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[ISW] 러시아의 공세 캠페인 평가, 2024년 8월 7일

by Summa posted Aug 08, 2024
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```html Key Takeaways

주요 요점:

  • 우크라이나군은 8월 7일 러시아 영토에서 기계화된 공세 작전을 계속하면서 러시아 쿠르스크주로 최대 10km까지 진격한 것을 확인했습니다.
  • 크렘린은 쿠르스크주에서의 우크라이나의 공세 활동에 대한 대응이 지금까지 모순적이었습니다. 러시아 관리들은 이러한 노력을 주목할 만한 우크라이나의 에스컬레이션으로 제시하면서도 잠재적인 영향력을 과장하고 국내 불만을 위험에 빠뜨리는 것을 피하려 하고 있습니다.
  • 일부 러시아 군사 블로거들은 러시아군 사령부가 쿠르스크주로의 우크라이나 공세 작전을 준비하거나 예방하지 못한 것에 대해 강력하게 비판했습니다.
  • 우크라이나군은 쿠르스크주 상공에서 러시아 Mi-28 헬리콥터를 격추하기 위해 일인칭 시점(FPV) 드론을 사용한 것으로 알려졌으며, 이는 우크라이나군이 드론 역량을 성공적으로 적용하고 있음을 나타냅니다.
  • 일부 러시아 군사 블로거들은 러시아군 사령부가 쿠르스크주로의 우크라이나 공세 작전을 준비하거나 예방하지 못한 것에 대해 강력하게 비판했습니다.
  • 우크라이나군은 쿠르스크주 상공에서 러시아 Mi-28 헬리콥터를 격추하기 위해 일인칭 시점(FPV) 드론을 사용한 것으로 알려졌으며, 이는 우크라이나군이 드론 역량을 성공적으로 적용하고 있음을 나타냅니다.
  • 우크라이나 국방정보국(GUR) 국장인 키릴로 부다노프는 8월 7일 러시아의 공세력이 1개월 반에서 2개월 안에 절정에 이를 것이라고 평가했으며, 이는 현재 러시아의 공세력에 대한 ISW의 평가와 전반적으로 일치합니다.
  • 우크라이나 유엔(UN) 인권감시단(HRMMU) 대표인 다니엘 벨은 러시아가 러시아 구금 시설에 있는 우크라이나 전쟁 포로(POW)의 95%를 고문했다고 밝혔습니다.
  • 몰도바 중앙선거관리위원회(CEC)는 8월 7일 2024년 10월 몰도바 대선과 국민투표에 친크렘린 승리 선거 블록을 등록하지 않을 것이라고 발표했습니다.
  • 러시아 법원은 8월 7일 러시아 초국가주의 군사 블로거 텔레그램 채널인 "모스크바 콜링"의 관리자인 안드레이 쿠르신에게 러시아 군대에 대한 "가짜" 정보를 게시한 혐의로 6년 반의 징역형을 선고했습니다.
  • 우크라이나군은 최근 차시브 야르 남쪽의 진지를 탈환했고, 러시아군은 시베르스크 북동쪽, 도네츠크 시 남서쪽, 도네츠크-자포리자주 경계 지역에서 진격했습니다.
  • 러시아 육군 전투 예비군(BARS) 부대는 계속해서 모집 활동을 하고 있습니다.
``` **분류:** 군사, 정치, 외교 **관련된 주요국가:** 우크라이나, 러시아, 몰도바 **향후 전망:** 우크라이나군은 쿠르스크주에서 계속해서 진격할 것으로 예상되며, 러시아군은 우크라이나의 공세를 저지하기 위해 추가 병력을 투입할 것으로 예상됩니다. 러시아는 또한 우크라이나의 인프라를 계속 공격할 것으로 예상되며, 우크라이나는 러시아의 공격으로부터 국민을 보호하기 위해 노력할 것입니다.

[원문]

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Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment

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Nicole Wolkov, Grace Mappes, Christina Harward, Karolina Hird, and Frederick W. Kagan


August 7, 2024, 7:15pm ET

Click here to see ISW's interactive map of the Russian invasion of Ukraine. This map is updated daily alongside the static maps present in this report.


