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[ISW] 러시아 공세 캠페인 평가, 2024년 8월 13일

by Summa posted Aug 14, 2024
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주요 요점:

  • 볼로디미르 젤렌스키 우크라이나 대통령과 다른 고위 우크라이나 관리들은 쿠르스크 주에 대한 우크라이나의 현재 침공에 대한 업데이트를 제공하고 이 지역에서 우크라이나의 여러 목표를 설명했습니다.
  • 러시아 군사 블로거들은 러시아가 이 지역의 전선을 안정화하려는 시도 속에서 우크라이나군이 쿠르스크 주에서 계속 진격하고 있다고 주장했습니다.
  • 러시아군 사령부는 쿠르스크 주에서 우크라이나의 침공에 대처하기 위해 도네츠크 주에서 러시아 불규칙 부대의 일부를 철수하고 있을 수 있습니다.
  • 그러나 러시아 당국은 주로 러시아 징집병과 전선의 덜 중요한 구역에서 철수한 일부 정규군 및 불규칙 군부대 요소에 의존하여 현재 우크라이나의 침공에 대처하고 있는 것으로 보입니다.
  • 보도에 따르면 블라디미르 푸틴 러시아 대통령은 8월 12일에 알렉세이 듀민 러시아 대통령 보좌관을 쿠르스크 주에서 러시아의 "테러 방지 작전"을 감독하도록 임명했습니다.
  • 러시아 관리들은 우크라이나가 합법적이고 성의 있는 협상에 참여하기를 원하지 않는 것처럼 거짓으로 묘사하고 우크라이나에 평화 협상의 책임을 전가하는 오랜 크렘린 정보 작전을 계속 약화시키고 있습니다.
  • 러시아 당국은 8월 13일에 텔레그램과 왓츠앱에 "금지된" 콘텐츠를 삭제하지 않은 혐의로 각각 400만 루블(44,000달러)의 벌금을 부과했습니다.
  • 러시아군은 최근 차시브 야르 근처와 도네츠크 시 남서쪽으로 진격했고, 우크라이나군은 최근 시베르스크 방향과 자포리자주 서부에서 진격했습니다.
  • 러시아 국방부(MoD)는 모스크바에서 열리는 육군-2024 국제 군사 기술 포럼을 계속 활용하여 국제 방위 관계를 확대하고 있습니다.
``` ### 분류: 군사 ### 관련된 주요국가: 러시아, 우크라이나 ### 향후 전망: 러시아와 우크라이나 간의 전쟁은 계속될 것으로 예상되며, 러시아는 우크라이나의 영토를 더 많이 점령하려 할 것입니다. 우크라이나는 러시아의 침략에 계속 저항할 것으로 예상되며, 서방 국가들의 지원을 받을 것입니다.

[원문]

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Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment

Support ISW

Angelica Evans, Nicole Wolkov, Kateryna Stepanenko,

Davit Gasparyan, and Frederick W. Kagan



August 13, 2024, 9:30pm ET 

Click here to see ISW's interactive map of the Russian invasion of Ukraine. This map is updated daily alongside the static maps present in this report.


Click here to see ISW’s 3D control-of-terrain topographic map of Ukraine. The use of a computer (not a mobile device) is strongly recommended for accessing this data-heavy tool.


Click here to access ISW’s archive of interactive time-lapse maps of the Russian invasion of Ukraine. These maps complement the static control-of-terrain maps that ISW produces daily by showing a dynamic frontline.


NEW | Click here to see ISW's interactive map of Ukraine's incursion into Kursk Oblast.


NEW | Click here to read the major new report from Drs. Kimberly and Frederick W. Kagan, "Ukraine and the Problem of Restoring Maneuver in Contemporary War."

Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky and other senior Ukrainian officials provided updates about the ongoing Ukrainian incursion into Kursk Oblast and outlined several Ukrainian objectives of the operations in the area. Zelensky stated on August 3 that Ukrainian forces "control" 74 localities in Kursk Oblast. It is unclear if Zelensky meant that Ukrainian forces are operating in 74 settlements or if he was referring to another type of geographic administrative units. ISW has observed claims and geolocated footage indicating that Ukrainian forces are operating in or near roughly 41 settlements in Kursk Oblast as of August 13, although there are many extremely small settlements and localities within this area that ISW has not included in this count. Discrepancies between Ukrainian official reporting and ISW's observed claims and geolocated footage are not a refutation of Ukrainian official reporting but rather are a result of the inherent limitations of ISW's open-source methodology and commitment to using only publicly available information. ISW does not assess that Ukrainian forces control all of the territory within the maximalist extent of claimed Ukrainian advances according to the definition of "control" that ISW uses. Zelensky also stated that Ukrainian forces continue to advance in Kursk Oblast and grow Ukraine's "exchange fund," likely referring to Russian military personnel taken as prisoners of war (POWs). Zelensky stated that Russian forces had conducted almost 2,100 artillery strikes from Kursk Oblast against Sumy Oblast since June 1, 2024, and that Ukraine's operations into Kursk Oblast are intended to secure Ukraine's borders from the Russian military. Ukrainian Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA) Spokesperson Heorhiy Tykhyi stated on August 13 that Ukraine is not interested in seizing territory in Kursk Oblast. Tykhyi stated that Ukraine needs to protect itself from Russian strikes and push Russian forces away from Russian border areas that Russia uses to strike Ukraine. Tykhyi also noted that Ukrainian operations into Kursk Oblast prevent the Russian military from transferring additional military units to Donetsk Oblast and complicate Russian military logistics.


