Dear ISW readers,

Welcome to the February installment of The Intel Brief.

Each month, the ISW editorial team distills our research teams' reports and assessments of the war in Ukraine, the Chinese Communist Party's paths to controlling Taiwan and relevant cross–Taiwan Strait developments, and the security challenges in the Middle East to provide you with an understanding in brief of the past month's happenings across our research portfolios.

This Month's Highlights:

• Russia Deputy Team Lead Karolina Hird published a special report that breaks down how and why Russia is occupying Ukraine, where we've seen this occupation playbook before, and why it is critical to understand this conflict as a war for people, not just land.

• As misinformation continues to distort the reality of Russia’s unprovoked invasion of Ukraine, ISW released a fact sheet to combat common myths about US aid to Ukraine.



• A new report by Russia Team Analyst Riley Bailey explores how Russian forces are conducting a cohesive multi-axis offensive operation in pursuit of an operationally significant objective for nearly the first time in over a year and a half of campaigning in Ukraine.

Ukraine

Avdiivka

Russian forces captured Avdiivka in Donetsk Oblast — a Ukrainian stronghold that Russian forces have been trying to capture since 2014. On February 17, Russian Defense Minister Sergei Shoigu claimed that Russian forces have established “full control” over Avdiivka, Donetsk Oblast. Ukrainian officials indicated that Ukrainian forces inflicted heavy losses on Russian forces during the defense of and withdrawal from Avdiivka — the Ukrainian Tavriisk Group of Forces Press Service reported that Ukrainian forces inflicted losses of 20,018 personnel, 199 tanks, and 481 armored combat vehicles in the Tavriisk direction (from Avdiivka through western Zaporizhia Oblast) between January 1 and February 15, with the majority of those losses inflicted near Avdiivka. Russian sources largely characterized the Ukrainian withdrawal as disorganized and costly and claimed that Russian forces managed to encircle large Ukrainian groups in Avdiivka.

Russian forces appear to have temporarily established limited and localized air superiority and were able to provide ground troops with close air support during the final days of their offensive operation to capture Avdiivka, likely the first time that Russian forces have done so in Ukraine. Meanwhile, delays in Western security assistance may lead to further significant constraints on Ukrainian air defenses that could allow Russian forces to replicate the close air support that facilitated Russian advances in Avdiivka at scale in Ukraine.

Russian forces are unlikely to exploit their seizure of Aviidvka to achieve an operational breakthrough. Ukrainian forces will likely be able to establish new defensive lines not far beyond Avdiivka, which will likely prompt the culmination of the Russian offensive in this area. Available imagery, which ISW will not present or describe in greater detail at this time to preserve Ukrainian operational security, does not support claims that Ukrainian forces lack prepared defensive positions west of Avdiivka. The Ukrainian command also recently committed fresh units to the Avdiivka front to counterattack advancing Russian forces and provide an evacuation corridor for Ukrainian units withdrawing from Avdiivka. These newly committed units are likely able to establish and hold defensive positions against Russian forces, degraded by their assaults on the town, west of Avdiivka. Russian forces, which have suffered high personnel and equipment losses in seizing Avdiivka, will likely culminate when they come up against relatively fresher Ukrainian units manning prepared defensive positions.

Black Sea

On the night of January 31 to February 1, Ukrainian forces successfully struck and sank a Russian Black Sea Fleet (BSF) vessel in the Black Sea near occupied Crimea. The Ukrainian Main Military Intelligence Directorate (GUR) published footage on February 1 showing Ukrainian maritime drones striking the Ivanovets Tarantul-class corvette (41st Missile Boat Brigade) near Lake Donuzlav in occupied Crimea. On the night of February 13 to 14 Ukrainian forces successfully sank another Russian BSF landing ship — the Caesar Kunikov Ropucha-class landing ship — in the Black Sea off the southern coast of occupied Crimea. ISW continues to assess that successful Ukrainian strikes on BSF vessels and infrastructure have limited the BSF’s ability to operate in the western part of the Black Sea.

Ukraine has been defending itself against illegal Russian military intervention and aggression for 10 years. Russia’s grand strategic objective of regaining control of Ukraine has remained unchanged in the decade since its illegal intervention in Ukraine began. Russia’s overarching strategic objective in Ukraine, as first manifested in the 2014 invasion of Crimea and the Donbas, has been and remains the destruction of Ukraine’s sovereignty and the re-establishment of a pro-Russian Ukrainian government subservient to Moscow’s direction.

In a Briefing Room video on February 22, Russia Deputy Team Lead and Analyst Karolina Hird detailed her report, "The Kremlin's Occupation Playbook: Coerced Russification and Ethnic Cleansing in Occupied Ukraine."

