Christina Harward, Angelica Evans, Grace Mappes,

Kateryna Stepanenko, Davit Gasparyan, and George Barros

August 10, 2024, 8:35pm ET 

Click here to see ISW's interactive map of the Russian invasion of Ukraine. This map is updated daily alongside the static maps present in this report.

Click here to see ISW’s 3D control-of-terrain topographic map of Ukraine. The use of a computer (not a mobile device) is strongly recommended for accessing this data-heavy tool.

Click here to access ISW’s archive of interactive time-lapse maps of the Russian invasion of Ukraine. These maps complement the static control-of-terrain maps that ISW produces daily by showing a dynamic frontline.

The Russian National Antiterrorism Committee announced a counterterrorism operation in Belgorod, Bryansk, and Kursk oblasts on August 9 in response to the Ukrainian incursion into Kursk Oblast. The Federal Security Service (FSB) Head and National Antiterrorism Committee Chairperson Alexander Bortnikov announced counterterrorism operations in Belgorod, Bryansk, and Kursk oblasts in response to "sabotage and reconnaissance units" conducting "terrorist acts" in Russia and "units of the Ukrainian armed forces" conducting a "terrorist attack" in Kursk Oblast. The counterterrorism operation allows Russian authorities to take a number of measures, including suspending or restricting communications services, monitoring telecommunication channels, confiscating vehicles, and entering private property. Russian authorities previously announced a counterterrorism operation in Belgorod Oblast for one day in May 2023 in response to raids by all-Russian pro-Ukrainian elements. The Kremlin notably did not elect to declare a formal state of war against Ukraine or martial law — more serious responses that would marshal greater Russian state resources through wider, and more domestically disruptive, mobilization.

The Kremlin likely decided to declare a counterterrorism operation — as opposed to a state of war or martial law — to downplay the scale of the Ukrainian incursion into Kursk Oblast and prevent domestic panic or backlash — demonstrating the Kremlin's reluctance to take more drastic measures to respond to the situation. Russian opposition outlet Verstka reported on August 8 that a source close to the Russian Federation Council's defense committee stated that the Russian Presidential Administration recommended that Russian deputies and senators not comment on the events in Kursk Oblast "until further notice" or discuss it as briefly as possible and refer only to official statements. Russian milbloggers have been suggesting that the Kremlin formally declare war against Ukraine and criticized the Kremlin for failing to declare martial law instead of the counterterrorism operation. The declaration of martial law notably would have allowed Russian authorities to take more drastic measures, such as prohibiting rallies and demonstrations, enacting curfews, and organizing the production of defense articles for the military. Russian President Vladimir Putin has refrained from officially declaring a state of war, has repeatedly demonstrated his unwillingness to transfer Russian society fully to a war-time footing, and has forgone declaring general mobilization as part of wider efforts to prevent domestic discontent that could threaten the stability of Putin's regime.  

Key Takeaways:

• The Russian National Antiterrorism Committee announced a counterterrorism operation in Belgorod, Bryansk, and Kursk oblasts on August 9 in response to the Ukrainian incursion into Kursk Oblast.

• The Kremlin likely decided to declare a counterterrorism operation - as opposed to a state of war or martial law - to downplay the scale of the Ukrainian incursion into Kursk Oblast and prevent domestic panic or backlash - demonstrating the Kremlin's reluctance to take more drastic measures to respond to the situation.

• Putin likely appointed Bortnikov as the head of the counterterrorist operation because Bortnikov has previously proven himself to be an effective manager during crises that threatened Russian domestic stability and the Kremlin regime.

• A complicated command and control (C2) arrangement for the FSB-led counterterrorism operation under Bortnikov may degrade the effectiveness of the Russian response to Ukraine’s operation.

• The Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) appears to be relying on a combination of Russian conscripts already operating in Kursk Oblast, elements of the Northern Grouping of Forces, and elements redeployed from lower-priority frontline areas in Ukraine to defend against the Ukrainian operation in Kursk Oblast, likely exacerbating the disorganization of Russia’s chosen response.

• Russian forces' usage of conscripts and forces already in Kursk Oblast, nearby forces fighting in northern Kharkiv Oblast, and lateral redeployments across the theater to defend against the Ukrainian incursion is consistent with a number of likely Russian courses of action (COAs) that ISW forecasted.

• The Russian MoD appears to be relying on select, battle-hardened units to conduct offensive and defensive operations in its most critical sectors of the front.

• Russian forces appear to be more adequately defending against Ukrainian assaults following the arrival of additional conscripts and more combat effective personnel from frontline areas in Ukraine.

• Geolocated footage and Russian reporting from August 10 indicates that Ukrainian forces largely maintain previously reported positions in Kursk Oblast and have advanced slightly further than their previously confirmed positions.

• Ukraine’s cross-border operation into Kursk Oblast threatens the Kremlin with a potential political crisis regarding causalities among Russian conscripts, whom the Kremlin has increasingly relied upon to defend the Russian state border with Ukraine.

• Ukrainian forces recently struck a Russian ship and a gas platform in the western Black Sea.

• Iran will reportedly deliver "hundreds" of ballistic missiles to Russia in the near future.

• Russian forces recently advanced near Kreminna, Toretsk, Pokrovsk, and Donetsk City.

• A Russian milblogger claimed that the Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) has begun to form the "Black Raven" strike drone volunteer unit and asked readers to donate to the 16-million-ruble (about $184,324) goal to supply the unit with drones and equipment.

Click here to read the full assessment.

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