Tykhyi emphasized that Ukraine is not violating international law and is within its rights to defend itself from Russian aggression, and US officials reiterated a similar sentiment on August 12 and 13. US National Security Spokesperson John Kirby and US State Department Deputy Spokesperson Vedant Patel stated on August 12 and 13 in response to questions about Russia's reactions to Ukrainian operations in Kursk Oblast that Russia is conducting a war of aggression against Ukraine and that a quick solution to the Ukrainian incursion into Russia would be for Russian forces to leave Ukraine.


Russian milbloggers claimed that Ukrainian forces continue to advance in Kursk Oblast amid Russian attempts to stabilize the frontline in the area. Russian milbloggers claimed that Russian forces have not completely stabilized the situation in Kursk Oblast despite ongoing efforts to stabilize the frontline and repel Ukrainian attacks. A Russian milblogger claimed that Ukrainian forces advanced in the fields north of Snagost (south of Korenovo), and geolocated footage published on August 13 indicates that Ukrainian forces recently advanced northeast of Korenovo. The Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) and other Russian sources claimed that Russian forces repelled Ukrainian attacks near Obshchy Kolodez (northeast of Korenevo and 30 kilometers from the international border) and Alekseevsky (northwest of Korenovo and 27km from the international border), and geolocated footage published on August 13 indicates that Ukrainian forces advanced northeast of Alekseevsky. Russian milbloggers claimed that Ukrainian forces continue attacking Koronevo and Tolpino (just north of Koronevo). Russian milbloggers also claimed that Ukrainian forces seized Pogrebki (north of Sudzha and 17km from the international border). A Russian milblogger claimed that Ukrainian forces attempted to gain a foothold near Bolshoye Soldatskoye (northeast of Sudzha and 27km from the international border). Geolocated footage published on August 12 shows Ukrainian forces operating in eastern Plekhovo (south of Sudzha), and Russian milbloggers claimed that fighting was ongoing in the settlement as of the evening of August 12, although a milblogger later claimed that Russian forces repelled Ukrainian forces from the settlement on August 13. Geolocated footage published on August 12 indicates that Ukrainian forces advanced east of Giri (southwest of Sudzha), although ISW cannot confirm a Ukrainian presence in Giri at this time. Russian milbloggers claimed that Russian forces repelled a Ukrainian attack in Giri, however. Geolocated footage published on August 12 and 13 showing Ukrainian forces operating well within the maximalist claimed limit of Ukrainian advances indicates that Ukrainian forces continue operating closer to the international border in Kursk Oblast and within Sudzha. Russian milbloggers claimed on August 13 that Russian forces continued to repel Ukrainian attempts to cross the Kolotilovka border checkpoint in Belgorod Oblast (on the international border southeast of Sudzha and northwest of Belgorod City).


The Russian military command may be pulling select elements of Russian irregular units from Donetsk Oblast to address the Ukrainian incursion in Kursk Oblast. Russian sources claimed as of August 12 and 13 that elements of the Russian "Pyatnashka" Brigade's "Sarmat" Battalion and the Russian Volunteer Crops recently transferred to Kursk Oblast. ISW has recently observed claims that elements of the "Sarmat" Battalion and other elements of the "Pyatnashka" Brigade and Russian Volunteer Corps are operating in the Chasiv Yar, Toretsk, and Pokrovsk directions in Donetsk Oblast. Russian milbloggers previously claimed that elements of the "Dikaya Division of Donbas," the "Pyatnashka" Brigade, the "Arbat" Separate Guards Special Purpose Battalion, and the "Night Wolves" drone detachment responded to the incursion and quickly redeployed to Kursk Oblast, and ISW had previously observed these units purportedly operating throughout Donetsk Oblast. Irregular battalions such as the "Sarmat" Battalion are almost never fully staffed to the doctrinal end strength and even when deployed in full are still largely comprised of relatively small units. Some elements of these irregular units likely remain in the Chasiv Yar, Toretsk, and Pokrovsk directions as these are the Russian military's assessed priority sectors of the frontline in Ukraine and the Kremlin and Russian military command are unlikely to pull entire units actively engaged in combat operations from these priority sectors to address the Ukrainian incursion into Kursk Oblast.


Key Takeaways:

  • Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky and other senior Ukrainian officials provided updates about the ongoing Ukrainian incursion into Kursk Oblast and outlined several Ukrainian objectives of the operations in the area.



  • Russian milbloggers claimed that Ukrainian forces continue to advance in Kursk Oblast amid Russian attempts to stabilize the frontline in the area.


  • The Russian military command may be pulling select elements of Russian irregular units from Donetsk Oblast to address the Ukrainian incursion in Kursk Oblast.


  • Russian authorities appear to be largely relying on Russian conscripts, and elements of some regular and irregular military units pulled from less critical sectors of the frontline to address the ongoing Ukrainian incursion, however.


  • Russian President Vladimir Putin reportedly appointed Russian Presidential Aid Aide Alexei Dyumin to supervise Russia’s “counterterrorism operation” in Kursk Oblast on August 12.


  • Russian officials continue to undermine a long-standing Kremlin information operation that falsely portrays Ukraine as unwilling to engage in legitimate, good-faith negotiations and places the onus for peace negotiations on Ukraine.


  • Russian authorities fined Telegram and WhatsApp four million rubles ($44,000) each for failing to remove "prohibited" content on August 13.


  • Russian forces recently advanced near Chasiv Yar and southwest of Donetsk City, and Ukrainian forces recently advanced in the Siversk direction and in western Zaporizhia Oblast.


  • The Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) continues to use the Army-2024 International Military-Technical Forum in Moscow to expand its international defense ties.


Click here to read the full assessment.

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The Institute for the Study of War (ISW) is a non-partisan, non-profit, public policy research organization. ISW advances an informed understanding of military affairs through reliable research, trusted analysis, and innovative education. We are committed to improving the nation's ability to execute military operations and respond to emerging threats in order to achieve US strategic objectives.



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