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[ISW] 러시아의 공세 캠페인 평가, 2024년 6월 18일

by Summa posted Jun 19, 2024
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Key Takeaways

주요 요점:

  • 러시아 대통령 블라디미르 푸틴은 북한 방문 전날 북한 국영 신문인 로동신문에 기사를 게재하여 러시아-북한 협력을 칭찬했습니다. 이는 북한이 러시아에 제공할 미래의 지원을 서방과의 공동 투쟁의 일환으로 규정할 가능성이 높습니다.
  • 우크라이나군은 6월 17일부터 18일까지 로스토프주와 크라스노다르 지방의 러시아 석유 저장소를 공격했습니다. 러시아 영토 내 지상 목표물에 국산 넵튠 미사일을 두 번째로 사용했습니다.
  • 우크라이나군은 현재 미국이 제공한 ATACMS의 사거리 내에 있지만 미국 정책에 의해 보호되는 러시아 영토 내 지역에 넵튠 미사일로 두 번 공격했습니다. 이 정책은 러시아 영토에 광대한 성역을 설정했습니다.
  • 러시아 정부는 우크라이나 군인과 군 관계자들을 결석 재판으로 기소하여 관할권 밖에서 러시아 연방법을 시행하고 우크라이나가 독립 국가로 존재해서는 안 된다는 것을 암시하려 하고 있습니다.
  • 크렘린과 연결된 Rybar Telegram 채널의 설립자 미하일 즈빈추크는 한 달 만에 두 번째로 이례적으로 공개 인터뷰를 했습니다. 그는 우크라이나에서 러시아의 전쟁 노력 상태를 비판하고 서방의 제재가 러시아의 산업과 경제에 부정적인 영향을 미치고 있음을 인정했습니다.
  • 러시아군은 최근 보브찬스크, 스바토베, 아브디이프카 근처에서 약간 진격했습니다.
  • 러시아 대통령 블라디미르 푸틴은 크렘린의 "영웅의 시간" 프로그램을 통해 러시아 군인을 러시아 정부의 직책에 배치하기 위한 노력을 계속하고 있습니다.
  • 러시아 점령 당국은 점령된 우크라이나에서 우크라이나 청소년을 군사화하려는 노력을 계속하고 있습니다.
### 분류: 군사, 정치 ### 관련된 주요국가: 러시아, 우크라이나, 북한 ### 향후 전망: 러시아와 우크라이나 간의 전쟁은 계속될 것으로 예상되며, 러시아는 우크라이나에 대한 군사적 압력을 계속 가할 것으로 보입니다. 또한, 러시아는 북한과의 관계를 강화하여 서방에 대항하려 할 것으로 예상됩니다.

[원문]

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Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment

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Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, June 18, 2024


Angelica Evans, Grace Mappes, Nicole Wolkov, Kateryna Stepanenko, and George Barros

Click here to see ISW's interactive map of the Russian invasion of Ukraine. This map is updated daily alongside the static maps present in this report.


Click here to see ISW’s 3D control-of-terrain topographic map of Ukraine. The use of a computer (not a mobile device) is strongly recommended for accessing this data-heavy tool.


Click here to access ISW’s archive of interactive time-lapse maps of the Russian invasion of Ukraine. These maps complement the static control-of-terrain maps that ISW produces daily by showing a dynamic frontline.

Russian President Vladimir Putin published an article in North Korean state-owned newspaper Rodong Sinmun praising Russian–North Korean cooperation on the eve of his visit to North Korea, likely to frame any future support that North Korea will lend to Russia as part of a common struggle against the West. Putin invoked the history of the Soviet Union's support for North Korea during and following the Korean War in his June 18 article and noted that the Soviet Union was the first country to establish diplomatic relations with North Korea. Putin claimed that the Soviet Union's support helped North Korea strengthen its economy and establish a peaceful society following the Korean War and thanked North Korea for its support of Russia's invasion of Ukraine. Putin praised Kim Jong-Un's dedication to his father's and grandfather's legacies and praised Pyongyang as a "staunch like-minded" nation who is standing with Russia in opposition to the collective West. Putin reaffirmed Russia’s support for North Korea’s struggle against its enemy — the United States. Putin also implied that Western states are common adversaries of Russia and North Korea. Putin noted that Russia, like North Korea, maintains its strong economy and independence despite Western sanctions and praised North Korea's long-term struggle against the West. Putin claimed that the West has refused peace offers from both leaders, although both leaders appear averse to serious, good-faith peace negotiations. Putin stated that Russia and North Korea will cooperate to develop a security architecture for Eurasia and expressed hope that their bilateral relations will continue to deepen. Putin's intentional appeal to known propaganda narratives about the legacies of the Kim regime, the Korean War, and North Korea's historical struggle against the US and the West is likely setting conditions for Putin to justify his future requests or demands of the North Korean people in support of Russia's war effort in Ukraine. Putin's visit to North Korea is also a significant goodwill gesture towards Kim Jong-Un as the visit helps legitimize Kim's pariah regime both domestically and abroad. Foreign heads of state rarely visit North Korea, and Putin last visited North Korea in 2000. Putin may be using this visit as flattery to assist in extracting additional aid from North Korea in the future, which may range from additional requests for weapon supplies or even manpower; for example, reports in 2022 suggested that North Korea was considering sending North Korean workers to Russian-occupied Ukraine to help with reconstruction efforts.


Select Western officials warned about the dangers of greater cooperation between global authoritarian regimes on June 17 in response to Putin's visit to North Korea. NATO Secretary General Jens Stoltenberg stated on June 17 that Russia's growing alignment with its "authoritarian friends" is making it "even more important" for NATO countries to work with their partners in the Indo-Pacific region and condemned the People's Republic of China’s (PRC) and North Korea's support for Russia's war effort. US National Security Spokesperson John Kirby stated during a press conference that the US is alarmed by deepening Russian–North Korean relations due to both the consequences in Ukraine and the security of the Korean peninsula. Kirby stated that the US is carefully monitoring the development of Russian–North Korea relations.


Key Takeaways:


  • Russian President Vladimir Putin published an article in North Korean state-owned newspaper Rodong Sinmun praising Russian–North Korean cooperation on the eve of his visit to North Korea, likely to frame any future support that North Korea will lend to Russia as part of a common struggle against the West.


  • Ukrainian forces struck Russian oil depots in Rostov Oblast and Krasnodar Krai overnight on June 17 to 18, using domestically produced Neptune missiles against a ground target in Russia for the second time.


  • Ukrainian forces have now conducted two strikes with its own Neptune missiles against areas in Russian territory that are within range of US-provided ATACMS but that are also protected by US policy that has established a vast sanctuary in Russian territory.


  • The Russian government is charging Ukrainian servicemen and military officials with crimes in absentia as part of its efforts to enforce Russian federal law outside of its jurisdiction and insinuate that Ukraine should not exist as an independent state.


  • Founder of the Kremlin-linked Rybar Telegram Channel, Mikhail Zvinchuk, gave his second uncharacteristically public interview within a month in which he criticized the state of Russia's war effort in Ukraine and acknowledged that Western sanctions are negatively affecting Russia's industry and economy.


  • Russian forces recently marginally advanced near Vovchansk, Svatove, and Avdiivka.


  • Russian President Vladimir Putin continues efforts to groom Russian military personnel for positions in the Russian government through the Kremlin's "Time of Heroes" program.


  • Russian occupation officials continue their efforts to militarize Ukrainian youth in occupied Ukraine.

Click here to read the full assessment.

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