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[ISW] 이스라엘-하마스 전쟁(이란) 업데이트, 2024년 7월 7일

by Summa posted Jul 08, 2024
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```html 중요 요점

중요 요점

  • 정전 협상: 하마스는 이스라엘 인질을 석방하고, 전쟁을 끝내고, 가자지구에서 대규모 재건 노력을 시작하는 단계적 정전 협정을 만들기 위한 이스라엘과 미국의 노력에 계속 저항하고 있습니다. 정전 협상에서 남은 격차는 중요합니다. 왜냐하면 가장 최근의 하마스 언어에 동의하면 하마스가 모든 남은 인질을 석방하기 전에 하마스가 요구해 온 영구적인 정전에 이스라엘이 효과적으로 동의하게 되기 때문입니다. 하마스의 현재 요구는 또한 하마스가 남은 인질을 석방하도록 강요할 메커니즘 없이 무기한 협상을 끌 수 있도록 할 수 있습니다.
  • 가자지구: 하마스 군 대변인 아부 오베이다는 7월 7일 하마스가 가자지구 전역에서 물자와 인력을 재생산했다고 주장했습니다.
  • 이란: 대통령 당선자 마수드 페제슈키안과 최고 지도자의 선거 후 성명은 페제슈키안 행정부가 정권의 궤적을 바꾸지 않을 것임을 시사합니다.
  • 북부 이스라엘: 레바논 헤즈볼라는 최근 이스라엘 공습에 대응하여 IDF 방공 자산과 감시 장비를 목표로 하는 대량의 로켓을 발사했습니다. 헤즈볼라는 공중 감시 및 전투 관리 기능을 수행하는 메론산을 표적으로 삼아 이스라엘의 통합 방공 시스템을 저하시키는 것을 목표로 합니다.
``` **분류:** 정전 협상, 가자지구, 이란, 북부 이스라엘 **관련된 주요국가:** 이스라엘, 미국, 이란 **향후 전망:** 하마스는 이스라엘 인질을 석방하고, 전쟁을 끝내고, 가자지구에서 대규모 재건 노력을 시작하는 단계적 정전 협정을 만들기 위한 이스라엘과 미국의 노력에 계속 저항할 것입니다. 하마스의 현재 요구는 또한 하마스가 남은 인질을 석방하도록 강요할 메커니즘 없이 무기한 협상을 끌 수 있도록 할 수 있습니다. 이란은 대통령 당선자 마수드 페제슈키안과 최고 지도자의 선거 후 성명은 페제슈키안 행정부가 정권의 궤적을 바꾸지 않을 것임을 시사합니다. 북부 이스라엘에서는 레바논 헤즈볼라가 최근 이스라엘 공습에 대응하여 IDF 방공 자산과 감시 장비를 목표로 하는 대량의 로켓을 발사했습니다. 헤즈볼라는 공중 감시 및 전투 관리 기능을 수행하는 메론산을 표적으로 삼아 이스라엘의 통합 방공 시스템을 저하시키는 것을 목표로 합니다.

[원문]

Iran Update

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Brian Carter, Andie Parry, Kelly Campa and Alexandra Braverman


Information Cutoff: 2:00 pm ET

Hamas is continuing to resist Israeli and US efforts to create a phased ceasefire deal that would secure the release of Israeli hostages, end the war, and begin major reconstruction efforts in the Gaza Strip. The remaining gap in ceasefire negotiations is significant because agreeing to the most recent Hamas language would effectively commit Israel to the permanent ceasefire Hamas has been demanding before Hamas had released all remaining hostages. Hamas’ current demands could also enable Hamas to drag on negotiations indefinitely with no mechanism to compel it to release the remaining hostages. Hamas remains unlikely to accept a proposal that does not meet its maximalist demands, including a permanent ceasefire, the complete withdrawal of Israeli forces from the Gaza Strip, and a hostage-for-prisoner exchange. The May 31 ceasefire proposal announced by US President Joe Biden continues to serve as the basis for negotiations. The phases of the May 31 proposal were:


  • Phase one involves a six-week ceasefire and the withdrawal of Israeli forces from densely populated areas in the Gaza Strip. Hamas would release an unspecified number of hostages, including Americans, women, and elderly and sick individuals, in exchange for “hundreds” of Palestinian prisoners in this phase. Displaced Palestinian civilians would return to their homes, including those in the northern Gaza Strip. Humanitarian aid would “surge with 600 trucks [entering the Gaza Strip] per day,” which is a notable increase from the 500 trucks in an earlier Israeli proposal. Negotiations for a permanent ceasefire would continue during this phase.
  • Phase two involves Hamas and other Palestinian militias releasing all remaining living hostages, and the IDF withdrawing from the Gaza Strip completely. Biden said that the United States, Egypt, and Qatar would facilitate continued negotiations during this phase.
  • Phase three involves major reconstruction efforts in the Gaza Strip. It also involves Hamas and the other militias returning the bodies of all hostages to Israel.


Hamas attempted in early June to undermine the phasing of the May 31 proposal by demanding the beginning of reconstruction in phase one and a complete halt to the war regardless of whether negotiations to transition to the second phase succeeded. The May 31 proposal notably did not guarantee a transition from the first to the second phase of the ceasefire. This would enable Israel to resume military operations if Hamas proved unwilling to compromise on the specifics for a permanent ceasefire beginning after phase two and three. Undermining the phasing would have enabled Hamas to continue to extract concessions from Israel indefinitely without transitioning to phase two, because Israel could not impose military pressure on Hamas to encourage Hamas to compromise to release hostages without breaking the agreement. Hamas’ attempt to undermine the phasing of the proposal also did not make clear how Israel would secure the release of the remaining hostages that would have been released under phase two of the May 31 proposal.


