Dear ISW readers,

Welcome to the June installment of The Intel Brief.

Each month, the ISW editorial team distills our research teams' reports and assessments of the war in Ukraine, the Chinese Communist Party's paths to controlling Taiwan and relevant cross–Taiwan Strait developments, and the security challenges in the Middle East to provide you with an understanding in brief of the past month's happenings across our research portfolios.

June 2024 Highlights:

• On June 7, Russian President Vladimir Putin outlined a theory of victory in Ukraine that assumes that Russian forces will continue to make gradual advances indefinitely, prevent Ukraine from conducting counteroffensive operations, and win a war of attrition against Ukrainian forces.

• Putin demanded Ukraine's surrender and recognition of Russia's annexation of eastern and southern territories as a precondition for peace talks, to undermine the June 15-16 Global Peace Summit in Switzerland.

• On June 25, Iran’s Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei shared foreign policy views that aligned closely with hardline presidential candidate Saeed Jalili’s views, which possibly indicate that Khamenei endorsed Jalili's candidacy. 

In the Media

“One of the most decisive things that the administration can do... is unambiguously remove all the sanctuary space and allow the Ukrainians to conduct strikes in the deep and operational rears with all the U.S.-provided weapons. ... I actually do think that we are on the cusp of what could be a game changer for the Ukrainians and what they could do on the battlefield.” — George Barros, ABC News, June 8, 2024

“Russia deliberately tried to sabotage the peace summit. Putin had a speech on the eve of the summit, trying to pretend that his maximalist demands for Ukraine’s capitulation were for a ceasefire. It actually was an information operation deliberately made so that the attention on the summit would be turned around and focused on Putin.” — Kateryna Stepanenko, CNN, June 17, 2024

“Russia is a chronic threat. Iran seeks domination of the Middle East, and North Korea has a nuclear arsenal with ballistic missiles that can reach the United States. This is serious. We believe, at [The Institute for the Study of War], that we haven't seen a threat like this since World War II.” — Gen. Jack Keane, Fox News, June 20, 2024

“Russia is, and has been since before the war, conducting these hybrid operations against NATO, the West, the EU, in tandem with its attempts to improve its conventional military abilities for a potential future conflict with NATO.” — Nicole Wolkov, CNN, June 30, 2024

Ukraine

Ukrainian Main Military Intelligence Directorate (GUR) Head Lieutenant General Kyrylo Budanov stated that Western military assistance is arriving in Ukraine, but that it will likely not arrive at a scale that will significantly impact the frontline situation until at least mid to late July 2024. The Biden Administration’s limited policy change permitting Ukraine to use US-provided weapons to strike some Russian military targets in a small area within Russian territory has reduced the size of Russia’s ground sanctuary by only 16 percent at maximum. US policy still preserves at least 84 percent of Russia's ground sanctuary — territory within range of Ukrainian ATACMS.

The Biden Administration’s limited policy change permitting Ukraine to use US-provided weapons to strike some Russian military targets in a small area within Russian territory has reduced the size of Russia’s ground sanctuary by only 16 percent at maximum. US policy still preserves at least 84 percent of Russia's ground sanctuary – territory within range of Ukrainian ATACMS. US policy restricting Ukraine’s usage of US-provided weapons has effectively created a vast sanctuary — territory in range of US-provided weapons but that Ukrainian forces are not allowed to strike with US-provided weapons — which Russia exploits to shield its combat forces, command and control, logistics, and rear area support services that the Russian military uses to conduct its military operations in Ukraine. US policy still protects the vast majority of Russia’s operational rear and deep rear, and US policy forbids Ukraine from using ATACMS anywhere in Russia. The partial removal of the sanctuary has already had a net positive effect and has helped Ukraine blunt Russia’s new offensive effort in Kharkiv Oblast, underscoring the powerful latent potential a larger policy change could achieve. The West maintains the ability to substantially disrupt Russian operations at scale by allowing Ukraine to use Western-provided weapons to strike Russia’s operational rear and deep rear areas in Russian territory.

Russian forces appear to be intensifying the tempo of their offensive operations in Donetsk Oblast while decreasing the rate of attacks in northern Kharkiv Oblast — consistent with ISW's assessment that Russian offensive operations in Kharkiv Oblast are primarily intended to fix and distract Ukrainian forces in order to allow Russian forces to intensify elsewhere in theater. ISW has long assessed that the Russian command intended its offensive operation in Kharkiv Oblast to fix Ukrainian manpower and scarce materiel along the northern border to grant Russian forces opportunities to re-intensify offensive operations in other more critical areas of the theater, particularly in Donetsk Oblast. Ukrainian sources have confirmed that some Ukrainian forces have redeployed units to the Kharkiv direction from Donetsk Oblast, so Russian forces may be exploiting this perceived weakness of Ukrainian lines to intensify attacks, particularly in the Toretsk-Horlivka direction (southwest of Chasiv Yar and northeast of Avdiivka). Russian forces have additionally maintained a high rate of attacks in the Chasiv Yar direction and around Avdiivka since decreasing the tempo in Kharkiv Oblast and may soon intensify attacks in this area if the Russian command identifies the coming weeks as an advantageous time to push in these areas before Ukrainian forces re-allocate reserves back to Donetsk Oblast. Ukrainian sources have warned that Russia will conduct a summer offensive that will likely focus on Ukraine's east after pursuing offensive operations in the north intended to stretch Ukraine's scarce resources, and recent intensifications in Donetsk Oblast may indicate preparations for such a summer offensive, assuming it has not already begun.

