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[ISW] 러시아 공세 캠페인 평가, 2024년 6월 26일

by Summa posted Jun 28, 2024
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```html 요약

요약

  • 6월 23일 다게스탄 공화국에서 이슬람 국가(IS) 계열 위라야트 카프카스가 테러 공격을 감행하면서 러시아 정보권에서는 북코카서스에서 추가 공격과 불안정이 우려되고 있다.
  • 6월 23일 다게스탄에서 발생한 테러 공격으로 체첸 공화국 수장인 람잔 카디로프는 북코카서스를 종교적 극단주의로부터 보호할 수 있는 무자비한 독재자로서의 이미지를 강화했다.
  • 북한은 이르면 2024년 7월에 점령된 도네츠크주에서 "재건 작업"에 참여하기 위해 군 건설 및 공병대를 파견할 예정이라고 한다.
  • 러시아 외무장관 세르게이 라브로프는 러시아가 우크라이나군이 이미 점령한 우크라이나 영토를 넘어서는 우크라이나 영토 양보로 이어지지 않는 어떠한 협상에도 관심이 없다고 거듭 강조했다.
  • 새로운 러시아 국방장관 안드레이 벨로우소프는 6월 26일 로이드 오스틴 미국 국방장관과의 첫 번째 통화에서 서방의 의사 결정을 표적으로 삼은 러시아의 반사적 통제 캠페인의 일환으로 우크라이나 지원을 중단하도록 미국을 강요하기 위한 표준적인 러시아 위협을 되풀이했다.
  • 러시아와 우크라이나는 6월 25일 유엔(UN)이 러시아의 포로 학대를 지속적으로 보고하는 가운데 일대일 포로 교환을 통해 각각 90명의 전쟁 포로(POW)를 교환했다.
  • 러시아와 이란은 러시아와 중국(PRC) 간의 러시아 가스 공급에 대한 의견 불일치가 보도된 후 6월 26일 러시아 가스를 이란에 공급하는 것에 대한 양해각서에 서명했다.
  • 우크라이나의 심각한 대공 미사일 부족은 우크라이나가 러시아의 공격으로부터 중요한 인프라를 보호하는 것을 방해하고 있다.
  • 러시아군은 최근 쿠피얀스크 근처에서 약간 진격했다.
  • 왕립연합군사연구소(RUSI)는 6월 26일 보고서를 발표하여 2023년 러시아의 군사 장비 및 무기 생산이 크게 증가했다고 밝혔다.

