Annika Ganzeveld, Johanna Moore,

Siddhant Kishore, and Brian Carter

Information Cutoff: 2:00pm ET

Different elements of the Iranian regime have advocated for varying responses to Israel’s killing of Hamas Political Bureau Chairman Ismail Haniyeh in Tehran on July 31. The different messages across the regime are very likely emblematic of differences in opinion between different camps in the regime. The messages may also reflect changes in position within these camps. Senior Iranian military and security officials, as well as Iranian armed forces- and IRGC-affiliated media, have suggested that Iran and its Axis of Resistance seek to conduct a coordinated, large-scale attack on Israel. Iranian Supreme Leader Adviser Ali Shamkhani, for example, claimed on August 10 that Israel “only understands [the] language of force.” Iranian armed forces-run outlet Defa Press separately published an article on August 10 speculating that Iran could attack Tel Aviv and Haifa. The publication of this article does not necessarily mean that Iran will target Tel Aviv and Haifa, and more likely reflects the Iranian armed forces’ general desire to strike Israel directly. Other elements of the regime, including moderate President Masoud Pezeshkian, have advocated for attacking “secret Israeli bases” in Iraqi Kurdistan or Azerbaijan to avoid a direct conflict with Israel. It is not possible to conclusively determine from individual statements exactly how and when Iran will respond to Israel given that these statements intentionally and unintentionally obfuscate regime discussions and Iran’s intent behind a potential attack.

The general trends reflected in Iranian rhetoric, however, support CTP-ISW's ongoing assessment that Iran and its Axis of Resistance will most likely conduct a coordinated, large-scale attack on Israel. The number of Iranian official statements vowing a “harsh” and “forceful” response to Israel far outweigh the number of statements calling for a more limited response. CTP-ISW's assessment is also not only based on Iranian rhetorical statements, but also on CTP-ISW's prior assessments about Iranian objectives and perceived strategic requirements. CTP-ISW previously assessed that Iran likely seeks to restore deterrence after its unsuccessful April 2024 attack while simultaneously trying to avoid a large-scale war with Israel. Iran and its allies fired around 170 one-way attack drones, 30 cruise missiles, and 120 ballistic missiles at Israel in the April 2024 attack. The United States, Israel, and their allies intercepted most of the projectiles, and the Iranian attack did significantly less damage than Tehran intended. CTP-ISW previously assessed that Iran could modify its April 2024 attack model in several ways, including by increasing the volume of projectiles it fires at Israel or changing the number of locations in Israel that it targets, to increase the likelihood of inflicting serious damage on Israel. CTP-ISW will continue to track and report the general trends in Iranian rhetoric across different elements of the regime while highlighting which elements of the regime likely have the most influence.

Unspecified Iranian-backed Iraqi fighters conducted a drone attack targeting US forces at the Rumalyn Landing Zone in Hasakah Province, Syria, on August 9. An unspecified US official told Reuters that the attack does not appear to have caused injuries but that medical evaluations are ongoing. Iranian-backed Iraqi militias have claimed six attacks targeting US forces in Iraq and Syria since late mid-July 2024. CTP-ISW assessed on July 17 that Iranian-backed Iraqi militias appear to have resumed their attack campaign targeting US forces in the Middle East.

Key Takeaways:

• Iranian Retaliation: Different elements of the Iranian regime have advocated for varying responses to Israel’s killing of Hamas Political Bureau Chairman Ismail Haniyeh in Tehran on July 31. The general trends reflected in Iranian rhetoric, however, support CTP-ISW's ongoing assessment that Iran and its Axis of Resistance will most likely conduct a coordinated, large-scale attack on Israel. The different messages across the regime are very likely emblematic of differences in opinion between different camps in the regime. The messages may also reflect changes in position within these camps. It is not possible to conclusively determine from individual statements exactly how and when Iran will respond to Israel given that these statements intentionally and unintentionally obfuscate regime discussions and Iran’s intent behind a potential attack.

• Iraq and Syria: Unspecified Iranian-backed Iraqi fighters conducted a drone attack targeting US forces at the Rumalyn Landing Zone in Hasakah Province, Syria, on August 9.

• Gaza Strip: The IDF Air Force targeted a group of Hamas fighters in a mosque at the al Tabaeen school in al Daraj, Gaza City on August 10.

Click here to read the full update.

ISW–CTP has launched an interactive map of Israeli ground operations to accompany our daily campaign assessments of the Israel–Hamas war. This product complements the daily static maps that ISW-CTP produces with high-fidelity and, where possible, street-level assessments of the war in Israel.

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