Click here to see ISW’s 3D control-of-terrain topographic map of Ukraine. The use of a computer (not a mobile device) is strongly recommended for accessing this data-heavy tool.


Click here to access ISW’s archive of interactive time-lapse maps of the Russian invasion of Ukraine. These maps complement the static control-of-terrain maps that ISW produces daily by showing a dynamic frontline.

Ukrainian forces have made confirmed advances up to 10 kilometers into Russia's Kursk Oblast amid continued mechanized offensive operations on Russian territory on August 7. Geolocated footage published on August 6 and 7 shows that Ukrainian armored vehicles have advanced to positions along the 38K-030 route about 10 kilometers from the international border. The current confirmed extent and location of Ukrainian advances in Kursk Oblast indicate that Ukrainian forces have penetrated at least two Russian defensive lines and a stronghold. A Russian insider source claimed that Ukrainian forces have seized 45 square kilometers of territory within Kursk Oblast since they launched the operation on August 6, and other Russian sources reported that Ukrainian forces have captured 11 total settlements, including Nikolaevo-Daryino (1.5 kilometers north of the Sumy Oblast border), Darino (three kilometers north of the Sumy Oblast border), and Sverdlikovo (east of the Nikolaevo-Darino-Darino area), and are operating within Lyubimovka (eight kilometers north of the Sumy Oblast border). Russian sources indicated that Ukrainian forces are trying to advance along the 38K-030 Sudzha-Korenovo highway, and a prominent Kremlin-affiliated milblogger claimed that by 1800 local time on August 7 Ukrainian forces had advanced both northwest and southeast along the highway and are now fighting on the outskirts of Korenovo (in the northwest direction) and Sudzha (in the southeast direction). The Russian insider source and several other Russian sources reported that Ukrainian forces fought for and seized the Sudzha checkpoint and the Sudzha gas distribution station (southwest of Sudzha along the 38K-004 highway, 500 meters from the Sumy-Kursk Oblast border). Geolocated imagery posted on August 7 shows that Ukrainian forces captured over 40 Russian prisoners of war (POWs) at the Sudzha checkpoint, and Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty's Russia service posted satellite imagery that shows heavy damage to buildings at the Sudzha checkpoint. Ukrainian military observer Kostyantyn Mashovets reported on August 7 that an unspecified unit of the Chechyna-based 71st Motorized Rifle Regiment (58th Combined Arms Army [CAA], Southern Military District [SMD]) has deployed directly to the Sudzhenskyi Raion—generally consistent with some reports from Ukrainian and Russian sources that social media footage shows Chechen "Akhmat" units in the Sudzha area since over a week ago. Chechen units reportedly suffered very heavy losses in Ukrainian attacks in the Korenovo Raion on August 7.


