Andie Parry, Kitaneh Fitzpatrick, Brian Carter, Siddhant Kishore, Kelly Campa, Katherine Wells, Kathryn Tyson, and William Doran

Information Cutoff: 2:00pm ET

Hardline presidential candidate Saeed Jalili will likely win the Iranian presidential election in the runoff race on July 5. No candidate received the majority of votes needed to win the Iranian presidential election on June 28 and Iran will hold a runoff election between the two most popular candidates—ultraconservative Saeed Jalili and reformist Masoud Pezeshkian—on July 5. Pezeshkian received 10.4 million votes while Jalili received around 9.5 million. The second most prominent hardline candidate—Mohammad Bagher Ghalibaf—received around 3.4 million votes in the first round of elections on June 28, which was not enough to compete in the runoff election. At least some Ghalibaf voters will presumably back Jalili in the runoff election, however, giving Jalili a significant advantage over Pezeshkian. Pezeshkian has also struggled to consolidate support among Iranian youth, a key voter demographic for the reformist faction. Pezeshkian is unlikely to garner enough support to win against Jalili, especially since social media users have circulated statements in recent days of Pezeshkian boasting about his role in enforcing unpopular policies such as mandatory veiling.

The Iranian regime is attempting to frame the July 5 presidential runoff elections as a fair and competitive race, despite Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei indicating a preference for hardline candidate Saeed Jalili.  Khamenei has repeatedly expressed concern about low voter turnout rates in recent years and views participation in Iran’s presidential elections as a demonstration of Iran’s democratic legitimacy. Iranian regime officials during this election cycle have attempted to reinforce the regime’s democratic legitimacy by boasting that Pezeshkian’s candidacy illustrated the legitimacy of Iran’s electoral process. Some Iranian university students confronted Pezeshkian in a meeting on June 16, framing his candidacy as an effort on the part of the regime to contribute to an “illusion of democracy” and an attempt by the regime to legitimize the elections." The June 28 voter turnout rate was nevertheless unprecedently low at 40 percent, with the lowest recorded rates in Kermanshah, Kurdistan and Tehran provinces. It is noteworthy that a significant percentage of anti-regime protests during the Mahsa Amini movement occurred in Kurdistan and Tehran provinces, suggesting continued disillusionment with the Iranian regime in these regions.

Key Takeaways:

• West Bank: Palestinian militia groups in the West Bank appear to be strengthening at the expense of the Palestinian Authority. The Palestinian Authority’s inability to exert effective control over refugee camps in the West Bank has significant implications for the post-war situation in the Gaza Strip, if statements to Western Media about strengthening militia groups in the West Bank are accurate.

• Northern Gaza Strip: The IDF continued operations aimed at degrading a reconstituting Hamas Battalion in Shujaiya. Hamas commanders in Shujaiya may have formed a composite unit there by combining multiple degraded or combat ineffective units to form one combat effective unit. Forming a composite unit is one method through which reconstitution takes place.

• Southern Gaza Strip: The IDF issued evacuation orders for eastern Khan Younis on July 1. These evacuation orders typically precede Israeli operations. 

• Iraq: Iranian-backed Iraqi militias threatened to target US interests in Iraq and the Middle East in the event of an Israeli operation into southern Lebanon. The groups identified the under-construction Aqaba-Basra oil pipeline between Basra, Iraq, and Aqaba, Jordan, as a starting point for a new attack campaign.

• Yemen: Houthi media published footage on June 30 of a Houthi attack targeting a bulk cargo carrier with a new model of unmanned surface vessel.

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