Dear ISW readers,

Welcome to the May installment of The Intel Brief.

Each month, the ISW editorial team distills our research teams' reports and assessments of the war in Ukraine, the Chinese Communist Party's paths to controlling Taiwan and relevant cross–Taiwan Strait developments, and the security challenges in the Middle East to provide you with an understanding in brief of the past month's happenings across our research portfolios.

This Month's Highlights:

• Riley Bailey and Frederick W. Kagan wrote about how delays in Western aid provided Russia with the initiative on the battlefield.

• George Barros reported on the necessity of eliminating Russia’s safe haven — Russian territory — to defeat Russia's military operation in Kharkiv.

• ISW Non-Resident Russia Fellow Nataliya Bugayova testified before the Helsinki Commission (US Commission on Security and Cooperation in Europe) on May 16.

• House Foreign Affairs Committee Chair Michael McCaul displayed a posterized ISW–CTP map of Russian military and security services bases in the Russian Federation within the range of US weapons during his questioning of Secretary of State Antony Blinken on May 22 to call attention to the Biden administration’s policy of not allowing Ukraine to use US-supplied weapons to strike within Russian territory.

• French President Emmanuel Macron held up a map by Le Monde (Source: ISW and Liveuamap) during a press conference in Gransee, Germany, with German Chancellor Olaf Scholz on May 28 to illustrate the need for Ukraine's allies to lift restrictions on Ukraine using their weapons to strike within Russian territory.

In the Media

"The monthslong delay in U.S. military assistance allowed Russia to take the initiative and launch offensives across the theater...it is going to take a while for Ukraine to stabilize the lines and hold off the current and upcoming Russian offensives." Kim Kagan — NYT, May 30, 2024



"Sexual violence, ethnic cleansing, and mass executions are all part of the Russian playbook. We must wake up to what its victory would mean." — Karolina Hird, The Telegraph, May 31, 2024

“Ukraine may need to make difficult decisions due to slowness of US action and the dilemma that is now causing,” — George Barros, CNN, May 18, 2024



“Russians began using chemical attacks systematically in early 2023, said Kateryna Stepanenko, Russia analyst at Institute for the Study of War who has been tracking the tactic.” — WSJ, May 23, 2024

Ukraine

On May 10, Russian forces began limited offensive operations along the Russian-Ukrainian border in northern Kharkiv Oblast. They encountered intense Ukrainian resistance when advancing near southern settlements like Lyptsi and Vovchansk.

By May 25, Ukrainian and Russian sources reported that Ukrainian forces are increasingly contesting the tactical initiative in northern Kharkiv Oblast, describing Russian operations as defensive. Russian forces are likely trying to reinforce the Northern Grouping of Forces before intensifying their offensive.

The initial Russian offensive into northern Kharkiv Oblast involved limited manpower, with no significant reserves committed, leading to a slowdown in their advances. This slower pace is creating tactical opportunities for Ukrainian counterattacks, though a full-scale Ukrainian counteroffensive to expel Russian forces from the region has not yet begun.

ISW reported on May 26 that Western officials continued debating Ukraine's right to use Western-provided weapons to strike military targets in Russia. This debate persists amid Russian efforts to maintain Western self-imposed limitations and divide NATO.

ISW assesses that Western restrictions have created a safe zone in Russia's border area. From this sanctuary, Russian aircraft conduct glide bomb and missile strikes against Ukrainian positions, and Russian forces assemble freely before crossing into Ukraine.

Russian forces use this sanctuary to strike Kharkiv City, likely aiming to depopulate the city and demoralize Ukrainians. These strikes occur without fear of Ukrainian air defenses due to Western constraints on using Western-provided systems against Russian targets. As long as these prohibitions remain, Russian forces will likely continue their offensive operations in northern Kharkiv Oblast unchallenged.

Throughout May, officials within the Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) continued to be purged on allegations of corruption. On May 12, Russian President Vladimir Putin appointed Andrei Belousov as the new Minister of Defense, replacing Sergei Shoigu, who was moved to the position of Security Council Secretary, replacing Nikolai Patrushev. This shift is part of Putin's broader cabinet reshuffle aimed at improving efficiency within the Russian MoD and the Russian Defense Industrial Base. Shoigu's removal also paves the way for the departure of his affiliates from the MoD, likely an intended outcome of these changes.

• On May 15, Geospatial Analyst Daniel Mealie provided an update on Russia's offensive north of Kharkiv City.

• On May 31, Russia Team Lead George Barros explained why the United States should allow Ukraine to strike legitimate military targets deep in Russian territory to eliminate the sanctuary the Russian military has to attack Ukraine. 

