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[ISW] 러시아의 공세 캠페인 평가, 2024년 7월 26일

by Summa posted Jul 27, 2024
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러시아-우크라이나 전쟁 상황 업데이트

주요 내용:

  • 러시아군은 최근 도네츠크 주에서 러시아 중부군의 책임 영역(AOR)을 확대했으며, 이는 러시아군 사령부가 아브디이프카 방향에서 작전 기동 부대로만 활동하던 이전 임무의 우선순위를 낮춘 것으로 보인다. 그 대신 러시아군 사령부는 중부군에 도네츠크 주에서 러시아의 주요 공세 대부분을 감독하도록 임무를 부여했을 수 있다.
  • 중부군의 AOR 확대는 러시아군 사령부가 아브디이프카 지역에서 빠른 전술적 이득을 거둘 가능성이 낮다고 판단했음을 시사한다.
  • 우크라이나군은 7월 25일부터 26일 밤에 점령된 크림 반도의 사키 공군기지에 ATACMS 공격을 가한 것으로 알려졌다.
  • 러시아 연방보안국(FSB)은 7월 26일에 러시아 전 국방부 차관인 드미트리 불가코프 육군 대장을 부패 혐의로 체포했다. 이는 2024년 4월 이후 크렘린이 고위 러시아 국방 관리들을 제거하기 위한 집중적인 노력의 일환이다.
  • 유럽 연합(EU)은 동결된 러시아 자산에서 나온 수익의 첫 번째 할부금을 우크라이나에 이체했다.
  • 크렘린은 러시아인의 인터넷 활동을 통제하고 러시아 내에서 자기 검열 문화를 조성하기 위한 노력을 계속 강화하고 있다.
  • 러시아 보안군은 7월 25일에 다게스탄 공화국에서 아파트 건물을 폭파하겠다고 위협한 알려지지 않은 인물들을 여러 명 구금한 것으로 알려졌다.
  • 러시아군은 최근 스바토베, 아브디이프카, 도네츠크 시 근처에서 약간 진격했다.
  • 왕립연합군사연구소(RUSI)는 7월 22일에 러시아 정보 기관이 러시아군의 사이버 및 재래식 역량을 더욱 통합한 것으로 보인다고 보고했다.
분류: 군사, 정치, 외교 관련된 주요 국가: 러시아, 우크라이나, 미국 향후 전망: 러시아군은 앞으로도 우크라이나 동부와 남부에서 공세를 계속할 것으로 예상된다. 우크라이나군은 서방 국가들의 지원을 받아 러시아군의 공세를 저지하고 반격을 가할 것으로 예상된다. 러시아-우크라이나 전쟁은 장기화될 가능성이 높다.

[원문]

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Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment

Support ISW

Riley Bailey, Christina Harward, Grace Mappes,

Angelica Evans, Davit Gasparyan, and George Barros


July 26, 2024, 6:45pm ET

Click here to see ISW's interactive map of the Russian invasion of Ukraine. This map is updated daily alongside the static maps present in this report.


Click here to see ISW’s 3D control-of-terrain topographic map of Ukraine. The use of a computer (not a mobile device) is strongly recommended for accessing this data-heavy tool.


Click here to access ISW’s archive of interactive time-lapse maps of the Russian invasion of Ukraine. These maps complement the static control-of-terrain maps that ISW produces daily by showing a dynamic frontline.

The Russian military has recently expanded the Russian Central Grouping of Forces' area of responsibility (AOR) in Donetsk Oblast, suggesting that the Russian military command has deprioritized the grouping's previous task to act solely as an operational maneuver force in the Avdiivka direction. The Russian military command may instead be tasking the Central Grouping of Forces with overseeing the bulk of Russia's main offensive efforts in Donetsk Oblast. Russian forces transferred the Central Grouping of Forces from the Kreminna area to the Avdiivka direction ahead of the Russian offensive operation to seize Avdiivka from October 2023 to February 2024 and proceeded to concentrate almost all Central Military District (CMD) elements deployed to Ukraine in the area during the offensive operation. The Russian military command established the Central Grouping of Forces as an operational maneuver force along a narrow front in the Avdiivka area following the seizure of Avdiivka in February 2024 and tasked CMD elements with exploiting Russian tactical advances and pushing as far west as possible before Ukrainian forces established more cohesive and harder-to-penetrate defensive lines in the area. The Russian Central Grouping of Forces made a notable tactical breakthrough northwest of Avdiivka in mid-April 2024 and achieved significant tactical gains in the area, largely due to Ukrainian materiel constraints caused by delays in Western security assistance. Ukrainian forces have since stabilized the front in the area and slowed the rate of Russian advance, and the Russian Central Grouping of Forces is now advancing at a relatively similar pace as Russian forces elsewhere in Ukraine.


The expansion of the Central Grouping of Forces' AOR indicates that the Russian military command may assess that rapid tactical gains in the Avdiivka area are unlikely. Whether this possible assessment is based on waning Ukrainian materiel and manpower constraints or specifically based on an assessment of the Central Grouping of Forces' failure to achieve its assigned tasks is unclear. An AOR that stretches from southwest of Donetsk City to Toretsk will draw available Russian manpower and materiel away from the existing effort to make tactically significant advances northwest and west of Avdiivka. The Central Grouping of Forces likely lacks the reserves necessary to intensify operations in the Avdiivka area to the degree that would facilitate relatively rapid gains while maintaining offensive pressure in the Toretsk and Donetsk City directions. The Russian military command is currently attempting to maintain consistent offensive pressure throughout the front to prevent Ukraine from contesting the battlefield initiative, and tasking the Central Grouping of Forces with grinding offensive operations along a longer front is more in line with this effort than tasking the grouping with achieving tactically significant gains through relatively rapid maneuver.


Key Takeaways:


  • The Russian military has recently expanded the Russian Central Grouping of Forces' area of responsibility (AOR) in Donetsk Oblast, suggesting that the Russian military command has deprioritized the grouping's previous task to act solely as an operational maneuver force in the Avdiivka direction. The Russian military command may instead be tasking the Central Grouping of Forces with overseeing the bulk of Russia's main offensive efforts in Donetsk Oblast.


  • The expansion of the Central Grouping of Forces' AOR indicates that the Russian military command may assess that rapid tactical gains in the Avdiivka area are unlikely.


  • Ukrainian forces reportedly conducted an ATACMS strike against Saky Airbase in occupied Crimea on the night of July 25 to 26.


  • The Russian Federal Security Service (FSB) arrested former Russian Deputy Defense Minister Army General Dmitri Bulgakov on corruption charges on July 26 – the latest in a concerted Kremlin effort to remove senior Russian defense officials since April 2024.


  • The European Union (EU) transferred the first tranche of proceeds from frozen Russian assets to Ukraine.


  • The Kremlin continues intensifying efforts to control Russians' internet activities and to create a culture of self-censorship within Russia.


  • Russian security forces reportedly detained several unknown actors threatening to blow up an apartment building in the Republic of Dagestan on July 25.


  • Russian forces recently marginally advanced near Svatove, Avdiivka, and Donetsk City.


  • The Royal United Services Institute (RUSI) reported on July 22 that the Russian intelligence services appear to have further integrated Russian forces' cyber and conventional capabilities.

Click here to read the full assessment.

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