukraine and continue efforts to exhaust Ukraine's scarce air defense assets. Ukrainian Energy Minister Herman Halushchenko stated that Russian missiles struck energy facilities in Zaporizhia, Dnipropetrovsk, Donetsk, Kirovohrad, and Ivano-Frankivsk oblasts. Ukrainian state-owned hydroelectric power plant (HPP) regulator Ukrhydroenergo reported that Russian strikes critically damaged equipment at two unspecified HPPs, and Ukraine's largest private energy operator DTEK reported that Russian strikes seriously damaged two unspecified thermal power plants (TTP). Russian milbloggers claimed that Russian forces struck the Kremenchuk HPP in Kirovohrad Oblast, the Dnipro HPP in Zaporizhia Oblast, the Burshtyn TPP in Ivano-Frankivsk Oblast, and the Ladyzhyn TPP in Vinnytsia Oblast. Ukrainian officials also reported damage to civilian areas, critical infrastructure, and energy facilities in Kharkiv, Lviv, Vinnytsia, Odesa, and Kherson oblasts, and Zaporizhzhia City.


The current lack of clarity about US restrictions on Ukraine's use of US-provided weapons to strike military targets in Russian territory misses an opportunity to deter further Russian offensive efforts across the border into northern Ukraine. US National Security Council Director for Europe Michael Carpenter told the Voice of America in an interview published on May 31 that the US policy allowing Ukrainian forces to strike certain Russian military targets in Russia "applies to counter-fire capabilities that are deployed just across the [Ukrainian] border [into Russia]" and "is meant to enable Ukrainians to defend themselves against what would otherwise be a Russian sanctuary across the border." Responding to a question about whether this policy permits Ukrainian strikes with US-provided weapons across the border from Sumy Oblast, Carpenter responded vaguely "yes, across the border for Russian attacks that are coming across, where otherwise Russians would enjoy a relative sanctuary." Politico reported on May 31 citing two people close to the Ukrainian presidential administration that Ukrainian officials are frustrated that Ukrainian forces are "restricted to the border area in Kharkiv [Oblast]" when using US-provided weapons to strike Russian territory, however. Carpenter's comments and the Politico report together suggest there is ambiguity on what the US has explicitly authorized regarding these strikes amid signaling that the US is open to expanding these authorizations to other areas in Ukraine should Russian forces launch offensive operations elsewhere along the international border area.


This US ambiguity misses an opportunity to deter Russian preparations for offensive operations elsewhere across the border into northern Ukraine. Ukrainian officials have recently warned that Russian forces are also concentrating forces in Kursk and Bryansk oblasts across the border from Sumy Oblast, and ISW has previously assessed that even a limited grouping would achieve its desired effect of drawing and fixing Ukrainian forces to this area. The Kremlin may decide to launch offensive operations in different Ukrainian border oblasts outside of Kharkiv Oblast if it believes it can continue to mass forces across the border without risk of Ukrainian strikes. Ukrainian forces would be forced to defend against such offensive operations before the US grants explicit authorization necessary for cross-border strikes outside of areas bordering Kharkiv Oblast. The increased likelihood of other Russian offensive operations in northern Ukraine would require Ukrainian forces to reallocate existing resources to deter or defend against the offensive operations, creating opportunities for Russian forces elsewhere in the theater to exploit. US clarity that Ukraine can use US-provided weapons against Russian ground forces concentrations in Russia that appear to be preparing for imminent cross-border operations would likely change Russian commanders' calculations about the wisdom of making such ostentatious preparations. ISW continues to assess that the US should allow Ukraine to strike all legitimate military targets in Russia’s operational and deep rear with US-provided weapons. 


Key Takeaways:


  • Russian forces conducted a large-scale drone and missile strike mainly targeting Ukrainian energy infrastructure on the night of May 31 to June 1.


  • The current lack of clarity about US restrictions on Ukraine's use of US-provided weapons to strike military targets in Russian territory misses an opportunity to deter further Russian offensive efforts across the border into northern Ukraine.


  • Individual Western governments are stipulating disparate policies about Ukraine's future use of Western-supplied F-16 fighter jets.


  • Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky acknowledged that some Ukrainian reserve brigades remain understrength and stated that the slow arrival of US security assistance is complicating Ukrainian efforts to effectively commit reserves to ongoing defensive operations.


  • Russian forces recently marginally advanced near Kupyansk, Chasiv Yar, and Avdiivka.


  • The Russian Ministry of Justice designated the "Way Home" social movement, a movement of relatives of mobilized Russian servicemembers that has been calling for their relatives' demobilization, as a "foreign agent" on June 1.


Click here to read the full assessment.

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ISW is a tax-exempt organization under section 501(c)(3) of the Internal Revenue Code. Donations are tax-deductible to the extent permitted by law.

The Institute for the Study of War (ISW) is a non-partisan, non-profit, public policy research organization. ISW advances an informed understanding of military affairs through reliable research, trusted analysis, and innovative education. We are committed to improving the nation's ability to execute military operations and respond to emerging threats in order to achieve US strategic objectives.



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