Hayat Tahrir al Sham (HTS) and its allies are contending with locally-organized cells of fighters in western Syria. HTS’s response to the current violence is fueling accusations of sectarianism and arbitrary targeting, which could in turn trigger further violence. HTS has launched a series of raids targeting former Assad regime members in northwestern Syria but has faced resistance in former Assad strongholds. Unspecified Syrian opposition fighters continue to target the Alawite community fueling distrust and accusations that arrests conducted by the HTS-led security forces are driven by sectarianism and not in pursuit of justice for crimes committed under the former regime. CTP-ISW cannot verify the vast majority of these attacks, but the informational effect generated by the rumors of ethnically- or sectarian-motivated attacks could still drive a cycle of violence between minority communities and the HTS-led coalition, which is predominantly but not solely Sunni Arab. The HTS-led government has attempted to assuage concerns and reassure the Alawite community that it intends to protect the rights of minorities but has taken few concrete steps to do so.
HTS-led forces launched large-scale clearing operations on December 28 in northwestern Syria targeting former Assad regime members. Clearing operations imply that HTS is operating against at least a locally organized force, even if independent cells of former regime members are not communicating with one another at this time. Military or internal security efforts against unorganized opposition would constitute policing actions, which these clearing operations are not. Clearing operations imply the existence of an at least minimally organized enemy. Syrian and Syrian state media reported that HTS-led forces deployed to Baniyas, about halfway between the Russian-controlled Hmeimim Air Base and Tartous Naval Port, and Sett Markho, approximately 20 kilometers north of Hmeimim Air Base. HTS-led forces arrested an unspecified number of former Assad regime military members and seized weapons and ammunition in Sett Markho. Syrian journalists reported that HTS-led forces have also launched air support from Istamo Air Base approximately 6.5 kilometers north of Hmeimim to support clearing operations targeting former Assad regime officials in the area. A Kremlin-affiliated Russian milblogger posted imagery and video on December 28 reportedly showing HTS-led forces present on the perimeter of the Hmeimim air base.
The US-backed, Kurdish-controlled Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF) reportedly continued to advance into Turkish-backed Syrian National Army (SNA)-controlled territory east of Manbij, northern Syria, on December 28. The SDF reportedly claimed that it seized the towns of Tal al Arsh and Halawla west of the Tishreen Dam. The SDF has engaged the SNA west of the Tishreen Dam in recent days and appears to have solidified control over the dam. The SDF claimed on December 28 that it killed 17 SNA fighters in clashes near the dam. Geolocated imagery posted on December 27 showed the SDF conducting a drone strike targeting SNA fighters and vehicles near Abu Qalqal, northwest of the Tishreen Dam.
The SDF reportedly claimed on December 28 that it seized three towns along the Euphrates River between the Tishreen Dam and the Qara Qozak Bridge. CTP-ISW cannot independently verify this claim. The SDF likely intends to threaten the SNA’s rear in the Qara Qozak area by expanding the bridgehead, if these advances are accurate. Geolocated imagery posted on December 28 showed the SDF conducting a drone strike targeting SNA excavators west of the Qara Qozak Bridge.
Geolocated imagery posted on December 28 showed the SDF conducting drone strikes targeting SNA positions at the Khafsah water treatment plant south of the Tishreen Dam. The SDF and SNA have fought near the plant in recent days, which has limited the plant’s ability to operate. The Khafsah water treatment plant is critical for providing water to residents in Aleppo City.
Key Takeaways:
- Conflict in Syria: Hayat Tahrir al Sham (HTS) and its allies are contending with locally-organized cells of fighters in western Syria. HTS’s response to the current violence is fueling accusations of sectarianism and arbitrary targeting, which could in turn trigger further violence. CTP-ISW cannot verify the vast majority of these attacks, but the informational effect generated by the rumors of ethnically- or sectarian-motivated attacks could still drive a cycle of violence between minority communities and the HTS-led coalition, which is predominantly but not solely Sunni Arab.
- SDF Operations Along the Euphrates: The SDF reportedly claimed on December 28 that it seized three towns along the Euphrates River between the Tishreen Dam and the Qara Qozak Bridge. CTP-ISW cannot independently verify this claim. The SDF likely intends to threaten the SNA’s rear in the Qara Qozak area by expanding the bridgehead, if these advances are accurate.
- SDF-Government Clashes in Aleppo: Arab media and pro-Kurdish social media accounts amplified competing narratives after likely SDF-affiliated Kurdish fighters in northern Aleppo City killed two pro-interim government fighters. These competing claims between anti-SDF and pro-Kurdish media come as the SDF attempts to negotiate with HTS to confirm the status of the SDF and Kurdish minority in the future Syrian state. CTP-ISW cannot adjudicate these competing claims, but it is noteworthy that these narratives are being injected into the information space as the SDF attempts to negotiate with the interim Syrian government.
- Iraq: Iraqi Defense Minister Thabet al Abasi inspected Iraqi army units and border police at Rabia border crossing, along the Syria-Iraq border, on December 28.
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[ISW] 러시아 공세 캠페인 평가, 2024년 12월 29일
[ISW] 러시아 공세 캠페인 평가, 2024년 12월 28일