China-Taiwan

The PRC launched two days of joint military exercises around Taiwan to "punish" it for President Lai Ching-te's election and his perceived separatist remarks in his inauguration speech. Analysts cited by PRC and ROC media suggest that the exercise's name, Joint Sword 2024A, indicates more exercises may follow this year.

On May 23, Taiwan’s Ministry of National Defense (MND) reported 49 People’s Liberation Army (PLA) aircraft around Taiwan, with 35 crossing the median line of the Taiwan Strait and entering the north, central, and southwest parts of Taiwan’s Air Defense Identification Zone (ADIZ). On May 24, the MND again reported 49 PLA aircraft, along with 19 PLAN vessels and 7 Chinese Coast Guard vessels, with 35 aircraft crossing the median line and entering Taiwan’s southwest ADIZ.

These exercises, which began three days after Lai's inauguration, aim to deter Taiwan's Democratic Progressive Party administration and external supporters from exerting the Republic of China's (Taiwan) sovereignty.

Separately, the PLA reported expelling the USS Halsey from waters around the Paracel Islands on May 10. According to a PLA Southern Theater Command military official, the PLA air and naval forces monitored, warned, and expelled the Halsey, which allegedly entered PRC "territorial waters" without permission.

Middle East Security Project

Iranian President Raisi Dies in Helicopter Crash

On May 19, Iranian President Ebrahim Raisi and Foreign Affairs Minister Hossein Amir Abdollahian, along with three other Iranian officials and a three-person crew, died when their helicopter crashed near Uzi, East Azerbaijan Province, Iran. This incident has significant implications for the succession of Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei, as Raisi was likely a leading contender.

Interim President Mohammad Mokhber appointed Ali Bagheri Kani as head of the administration's Foreign Relations Council on May 20, effectively making him the acting foreign affairs minister.

Following Raisi's death, the Iranian government scheduled a presidential election for June 28 to replace him. Political factions are preparing for this election, with reformist politicians, including former President Mohammad Khatami, calling for political diversity to boost voter turnout.

Israel–Hamas War

On May 7, Israeli forces launched a limited ground operation at the Rafah crossing between Egypt and the Gaza Strip, advancing into eastern Rafah. Despite the operation, Hamas is expected to survive due to its control over other Gaza territories.

Hamas defended against Israeli advances in eastern Rafah on May 10 with sophisticated attacks using thermobaric bombs and RPGs. The IDF continued operations on May 11 and 12, destroying Hamas tunnels and rocket launch sites. Palestinian militias, including Hamas, remained active, especially in northern Gaza. The IDF expanded operations in Rafah on May 18, destroying infrastructure and killing about 50 fighters.

By May 25, Israeli forces were moving "more deliberately" in Rafah. Israeli officers reported that the IDF is using "less airpower and artillery, and fewer, smaller bombs," which forces Israeli soldiers to clear urban areas on foot." An IDF airstrike on May 26 killed two Hamas officials but also resulted in civilian casualties. On May 27, Israeli and Egyptian forces exchanged fire at the Rafah border, resulting in the death of one Egyptian soldier.

The Netanyahu government seeks regional collaboration for post-war oversight in Gaza, involving the US, Egypt, Saudi Arabia, and the UAE, focusing on redevelopment and security. This plan, however, does not guarantee a sovereign Palestinian state, causing some rejection among Arab officials.

Iran’s Nuclear Program

The International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) has a declining understanding of Iran's nuclear ambitions, as highlighted in the IAEA Safeguards Implementation Report. Despite an 8% increase in inspections in Iran in 2023, the IAEA's knowledge of Iran’s centrifuge production, heavy water, and uranium ore concentration has worsened. IAEA Director General Rafael Grossi noted minimal progress on outstanding safeguards issues, making it difficult to assure the peaceful nature of Iran’s nuclear program. Additionally, Iran’s stockpile of 20% enriched uranium rose by 145 kilograms in the last quarter.

The Associated Press, citing a leaked IAEA safeguards implementations report, reported on May 27 that Iran possesses 142.1 kilograms of uranium enriched up to 60 percent. This amount marks a 20.6 kilogram (16.95 percent) increase in Iran’s stockpile of 60 percent enriched uranium since the IAEA published its last quarterly report in February 2024.

On May 13, during an Arab–Iranian dialogue conference, Kamal Kharrazi, Chairman of Iran’s Strategic Foreign Relations Council, suggested Iran might revise its nuclear doctrine if threatened by nuclear-armed countries.

A senior European diplomat told Reuters that Iran has neither slowed its nuclear program nor shown goodwill in cooperating with the IAEA, raising further international concern.

We appreciate your continued support and enthusiasm for the Institute for the Study of War.

Best regards,

Christopher Solomon

Production Manager and Editor

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