The Kremlin's response to Ukrainian offensive activities in Kursk Oblast has so far been contradictory, as Russian officials are attempting to balance presenting the effort as a notable Ukrainian escalation with avoiding overstating its potential implications and risking domestic discontent. Russian President Vladimir Putin met with members of the Russian government on August 7, accusing Ukrainian forces of a "large-scale provocation" in Kursk Oblast and instructing First Deputy Prime Minister Denis Manturov and regional authorities to coordinate assistance in Kursk Oblast. Putin also met with Defense Minister Andrey Belousov, Security Council Secretary Sergei Shoigu, Federal Security Service (FSB) Director Alexander Bortnikov, and Chief of the General Staff Army General Valery Gerasimov on August 7 about the Kursk Oblast attack. Gerasimov portrayed the situation as largely under control, however, claiming that Ukrainian forces attacked with about 1,000 personnel and that Russian FSB and the Northern Grouping of Forces have stopped Ukraine's advance and inflicted significant casualties. Gerasimov claimed that Russian forces will complete their operation when they have defeated Ukrainian forces and reached the Kursk Oblast-Ukraine border. Other Russian officials doubled down on these contradictory points, often seeking to strike a balance between the alarmism of a Ukrainian mechanized assault and penetration into Russian territory and the status quo reassurances that the Kremlin "has the situation under control." The Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) notably edited a post on August 6 to remove claims that the attacking Ukrainian forces were just a sabotage and reconnaissance group and that the Ukrainian forces retreated, likely to avoid backlash from making demonstrably false claims about the scale and tactics of the ongoing Ukrainian penetration. Kursk Oblast Acting Head Alexey Smirnov claimed that the situation is "under [Putin's] personal control" and stated that several thousand Kursk Oblast civilians have already evacuated the area. Manturov instructed the Russian Ministry of Finance to allocate a first tranche of 1.8 billion rubles (about $20.9 million) to assist Kursk Oblast residents in resettling. Russian Investigative Committee Head Alexander Bastrykin announced that the Investigative Committee has opened an investigation into the Ukrainian "provocation." The Kremlin likely seeks to balance its messaging against two contradictory objectives to both discredit Ukraine internationally for conducting this attack into Russian territory and avoid inciting domestic panic about the scale, impacts, and potential outcomes of the Ukrainian operation. The Kremlin risks, however, discrediting itself among certain communities by seemingly dismissing the significance of the attack by framing it only as a "provocation."


Key Takeaways:


  • Ukrainian forces have made confirmed advances up to 10 kilometers into Russia's Kursk Oblast amid continued mechanized offensive operations on Russian territory on August 7.


  • The Kremlin's response to Ukrainian offensive activities in Kursk Oblast has so far been contradictory, as Russian officials are attempting to balance presenting the effort as a notable Ukrainian escalation with avoiding overstating its potential implications and risking domestic discontent.


  • Select Russian milbloggers heavily criticized the Russian military command for not detecting preparations for or preventing Ukrainian offensive operations into Kursk Oblast.


  • Ukrainian forces reportedly used a first-person view (FPV) drone to down a Russian Mi-28 helicopter over Kursk Oblast, indicating that Ukrainian forces continue to successfully adapt their drone capabilities.


  • Select Russian milbloggers heavily criticized the Russian military command for not detecting preparations for or preventing Ukrainian offensive operations into Kursk Oblast.


  • Ukrainian forces reportedly used a first-person view (FPV) drone to down a Russian Mi-28 helicopter over Kursk Oblast, indicating that Ukrainian forces continue to successfully adapt their drone capabilities.


  • Ukraine's Main Military Intelligence Directorate (GUR) Head Kyrylo Budanov assessed on August 7 that Russian offensive potential will culminate within one and a half to two months, generally consistent with ISW's assessment on current Russia's offensive capabilities.


  • Head of the United Nations (UN) Human Rights Monitoring Mission in Ukraine (HRMMU), Danielle Bell, stated that Russia has tortured 95 percent of Ukrainian prisoners-of-war (POWs) in Russian detention.


  • The Moldovan Central Electoral Commission (CEC) announced on August 7 that it would not register the pro-Kremlin Victory electoral bloc in the October 2024 Moldovan presidential election and referendum.


  • A Russian court sentenced Andrey Kurshin, administrator of the "Moscow Calling" Russian ultranationalist milblogger Telegram channel, to six and a half years in prison on August 7 for publishing "fake" information about the Russian military.


  • Ukrainian forces recently regained positions south of Chasiv Yar, and Russian forces advanced northeast of Siversk, southwest of Donetsk City, and in the Donetsk-Zaporizhia Oblast border area.


  • Russian Army Combat Reserve (BARS) units continue recruitment efforts.

Click here to read the full assessment.

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The Institute for the Study of War (ISW) is a non-partisan, non-profit, public policy research organization. ISW advances an informed understanding of military affairs through reliable research, trusted analysis, and innovative education. We are committed to improving the nation's ability to execute military operations and respond to emerging threats in order to achieve US strategic objectives.



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