The Russian military command recently redeployed elements of at least one Russian airborne (VDV) regiment from western Zaporizhia Oblast in response to Ukraine’s incursion into Kursk Oblast, possibly in an effort to stabilize the lines and improve command and control (C2) over Russian conscripts. A Crimean occupation official, who had volunteered to fight as part of the Russian 56th VDV Regiment (7th VDV Division), claimed on August 19 that his platoon redeployed from the Robotyne and Verbove area in western Zaporizhia Oblast to “defend” Kursk Oblast. A Russian relative also claimed on Telegram that elements of the 1st Assault Company (56th VDV Regiment) began redeploying to unspecified area in Russia on August 15, and a Russian VDV-affiliated Telegram channel announced a crowdfunding effort on August 17 in support of elements of the 56th VDV Regiment that were reportedly already in Kursk Oblast. Elements of the 56th VDV Regiment have been operating in western Zaporizhia Oblast since at least Summer 2023. ISW has also observed proprietary, commercially-available data appearing to support reports of these redeployments. The Crimea-based Telegram channel Crimean Wind posted footage on August 22 of Russian military trucks reportedly transferring a “large amount of military equipment” from occupied Sevastopol and Perevalne, Crimea in the “northern direction.” OSINT analysts on X (formerly Twitter) observed tactical insignia on the trucks seen in Crimean Wind’s footage that reportedly belongs to the 56th VDV Regiment and analyzed other footage of Russian military equipment and trucks moving through Voronezh Oblast towards Kursk Oblast. A Russian milblogger also claimed on August 22 that elements of the 56th VDV “Brigade” were operating in Russkaya Konopelka (just east of Sudzha and 12km from the international border) alongside former Wagner Group elements before editing the post to claim that elements of the 11th VDV Brigade were operating in the area. Russian sources recently amplified footage purportedly showing elements of the 11th VDV Brigade allegedly leading conscripts out of an encirclement in an unspecified area in Kursk Oblast, and ISW observed elements of the 11th VDV Brigade operating in the Chasiv Yar direction in early July 2024.
The scale of the redeployment of the 56th VDV Regiment is unclear from available information in the open source, although this reported redeployment is consistent with ISW’s observation that Russia has been pulling forces from less critical sectors of the frontline such as western Zaporizhia and Kherson oblasts. The Russian military command notably redeployed elements of the Russian 810th Naval Infantry Brigade (Black Sea Fleet [BSF]) and elements of two unspecified VDV battalions from the Kherson direction to Kursk Oblast, and ISW has also observed claims that elements of the 810th Naval Infantry Brigade were operating near Vovchansk, Kharkiv Oblast in June 2024. The Russian military command generally regards VDV and naval infantry elements as “elite” forces (even though many Russian elite units have lost their eliteness over the course of the Russian full-scale invasion of Ukraine) and tends to deploy these forces to prioritized directions. The scale of such redeployments serves as a greater indicator of the Russian military’s prioritization, however. ISW continues to assess that Russian President Vladimir Putin and the Russian military will likely continue prioritizing Russian offensive operations in eastern Ukraine – namely in the Pokrovsk and Toretsk directions. The Ukrainian General Staff notably observed a decrease in Russian combat operations in western Zaporizhia and Kherson oblasts on August 22. The effects of redeploying elements of the 56th VDV Regiment and other elite elements from southern Ukraine will also depend on the scale of the redeployments. The Russian military command may be redeploying limited numbers of elite forces to improve C2 in Kursk Oblast and oversee inexperienced conscripts.