Russian forces have sustained the tempo of their offensive operations in the Toretsk direction since activating in the area on June 18 and likely aim to reduce a Ukrainian salient in the area, but there is little current likelihood of rapid Russian gains near Toretsk. Russian forces have committed only limited forces to this operation so far, which suggests that Russian forces continue to prioritize gradual advances through consistent grinding assaults over operationally significant gains through rapid maneuver. Russian forces increased the intensity of their assaults in the Toretsk direction (southwest of Chasiv Yar and northeast of Avdiivka) on the night of June 18 after being generally inactive on this sector of the front so far in 2024. Russian forces have so far conducted mainly frontal infantry-heavy assaults on small settlements south and east of Toretsk and have yet to conduct any significant mechanized assaults in the area. Russian forces have yet to make any notable tactical gains in the area. Russian forces have sought to exploit how renewed Russian offensive operations in northern Kharkiv Oblast have drawn and fixed Ukrainian forces from other sectors of the frontline to pursue gains in critical frontline areas, particularly in Donetsk Oblast.

It is noteworthy, however, that Russian forces have recently intensified operations in a previously inactive sector of the front instead of their efforts to advance in the Pokrovsk direction (west of Avdiivka) or to seize the operationally significant town of Chasiv Yar. The further Russian forces advance in the Chasiv Yar area and northwest of Avdiivka without making similar gains in the Toretsk direction, the deeper the Ukrainian salient in the Toretsk direction would become, offering Ukrainian forces an area from which to conduct routine fire against immediate rear areas of the Russian advance in the Chasiv Yar and Avdiivka directions. A deeper salient in the Toretsk area would also leave Russian forces more vulnerable to significant Ukrainian counterattacks on the southern front of the Chasiv Yar direction and the northern front of the Avdiivka salient. Russian offensive operations near Toretsk likely aim to reduce the threat posed by this Ukrainian salient while Russian forces continue to pursue gains in the Avdiivka and Chasiv Yar directions.

Slow grinding Russian offensive operations in the Toretsk direction are in line with Russian President Vladimir Putin's articulated theory of victory that posits that Russian forces will be able to continue gradual creeping advances indefinitely, prevent Ukraine from conducting successful operationally significant counteroffensive operations, and win a war of attrition against Ukrainian forces. The current rate of Russian advance suggests that Russian forces may pursue individual operationally significant objectives over the course of many months if not years, and Russian forces may accept the prospect of conducting offensive operations for months to seize Toretsk and advance northwestward towards Kostyantynivka. The Russian military command likely hopes that offensive pressure in the Toretsk direction will aid its efforts to prevent Ukraine from accumulating the personnel and resources Ukraine needs to contest the theater-wide initiative, and this objective may supersede any specific territorial operational objective that Russian forces have in the Toretsk area. The West must proactively provide Ukrainian forces with the necessary equipment and weapons at the scale, timing, and regularity that Ukrainian forces require for operations that liberate significant swaths of occupied Ukraine and challenge Putin's belief that he can gradually subsume Ukraine should rapid total victory appear unreachable.

Russia Deputy Team Lead and Analyst Karolina Hird examined the battlefield situation in Kharkiv and Donetsk oblasts on June 30. 

China-Taiwan

The PRC forcefully blocked a Philippine resupply mission to Second Thomas Shoal two days after the implementation of a new CCG (Chinese Coast Guard) regulation that permits more aggressive “law enforcement” in the South China Sea. A CCG and Philippine boat collided, and the CCG boarded, towed, emptied, and damaged two Philippine supply boats. CCG, PLA Navy, and Chinese Maritime Militia vessels disrupted a joint Philippine Coast Guard and Navy resupply mission to Second Thomas Shoal on June 17. The Philippines controls Second Thomas Shoal and has troops stationed aboard the grounded warship Sierra Madre, but the PRC also claims the shoal as its territory. The Philippine supply ship and a PRC vessel collided during the confrontation. The PRC and the Philippines blamed each other for the collision. The CCG also boarded, inspected, and towed away two Philippine inflatable boats carrying supplies and confiscated some of the supplies, including rifles. CCG personnel damaged the hulls of the boats with bladed weapons and abandoned them. At least eight Philippine personnel were injured during the clash, including one who lost a thumb. This is the first time the PRC has used bladed weapons or boarded a Philippine government vessel during its confrontations with the Philippines in the South China Sea.