분류: 군사, 정치 관련된 주요국가: 러시아, 우크라이나, 북한 향후 전망: 러시아는 우크라이나에서의 군사 작전을 계속할 것이며, 우크라이나는 서방의 지원을 받아 저항을 계속할 것이다. 러시아와 우크라이나 간의 전쟁은 장기화될 가능성이 높다.
```

[원문]

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Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment

Support ISW

Riley Bailey, Grace Mappes, Angelica Evans, Karolina Hird, and Frederick W. Kagan


June 26, 2024, 7pm ET

Click here to see ISW's interactive map of the Russian invasion of Ukraine. This map is updated daily alongside the static maps present in this report.


Click here to see ISW’s 3D control-of-terrain topographic map of Ukraine. The use of a computer (not a mobile device) is strongly recommended for accessing this data-heavy tool.


Click here to access ISW’s archive of interactive time-lapse maps of the Russian invasion of Ukraine. These maps complement the static control-of-terrain maps that ISW produces daily by showing a dynamic frontline.

The likely Islamic State (IS) affiliate Wilayat Kavkaz terrorist attacks in the Republic of Dagestan on June 23 have increased fears within the Russian information space about further attacks and instability in the North Caucasus. Russian sources, including prominent Kremlin-affiliated milbloggers and Russian opposition media, amplified reports of two armed men firing on police in Makhachkala on the evening of June 25 and amplified footage of the alleged gunmen and gunfire in the area. Kremlin newswire TASS reported that police deployed to central Makhachkala and cordoned off select areas, but Dagestan's Ministry of Internal Affairs (MVD) stated that it did not introduce an "interception" plan to apprehend the alleged gunmen. Dagestan's MVD reported on June 25 that police received reports about an armed man in central Makhachkala but that the reports were false and that there were no violations of public order in the city. Many Russian sources amended their earlier reports to label the shooting as fake and claimed that the footage was from the June 23 terrorist attacks and not the evening of June 25. The apparent widespread misreporting of the shooting and the relatively heavy police response to the false reports suggests heightened fear and expectations in the Russian information space that there will be further terrorist attacks in the North Caucasus.


The Kremlin is attempting to maintain a veneer of stability and normalcy in response to the Dagestan terror attack and posture Russia's alleged multiethnic and multi-religious unity but is likely so far failing to reassure the public that there will not be further attacks. The March 2024 Crocus City Hall terrorist attack in Moscow and increasingly frequent Russian counterterrorism operations in the North Caucasus have previously prompted tensions within the Russian information space, exacerbated by calls for increased controls on migration to Russia, appeals to Russia's multiethnic and multi-religious makeup, and outright xenophobia and racism. The Kremlin has struggled to balance its appeals to anti-migrant Russian ultranationalists, its reliance on recruiting migrants for its war effort in Ukraine, and its need for migration to address labor shortages within Russia. Heightened fears about religious extremism will further complicate the Kremlin's efforts to balance between these competing priorities. A Russian insider source directly commented on this nexus in response to the Dagestan attacks and claimed that Dagestan's force generation efforts caused practitioners at a government-friendly mosque to turn to a more radical mosque with alleged Wahhabi connections. ISW has previously assessed that Russian force generation efforts and Russian ultranationalist rhetoric are alienating minority and Muslim-majority communities and generating animosities that Salafi-Jihadi groups can exploit in recruitment efforts.


The June 23 terrorist attacks in Dagestan also prompted Chechen Republic Head Ramzan Kadyrov to double down on his image as a ruthless autocratic strongman capable of protecting the North Caucasus from religious extremism. Kadyrov held a meeting with Chechen law enforcement agencies on June 25 in connection with the Dagestan attacks and called on Chechens to be especially vigilant and prevent their relatives from succumbing to religious extremism. Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty’s North Caucasus service Kavkaz Realii reported that Kadyrov stated in Chechen that Chechen authorities would kill the relatives of those suspected of Wahhabism in a "blood feud." Kadyrov has routinely threatened the family members of those he deems a threat to his control over Chechnya. Kadyrov appears to be attuned to heightened Russian fears about further attacks and is posturing himself as an attentive and ruthless strongman who can prevent instability in the North Caucasus. Kadyrov invoked the memory of the Chechen wars of the 1990s and 2000s and claimed that his father, Akhmad, and Russian President Vladimir Putin prevented "international" efforts to use Chechnya to destroy Russia. Akhmad Kadyrov supported Russian forces in the Second Chechen War (1999–2002), in which the Russian military brought Chechen separatism to heel through excessive force including the almost complete destruction of Chechnya's capital, Grozny. Kadyrov has long modeled himself in the image of his father, a strongman loyal to the Kremlin and whom the Kremlin can rely on to ensure stability in the region. Kadyrov consistently appeals to Putin's favor and is likely aware that further terrorist activity in the North Caucasus may threaten his standing with the Kremlin. Kadyrov also claimed that religious extremism is emanating from Europe and suggested that outside actors aided the Dagestan attackers, supporting Kremlin efforts to tie the attacks to the war in Ukraine while also downplaying the threat of an endogenous religious extremism threat in the North Caucasus.


Key Takeaways:



  • The likely Islamic State (IS) affiliate Wilayat Kavkaz terrorist attacks in the Republic of Dagestan on June 23 have increased fears within the Russian information space about further attacks and instability in the North Caucasus.


  • The June 23 terrorist attacks in Dagestan also prompted Chechen Republic Head Ramzan Kadyrov to double down on his image as a ruthless autocratic strongman capable of protecting the North Caucasus from religious extremism.


  • North Korea will reportedly send military construction and engineering forces to participate in "reconstruction work" in occupied Donetsk Oblast as early as July 2024.


  • Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov reiterated that Russia is not interested in any negotiations that do not result in Ukrainian territorial concessions beyond the parts of Ukraine Russian forces already occupy.


  • New Russian Defense Minister Andrei Belousov used his first phone call with US Secretary of Defense Lloyd Austin on June 26 to reiterate standard Russian threats meant to coerce the US out of supporting Ukraine as part of the wider Russian reflexive control campaign targeting Western decision-making.


  • Russia and Ukraine exchanged 90 prisoners of war (POWs) each in a one-to-one POW exchange on June 25 amid United Nations (UN) reports of Russia's continued abuse of POWs.


  • Russia and Iran signed a memorandum on June 26 regarding the supply of Russian gas to Iran, following reported disagreements between Russia and the People's Republic of China (PRC) on the Russian supply of gas to the PRC.


  • Ukraine’s pervasive shortage of critical air defense missiles is inhibiting Ukraine’s ability to protect its critical infrastructure against Russian strikes.


  • Russian forces recently marginally advanced near Kupyansk.


  • Royal United Services Institute (RUSI) published a report on June 26 detailing a significant increase in Russia's military equipment and weapons production in 2023.


Click here to read the full assessment.

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The Institute for the Study of War (ISW) is a non-partisan, non-profit, public policy research organization. ISW advances an informed understanding of military affairs through reliable research, trusted analysis, and innovative education. We are committed to improving the nation's ability to execute military operations and respond to emerging threats in order to achieve US strategic objectives.



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