The Russian military command reportedly heavily committed elements initially intended for the Russian offensive effort in northern Kharkiv Oblast to the defense of Kursk Oblast. Russian opposition outlet Novaya Gazeta reported on August 19 that appeals from relatives on Russian social media, reports about missing soldiers, and OSINT assessments indicate that Russia has committed elements of the following units to fighting in Kursk Oblast: the 488th Motorized Rifle Regiment's 17th and 18th battalions (144th Motorized Rifle Division, 20th Combined Arms Army [CAA], Moscow Military District [MMD]), the 252nd Motorized Rifle Regiment (3rd Motorized Rifle Division, 20th CAA, MMD), the 102nd Motorized Rifle Regiment's 31st Battalion (150th Motorized Rifle Division, 8th CAA, SMD), the 9th Motorized Rifle Regiment (1st Donetsk People's Republic [DNR] Army Corps [AC]), the 143rd Motorized Rifle Regiment (127th Motorized Rifle Division, 5th CAA, Eastern Military District [EMD]), Chechen Akhmat Spetsnaz units, 810th Naval Infantry Brigade (Black Sea Fleet), 22nd Motorized Rifle Regiment (72nd Motorized Rifle Division, 44th AC, Leningrad Military District [LMD]), 25th Motorized Rifle Brigade (6th CAA, LMD), 200th Motorized Rifle Brigade (14th AC, LMD), Nizhnyi Novgorod’s "Kulibin" detachment, the DNR "Pyatnashka" Brigade, "Veterany" 60th Motorized Rifle Brigade's "Oleg Mamiev" 3rd reconnaissance and assault detachment and "Otvazhnye" assault squad (Russian Volunteer Corps), unspecified BARS volunteer formations, and the 5th Anti-Aircraft Missile Brigade (6th Air Defense Army). Novaya Gazeta noted that elements of the 22nd Motorized Rifle Regiment, "Veterany" 60th Motorized Rifle Brigade, and the 25th Motorized Rifle Brigade that were committed to Kursk Oblast were either recently deployed or about to deploy to Vovchansk (northeast of Kharkiv City). ISW has observed that significant redeployments of elements of the Northern Grouping of Forces (which is responsible for the Kharkiv direction) to Kursk Oblast suggest that the Russian military command has determined that disruption to the offensive operation in northern Kharkiv Oblast is a necessary sacrifice to appropriately respond to the Ukrainian incursion while avoiding redeployments from higher priority sectors of the frontline. The Ukrainian incursion into Kursk Oblast will continue to generate theater-wide operational pressures on Russian forces, and it is unlikely that the Russian military will be able to restrict significant disruptions to just the Northern Grouping of Forces particularly if and when it undertakes to expel Ukrainian forces from Kursk.
The Kremlin may be taking steps to address its border vulnerabilities amid the Ukrainian incursion into Kursk Oblast and following a series of unsuccessful long-term efforts to improve Russian border security. Russian President Vladimir Putin met with the heads of Bryansk, Kursk, and Belgorod oblasts and several Russian officials to discuss the updated socio-economic situation in Russia's oblasts bordering Ukraine on August 22 amid the larger-scale Ukrainian incursion into Kursk Oblast and more limited Ukrainian attacks into Belgorod and Bryansk oblasts. Bryansk Oblast Head Alexander Bogomaz reported during the meeting that the Bryansk government formed a territorial defense force during October 2023 on Putin's orders and that an unnamed Russian airborne forces (VDV) major general commands Bryansk Oblast's territorial defense forces. Bogomaz claimed that Rosgvardia recently provided light and heavy weapons for the forces and stated that Rosgvardia and the territorial defense forces are currently jointly patrolling the international border. Bogomaz asked Putin to consider financing regional territorial defense forces from the Russian federal budget in order to alleviate strain on regional budgets and incentivize participation in the territorial defense forces by offering regular wages to participants. Belgorod Oblast Head Vyacheslav Gladkov also expressed his support for this initiative, and a series of Kremlin officials, including Putin, insinuated that the Russian government will work to resolve the issue and provide federal funding for regional territorial defense forces.
Key Takeaways:
- The Russian military command recently redeployed elements of at least one Russian airborne (VDV) regiment from western Zaporizhia Oblast in response to Ukraine’s incursion into Kursk Oblast, possibly in an effort to stabilize the lines and improve command and control (C2) over Russian conscripts.
- The Russian military command reportedly heavily committed elements initially intended for the Russian offensive effort in northern Kharkiv Oblast to the defense of Kursk Oblast.
- The Kremlin may be taking steps to address its border vulnerabilities amid the Ukrainian incursion into Kursk Oblast and following a series of unsuccessful long-term efforts to improve Russian border security.
- Ukrainian forces marginally advanced throughout their salient in Kursk Oblast amid continued Russian efforts to stop these advances on August 22.
- Recent Russian advances in the Pokrovsk direction appear to have prompted Ukrainian withdrawals from limited positions southeast of Pokrovsk, and Russian forces have likely failed to achieve their apparent objective of tactically encircling Ukrainian forces in the area.
- The tempo of Russian aviation operations is reportedly decreasing throughout most of the theater, although this decreased tempo may be temporary, and its cause is unclear.
- Ukrainian forces conducted a series of successful strikes against targets in Volgograd Oblast and Krasnodar Krai on August 22.
- Russian forces recently advanced north of Siversk, within Chasiv Yar and southeast of Toretsk and Pokrovsk.
- Russian State Duma Committee on Information Policy Head Alexander Khinshtein stated on August 21 that the Russian Union of Journalists and Ministry of Digital Development submitted a bill to the Cabinet of Ministers proposing to grant veteran status to journalists who have worked in Ukraine, the "counter-terrorism operation" zone in Kursk Oblast, and other unspecified combat zones.
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[ISW] 이스라엘-하마스 전쟁(이란) 업데이트, 2024년 8월 23일
[ISW] 이스라엘-하마스 전쟁(이란) 업데이트, 2024년 8월 22일