Hamas’ most recent ceasefire position demonstrates that the group has not meaningfully shifted its position since negotiations last stalled in June and that it still seeks to undermine the agreement’s phasing. Axios reported on July 6 that the outstanding gaps between Israel and Hamas center on the language regarding and time-delimitation of negotiations to transition from the first phase of the ceasefire deal to the second phase. The current proposal says that the United States, Egypt, and Qatar will “make every effort” to ensure negotiations during the first phase end in a transition to the second phase and a sustainable calm. Hamas is attempting to remove “make every effort,” replacing it with “ensure“ and dropping the original six-week time limit for the first phase. This change would make the initial ceasefire effectively permanent from the start and would commit the United States, Qatar, and Egypt to securing a ceasefire and enable Hamas to draw out negotiations for the transition to the second phase indefinitely, if needed. The language and removal of the time-delimited first phase makes it more difficult for Israel to resume operations to pressure Hamas and extract concessions without breaking the agreement entirely or appearing to scuttle negotiations over the transition to phase two. This could allow Hamas to secure a complete ceasefire without adhering to commitments under phases two and three, which include the release of Israeli hostages. The categories of hostages in phase two and three include Israeli soldiers, whom Hamas is reticent to release.


Hamas and its leader in the Gaza Strip, Yahya Sinwar, feel that they can manipulate ceasefire negotiations in this manner because they remain confident that they are winning in the Gaza Strip. Hamas forces throughout the Strip remain combat effective and are attempting to reconstitute, with some success. Sinwar has noted that he believes Hamas has Israel “right where [Hamas] wants [Israel].”

 

Key Takeaways:


  • Ceasefire Negotiations: Hamas is continuing to resist Israeli and US efforts to create a phased ceasefire deal that would secure the release of Israeli hostages, end the war, and begin major reconstruction efforts in the Gaza Strip. The remaining gap in ceasefire negotiations is significant because agreeing to the most recent Hamas language would effectively commit Israel to the permanent ceasefire Hamas has been demanding before Hamas had released all remaining hostages. Hamas’ current demands could also enable Hamas to drag on negotiations indefinitely with no mechanism to compel it to release the remaining hostages.


  • Gaza Strip: Hamas military spokesperson Abu Obeida claimed on July 7 that Hamas has regenerated materiel and personnel across the Gaza Strip.


  • Iran: Post-election statements by both President-elect Masoud Pezeshkian and the supreme leader indicate that the Pezeshkian administration will not change the regime’s trajectory.


  • Northern Israel: Lebanese Hezbollah launched a heavy barrage of rockets targeting IDF air defense assets and surveillance equipment in response to a recent Israeli strike. Hezbollah aims to degrade Israel's integrated air defense system by targeting Mount Meron, which hosts air surveillance and battle management functions.

Click here to read the full update.

ISW–CTP has launched an interactive map of Israeli ground operations to accompany our daily campaign assessments of the IsraelHamas war. This product complements the daily static maps that ISW-CTP produces with high-fidelity and, where possible, street-level assessments of the war in Israel.

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