China-Taiwan

The Legislative Yuan (LY) elected Kuomintang (KMT) legislature Han Kuo-yu speaker of the legislature on February 1. Han is a divisive figure in Taiwanese politics, notorious for his Beijing-friendly platform that contributed to popular dissatisfaction with his incumbency and subsequent removal from office as mayor of Kaohsiung in 2020. The KMT’s victory will strengthen its influence over policymaking during Lai Ching-te’s incoming administration and portends an acrimonious relationship between the KMT and the Democratic Progressive Party (DPP) during Lai’s presidency.

The Chinese Communist Party (CCP) is engaging in global cyberattacks to degrade regional countries’ capacity to engage in military action against the People's Republic of China (PRC) during a crisis. The cyberattacks could also facilitate actions against individuals who oppose the CCP. US and foreign partner cybersecurity and intelligence agencies confirmed in a joint advisory on February 7 that a PRC state-sponsored cyber threat actor known as Volt Typhoon infiltrated critical infrastructure organizations in the continental United States and US territories. The authoring agencies assessed with high confidence that Volt Typhoon’s goal was to develop the capability to disrupt key operational technology functions in the event of a conflict with the United States by leveraging its access to informational technology environments.

A February 13 report from the US security firm Trellix also shows a significant increase in cyberattacks against Taiwan during the 24 hours before its January 13 presidential election. The report stated that the cyberattacks targeted a myriad of institutions, such as governmental offices, police departments, and finance entities. Trellix is reviewing the data but posited that PRC threat actors may have been responsible.

Eight PRC high-altitude balloons that crossed the median line in the Taiwan Strait two days in a row on February 9 and 10 are likely part of a campaign to test and erode Taiwan’s military readiness. At least two of the eight balloons on February 9 and at least six of the eight balloons on February 10 flew directly over the island of Taiwan. Eight balloons crossing the median line in the Taiwan Strait in one day is a record high since Taiwan’s Ministry of National Defense (MND) started publicly tracking such balloons in December 2023. The spike in the number of balloons passing over the median line on February 9 and 10 coincided with the beginning of the Lunar New Year celebrations in Taiwan and the PRC. The CCP may be using increased balloon incursions during the holiday to further strain Taiwan’s resources.

The Chinese Coast Guard (CCG) began conducting regular maritime inspections around Taiwan-controlled Kinmen Island on February 19. Normalizing PRC maritime enforcement around the island will erode Taiwan’s control over its territorial waters and risk confrontations between the PRC and Taiwan’s maritime law enforcement. An incident on February 14 that resulted in the death of two PRC nationals prompted the CCG to defy Taiwan’s sovereignty in the waters around its outer islands.

Middle East Security Project

Yemen Air Strikes

The United States and the United Kingdom conducted strikes targeting 36 Houthi military positions and assets in 13 locations across Houthi-controlled territory in Yemen on February 3. US Central Command launched subsequent preemptive strikes targeting Houthi positions throughout February as Houthi attacks continued.

The Houthi movement launched an anti-ship ballistic missile that struck and disabled the UK-owned, Belize-flagged Rubymar cargo ship in the Bab al Mandeb strait on February 18. This incident marks the first time that a crew has had to abandon ship after a Houthi attack since Houthi attacks began during this round of escalation on November 19.

Houthi leader Abdulmalik al Houthi stated on February 22 that the group will “escalate” its operations targeting shipping around the Red Sea. Abdulmalik added that the group would introduce "submarine weapons,” likely referring to subsurface one-way naval attack drones, but gave no further details. Iranian military advisers are providing targeting intelligence to support the Houthis’ attacks targeting US naval vessels.

Israel–Hamas War

Israeli War Cabinet Minster Benny Gantz said Israeli forces will enter Rafah at the start of Ramadan if Hamas does not release the remaining Israeli hostages the group holds. Ramadan is expected to begin on March 10, 2024. Israeli officials have committed to minimizing civilian casualties in operations in Rafah, but they have not publicly outlined a plan for how the IDF would evacuate civilians from Rafah. Israel’s partners and allies, including the United States, have refused to support a Rafah operation without a plan in place to protect civilians. The IDF Chief of Staff stated on February 13 that Rafah contains an estimated 10,000 Hamas fighters and over a million displaced Palestinian civilians. Netanyahu said on February 17 that the IDF would enter Rafah to destroy the remaining Hamas battalions even if a hostage deal is achieved. The Israeli Defense Minister said on February 16 that Israel would not evacuate Rafah’s civilian population into Egypt.

Iran

The United States struck over 85 Iranian Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps Quds Force and Iranian-backed militia targets in Iraq and Syria on February 2. The strikes targeted operations and intelligence centers, rockets, missiles, drone storage facilities, and “logistics and munition supply chain facilities” of the IRGC and Iranian-backed militia groups. US President Joe Biden called these strikes the beginning of the US response to the January 28 Iranian-backed attack in Jordan that killed three US servicemembers. He vowed that the response will “continue at times and places of our choosing.”

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Best regards,

Adam Grace

ISW Media and Publishing Associate

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