Ukrainian cross-border mechanized offensive operations into Kursk Oblast that began on August 6 are continuing as part of a Ukrainian operational effort within Russian territory. ISW will not offer assessments about the intent of this Ukrainian operation in order to avoid compromising Ukrainian operational security. ISW will not make forecasts about what Ukrainian forces might or might not do or where or when they might do it. ISW will continue to map, track, and evaluate operations as they unfold but will not offer insight into Ukrainian planning, tactics, or techniques. ISW is not prepared to map control of terrain within Russia at this time and will instead map observed events associated with the Ukrainian incursion into Russian territory as well the maximalist extent of claims and unverified reports about Ukrainian advances. Maximalist claims and unverified reports about Ukrainian advances within Russia do not represent territory that ISW assesses that Ukrainian forces have seized or control. Inferring predictions about Ukrainian operations from ISW maps and assessments that do not explicitly offer such predictions is inappropriate and not in accord with their intended use.
Geolocated footage and Russian claims indicate that Ukrainian forces continued rapid advances further into Kursk Oblast on August 8, and Ukrainian forces are reportedly present in areas as far as 35 kilometers from the international border with Sumy Oblast. Ukrainian forces most certainly do not control all of the territory within the maximalist extent of Russian claims about Ukrainian advances in Kursk Oblast, however. Russian milbloggers claimed that Ukrainian forces advanced as far as Kromskiye Byki and Molyutino (up to 35 kilometers from the international border and 17 kilometers southeast of Lgov) but noted that these are small groups not immediately trying to hold territory. Russian milbloggers issued contradictory claims about Ukrainian positions in Sudzha (northeast of Sumy City and roughly 10 kilometers from the international border), with some milbloggers claiming that Ukrainian forces seized the settlement while other milbloggers claimed that Ukrainian forces only seized part of the settlement. Geolocated footage published on August 8 indicates that Ukrainian forces likely advanced towards Russkoye Porechnoye (north of Sudzha), and Russian milbloggers claimed that Ukrainian forces also advanced further north of Sudzha along the 38K-024 highway near Anastasyevka. Geolocated footage published on August 7 and 8 shows Ukrainian forces operating within Goncharovka (just west of Sudzha) and north of Zaoleshenka (northwest of Sudzha), and a Russian milblogger claimed that Ukrainian forces seized Goncharovka. A geolocated photo shows Ukrainian forces operating within Novoivanovka (10km north of the international border and northwest of Sudzha), and Russian milbloggers also claimed that Ukrainian forces seized Novoivanovka and Bogdanovka (northwest of Sudzha). Russian milbloggers claimed that Ukrainian forces also advanced northwest of Sudzha into Malaya Loknya and to the outskirts of Cherkasskoye Porechnoye; northeast of Sudzha near Kruglenkoye, Martynovka, and Bolshoye Soldatskoye; and east of Sudzha near Mirny, although two Russian milbloggers denied claims that Ukrainian forces are operating near and within Bolshoye Soldatskoye. Russian milbloggers also claimed that Russian forces repelled a Ukrainian attack near Korenevo (north of Sumy City and roughly 23 kilometers north of the international border) and that Ukrainian forces attacked within Snagost (south of Korenevo) and near Olgovka (east of Korenevo).
Russian milbloggers claimed that small Ukrainian armored groups are advancing further into the Russian rear and bypassing Russian fortifications before engaging Russian forces and then withdrawing from the engagements without attempting to consolidate control over their furthest advances. Russian milbloggers noted that the prevalence of these armored groups is leading to conflicting reporting because Ukrainian forces are able to quickly engage Russian forces near a settlement and then withdraw from the area. Ukrainian forces appear to be able to use these small armored groups to conduct assaults past the engagement line due to the low density of Russian personnel in the border areas of Kursk Oblast. Larger Ukrainian units are reportedly operating in areas of Kursk Oblast closer to the international border and are reportedly consolidating and fortifying some positions.
Key Takeaways:
- Ukrainian cross-border mechanized offensive operations into Kursk Oblast that began on August 6 are continuing as part of a Ukrainian operational effort within Russian territory. ISW will not offer assessments about the intent of this Ukrainian operation in order to avoid compromising Ukrainian operational security.
- Geolocated footage and Russian claims indicate that Ukrainian forces continued rapid advances further into Kursk Oblast on August 8, and Ukrainian forces are reportedly present in areas as far as 35 kilometers from the international border with Sumy Oblast. Ukrainian forces most certainly do not control all of the territory within the maximalist extent of Russian claims about Ukrainian advances in Kursk Oblast, however.
- The Kremlin will almost certainly endeavor to retake Russian territory in Kursk Oblast that Ukrainian forces have seized and stop Ukrainian activity further into Russia, as substantial Ukrainian advances within Russia would be a strategic blow to Russian President Vladimir Putin's decades-long effort to cement a legacy of Russian stability, security, and geopolitical resurgence.
- COA (Course of Action) 1: The Russian military command may decide to use existing conscripts, Federal Security Service (FSB) border guards, Rosgvardia, and other irregular forces already deployed to the international border area to push Ukrainian forces back and defend against the Ukrainian operation in Kursk Oblast.
- COA 2: The Russian military command may decide to use the existing Northern Grouping of Forces deployed along the Russian-Ukrainian border to respond to the Ukrainian offensive in Kursk Oblast.
- COA 3: The Russian military command may choose to redeploy operational reserves that it accumulated for its planned Summer 2024 offensive effort and/or relatively better provisioned and more combat effective frontline units to Kursk Oblast from elsewhere in the theater.
- COA 4: The Russian military command may seek to maintain the forces it currently has committed to Kursk Oblast but could redeploy significant aviation and strike elements to the area in an effort to improve Russia's ability to retake territory.
- The lack of a coherent Russian response to the Ukrainian incursion into Kursk Oblast and the reported rate of Ukrainian advance indicates that Ukrainian forces were able to achieve operational surprise along the border with Russia.
- Ukrainian officials have yet to comment directly on Ukraine's ongoing operation into Kursk Oblast.
- US officials noted that Ukraine's ongoing operation into Kursk Oblast is not a violation of US restrictions on Ukraine's ability to strike military targets within Russia's border areas.
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