The PRC has carried out violations of Taiwan’s Air Defense Identification Zone (ADIZ) more frequently since President Lai Ching-te’s inauguration on May 20. Taiwan’s Ministry of National Defense (MND) reported 305 ADIZ violations by PLA aircraft between June 1 and June 27. The June total to date is the second-highest monthly total on record and the highest for any month without a large-scale PLA exercise. The record for most ADIZ violations in one month was 446 in August 2022, when the PRC responded to then-US Speaker of the House Nancy Pelosi’s visit to Taiwan with record-scale military exercises around Taiwan. There were 289 violations in May, of which 82 (28 percent) occurred on May 23 and 24 during the PRC’s Joint Sword 2024A exercise around Taiwan. The number of ADIZ violations that Taiwan’s MND reports does not include PRC vessels and aircraft around Taiwan’s outlying islands such as the Kinmen and Matsu archipelagos.

The heightened number of violations reflects an intensified PRC pressure campaign against Taiwan under the new administration of Lai Ching-te, whom the PRC considers a dangerous separatist. The high frequency of ADIZ violations drains Taiwan’s resources, exhausts military personnel, and degrades Taiwan’s threat awareness. 

Middle East Security Project

Israel–Hamas War

Israeli forces rescued four Hamas-held hostages during a complex operation in the central Gaza Strip. Hamas captured the four hostages from the Nova music festival during the October 7 attack. This marks the second successful rescue of living hostages by Israel during the war. Israeli forces engaged Palestinian fighters during the rescue and Palestinian fighters killed one Israeli officer during the engagement. Hamas fighters fired a man portable air defense system at an Israel Defense Forces (IDF) helicopter in Nuseirat, where the rescue occurred. The IDF acknowledged the presence of civilians in the area and estimated the number of casualties to be under 100. Palestinian reports said that hundreds of civilians died during the rescue. An Israeli Army Radio correspondent reported that the IDF recently launched raids in eastern Bureij and eastern Deir al Balah in the central Gaza Strip prior to “provide cover” for the rescue operation. US officials speaking to Western media said that the United States provided some intelligence to support the hostage rescue operation.

Hamas is rebuilding its weapons production capacity in the Gaza Strip as part of a larger effort to reconstitute its military forces. An Israeli military correspondent reported on June 24 that Hamas is establishing small weapons manufacturing sites across the Gaza Strip in order to replenish its stockpiles of military equipment and weapons. The replenishment of these resources is a key component of the reconstitution of a military force.

Iran’s Nuclear Program

Iran notified the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) that it will install 1,400 new centrifuges at Fordow, which has the capacity to produce nearly 320 pounds of weapons-grade uranium within one month of being installed. IAEA inspectors confirmed on June 19 that Iran plans to increase its uranium enrichment capacity at Fordow and Natanz. Iran notified the IAEA early last week that it plans to install 1,400 IR-6 centrifuges at Fordow within four weeks, according to the Washington Post. A US weapons expert noted on June 19 that the installation of 1,400 centrifuges would increase Fordow’s enrichment capacity by 360 percent. The weapons expert added that the centrifuges could produce approximately 320 pounds of weapons-grade uranium (WGU) — enough WGU for five nuclear weapons — within one month of being installed. The Washington Post report comes after anonymous diplomats told Reuters on June 12 that Iran is installing new centrifuges at Natanz and Fordow. The diplomats said that Iran is responding to the IAEA Board of Governors’ decision to censure Iran on June 5 for failing to cooperate sufficiently with the IAEA.

Iran's Presidential Election

No candidate received the majority of votes needed to win the Iranian presidential election on June 28. Iran will hold a runoff election between the two most popular candidates—ultraconservative Saeed Jalili and reformist Masoud Pezeshkian—on July 5. Jalili will likely win the runoff vote and become the next Iranian president. The Iranian regime reported that Pezeshkian received the most votes at around 10.4 million, while Jalili received around 9.5 million. Jalili will likely receive significantly more votes in the runoff election since there will be no other hardline candidates splitting the hardline vote. The election saw unprecedently low voter turnout, highlighting widespread disillusionment with the Iranian regime. The Iranian Interior Ministry announced that around 25.5 million votes were cast, which is around 40 percent of the Iranian electorate.

Jalili would run an ultraconservative hardline government similar to late-President Ebrahim Raisi. Such a president would likely exacerbate the economic and socio-cultural issues frustrating large swaths of the Iranian population. Jalili is a deeply ideological regime loyalist who has long supported extreme domestic and foreign policies. Western and Iranian opposition outlets reported that some Iranian hardliners, including senior officers from the Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps, tried to prevent Jalili from running for president, feeling that his views are too radical. Jalili downplayed the importance of external engagement to improve the Iranian economy during the presidential debates, suggesting that he might instead favor an autarkic agenda. Jalili also voiced support for Iran’s “nuclear rights” and criticized the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action in the debates. These comments are particularly concerning given that Iran has in recent months expanded its nuclear program significantly and begun running computer simulations that could help build a nuclear weapon.

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Best regards,

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Media and Publishing Associate

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