Ukrainian forces blunted one of the largest Russian mechanized assaults in Ukraine since October 2023 in western Donetsk Oblast on July 24. Geolocated footage published on July 24 shows that Ukrainian forces stopped a reinforced battalion size Russian mechanized assault near Kostyantynivka (southwest of Donetsk City) after Russian forces advanced up to the southeastern outskirts of the settlement. A Ukrainian brigade operating in the Kurakhove direction reported that Russian forces attacked simultaneously with 11 tanks, 45 armored combat vehicles, a rare "Terminator" armored fighting vehicle (of which Russia has reportedly manufactured only 23 as of December 2023), 12 motorcycles, and roughly 200 personnel from several tactical directions at dawn on July 24. The brigade reported that Ukrainian aerial reconnaissance identified the mechanized columns from a distance and that Ukrainian forces used artillery, drones, and minefields to blunt the Russian assault. The brigade reported that Ukrainian forces damaged or destroyed six Russian tanks, seven armored combat vehicles, and all 12 motorcycles and that Russian forces retreated after Ukrainian forces destroyed the first wave of vehicles. ISW last observed Russian forces conduct a battalion-sized mechanized attack in Donetsk Oblast in March 2024. Russian forces have not conducted larger mechanized assaults in Ukraine since the first days of Russia's four-month long operation to seize Avdiivka in October 2023. Russian forces likely intended to advance further into Kostyantynivka as part of their efforts to seize the settlement and cut the Vuhledar-Kostyantynivka T-0524 highway. Russian sources have long identified interdicting the T-0524 highway and disrupting Ukrainian ground lines of communication (GLOCs) into Vuhledar as a primary tactical objective in this direction. Russian milblogger recently suggested that Russian forces would intensify operations south of Kostyantynivka in support of this objective and force Ukrainian forces to retreat from positions in and around Vuhledar. Russian forces likely will not make operationally significant advances in this area of the frontline in the near term even if they achieve tactically significant advances and prompt Ukrainian forces to retreat from nearby positions, as the surrounding area has no operationally significant objectives and is largely comprised of fields and isolated, small settlements and no significant nearby tactical heights.
The Russian military command's willingness to expend a large number of armored vehicles on limited tactical objectives reflects poor longer-term operational foresight, and constraints on Russian equipment in the medium- to long-term will make such failed mechanized assaults costlier with time. The Russian military has extensively relied on refurbishing stocks of Soviet-era weapons and military equipment, particularly armored vehicles, to sustain the tempo of its offensive operations in Ukraine. The Russian government will likely have to further mobilize the Russian economy and defense industry if the Russian military intends to sustain its current tempo of operations in the medium- to long-term as Russia depletes its finite Soviet stockpiles, but it is unclear if the Russian defense industry will be able to produce enough vehicles to sustain a high level of equipment losses even with further economic mobilization. Ukraine-based open-source organization Frontelligence Insight stated on July 25 that it observed Russian forces moving hundreds of pieces of equipment, primarily restored old, armored vehicles such as T-62 and T-55 tanks, to the front in June and early July 2024. Frontelligence Insight noted that these restored vehicles have yet to appear on the battlefield and assessed that Russia may be preparing to use them in later 2024. Frontelligence Insight reported that internal Russia documents show that Russian tanks damaged within the past six months (since about January 2024) are widely waiting for replacement parts and that widespread engine shortages have led to the increasing cannibalization of more modern T-80 tanks to conduct repairs. Russia currently has enough armored vehicles to conduct periodic company-sized and larger mechanized assaults throughout the frontline for the foreseeable future, however. The Russian military command's continued willingness to suffer high armored vehicle losses for minor tactical gains instead of conserving armored vehicles for operations that pursue operationally significant objectives will impose increasingly significant costs on Russian forces as the Russian military's equipment constraints worsen over the coming years. The Russian military may be attempting to restore maneuver to the battlefield and pursue rapid gains through mechanized maneuver, although continued large scale frontal mechanized assaults indicate that the Russian military command has not fully internalized lessons about the difficulties of mechanized maneuver in the nearly transparent battlespace in Ukraine.
Syrian President Bashar al Assad met with Russian President Vladimir Putin in Moscow on July 24. [NOTE: A version of this text appears in ISW-CTP's July 25 Iran Update] Assad and Putin discussed escalating tensions in the Middle East, including in Syria. The leaders also discussed improving bilateral economic relations. Assad last met with Putin in Russia in March 2023 during which they reached over 40 agreements on promoting economic cooperation. It remains unclear if Syria and Russia have advanced the 2023 agreements since then.
Key Takeaways:
- Ukrainian forces blunted one of the largest Russian mechanized assaults in Ukraine since October 2023 in western Donetsk Oblast on July 24.
- The Russian military command's willingness to expend a large number of armored vehicles on limited tactical objectives reflects poor longer-term operational foresight, and constraints on Russian equipment in the medium- to long-term will make such failed mechanized assaults costlier with time.
- The Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) indicated that Lieutenant General Sergey Kobylash has become Deputy Commander of the Russian Aerospace Forces (VKS).
- Kremlin Spokesperson Dmitri Peskov attempted to frame Ukraine as unwilling to negotiate, while demonstrating the Kremlin's own unwillingness to engage in good faith negotiations by reinvigorating Russian information operations falsely portraying Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky as an "illegitimate" leader of Ukraine.
- The Kremlin continues to strengthen its ties with the People's Republic of China (PRC) and Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) member states.
- The Ukrainian Security Service (SBU) and National Police announced that they neutralized a group connected to the Russian Federal Security Service (FSB) that had been preparing to commit arson against civilian objects in Ukraine and elsewhere in Europe.
- Select Russian officials continue to call for measures targeting diaspora groups while the Russian government continues efforts to extend its control over migrants in Russia.
- Syrian President Bashar al Assad met with Russian President Vladmir Putin in Moscow on July 24.
- Ukrainian forces recently advanced near Robotyne, and Russian forces recently marginally advanced north of Kharkiv City and near Toretsk, Donetsk City, and Robotyne.
- Russian President Vladimir Putin signed a law on July 24 granting deferments from military conscription to employees of the Russian Prosecutor General's Office and Investigative Committee who have higher education and special ranks starting in September 2024.
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[ISW] 러시아의 공세 캠페인 평가, 2024년 9월 9일
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