Ashka Jhaveri, Kathryn Tyson, Kelly Campa, Annika Ganzeveld, Andie Parry, Katherine Wells, and Brian Carter

Information Cutoff: 2:00pm ET

Hamas is preserving its forces in Rafah rather than engaging the Israel Defense Forces (IDF), likely because Hamas does not believe Israel’s Rafah operation will be decisive. Israeli journalists traveling with the Israel Defense Forces (IDF) in Rafah reported that Hamas fighters are avoiding becoming decisively engaged, and that Hamas’ fighters have instead remotely detonated houses that were rigged to explode prior to the arrival of Israeli forces in the area.[ The IDF has found few Palestinian fighters above ground, with the majority of Hamas fighters remaining in Hamas’ tunnel system underneath Rafah. Israeli journalists added that an unspecified number of Hamas fighters fled north to Khan Younis and Mawasiresence. Israeli forces have killed 550 Palestinian fighters out of an estimated 2,000 fighters, a low number compared to fighting in other areas of the Gaza Strip. Hamas’ leaders have believed since at least February 2024 that a Rafah operation would fail to destroy its military forces and assess that Hamas is winning the war. Hamas aims to preserve its military capabilities by relocating to safer areas, which maintains the group’s long-term viability and avoids committing to a decisive battle with the IDF in Rafah. The Israeli journalists in Rafah said that Israeli forces are currently considering the Philadelphi Corridor, which the IDF seized, as a long-term asset. Israeli officials expect that controlling the Philadelphi Corridor will prevent Hamas from importing weapons into the Gaza Strip, as the IDF’s presence cuts off Hamas’ smuggling routes.

Hamas’ Rafah Brigade would presumably become decisively engaged with Israeli forces if Hamas believed the Rafah operation would destroy Hamas’ military organization. Hamas’ units would defend Rafah if they believed that a successful Israeli operation in Rafah would destroy Hamas. The use of prepared explosively rigged buildings and tunnels suggests that Hamas’ units in Rafah prepared to preserve their strength by avoiding direct engagements. The movement of Hamas’ unit northwards towards Khan Younis and elsewhere allows Rafah units to supplement Khan Younis units and accelerate their reorganization and reconstitution to continue operations against the IDF in the future. Remaining in Rafah would have almost certainly led to the degradation of Hamas units, possibly rendering some combat ineffective and requiring a lengthier reconstitution process.

Key Takeaways:

• Rafah: Hamas is preserving its forces in Rafah rather than engaging the Israel Defense Forces (IDF), likely because Hamas does not believe Israel’s Rafah operation will be decisive. Hamas’ Rafah Brigade would presumably become decisively engaged with Israeli forces if Hamas believed the Rafah operation would destroy Hamas’ military organization.

• Gaza Strip: An IDF commander said that the IDF determines if a Hamas battalion is “dismantled” by assessing whether the IDF has destroyed tunnel systems.

• Iranian Presidential Election: Iranian reformist presidential candidate Masoud Pezeshkian is continuing to struggle to consolidate support among Iranian youth ahead of the June 28 election.

• Northern Israeli Border: The IDF on June 18 approved operational plans for a possible military offensive into Lebanon. The Israeli government has not approved an operation into Lebanon.

• Hezbollah: Hezbollah leader Hassan Nasrallah threatened to strike against Israel’s economy and civilian positions in the event of a war. Nasrallah suggested that Hezbollah has internalized some lessons derived from the April 13 Iranian drone and missile attack on Israel.

• Iranian Nuclear Program: Iran notified the IAEA that it will install 1,400 new centrifuges at Fordow, which has the capacity to produce nearly 320 pounds of weapons-grade uranium within one month of being installed. 

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ISW–CTP has launched an interactive map of Israeli ground operations to accompany our daily campaign assessments of the Israel–Hamas war. This product complements the daily static maps that ISW-CTP produces with high-fidelity and, where possible, street-level assessments of the war in Israel.

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