Riley Bailey, Christina Harward, Angelica Evans, Grace Mappes, Davit Gasparyan, and Frederick W. Kagan

August 17, 2024, 10:50pm ET

Click here to see ISW's interactive map of the Russian invasion of Ukraine. This map is updated daily alongside the static maps present in this report.

Click here to see ISW’s 3D control-of-terrain topographic map of Ukraine. The use of a computer (not a mobile device) is strongly recommended for accessing this data-heavy tool.

Click here to access ISW’s archive of interactive time-lapse maps of the Russian invasion of Ukraine. These maps complement the static control-of-terrain maps that ISW produces daily by showing a dynamic frontline.

NEW | Click here to see ISW's interactive map of Ukraine's incursion into Kursk Oblast.

NEW | Click here to read the major new report from Drs. Kimberly and Frederick W. Kagan, "Ukraine and the Problem of Restoring Maneuver in Contemporary War."

The Ukrainian incursion into Kursk Oblast and Russian offensive operations in eastern Ukraine are not in themselves decisive military operations that will win the war. Both Russian and Ukrainian forces lack the capability to conduct individual decisive war-winning operations and must instead conduct multiple successive operations with limited operational objectives that are far short of victory, but that in aggregate can achieve strategic objectives. It is too early to assess the outcomes and operational significance of the Ukrainian incursion into Russia and the ongoing Russian offensive effort in eastern Ukraine. The significance of these operations will not emerge in isolation, moreover, but they will matter in so far as they relate to a series of subsequent Russian and Ukrainian campaigns over time.

The scale of the war in Ukraine prevents either side from resolving the war in a single decisive campaign. ISW recently published "Ukraine and the Problem of Restoring Maneuver in Contemporary War," wherein Dr. Frederick W. Kagan and Dr. Kimberly Kagan noted that Ukraine and Russia both have the ability to establish deep defensive positions and reserves that will prevent any single campaign from achieving strategic war aims before it culminates. Russia's and Ukraine's ability to generate enough combat power to man continuous defensive positions with no open flanks and establish tactical depth at significant points along the frontline has forced both sides to attempt penetration battles that are so costly that subsequent exploitation is often not feasible. (Ukraine, in fact, took advantage of a flank the Russians had left open in Kursk Oblast, but Russia has enough combat power to cover its frontiers if it so chooses at the cost of pursuing other objectives). Russia and Ukraine can usually establish defensive positions at some distance in the rear and sufficiently stabilize the frontline even in the event of a successful penetration and exploitation. Effective Ukrainian and Russian campaign design therefore requires forethought and planning for multiple successive operations that each set conditions for the subsequent operation. Rarely has either side been able to conduct successive operations without interruption, however, since operational pauses or decreased operational tempo have offered the other belligerent the opportunity to contest and seize the initiative.

Key Takeaways:

• The Ukrainian incursion into Kursk Oblast and Russian offensive operations in eastern Ukraine are not in themselves decisive military operations that will win the war. Both Russian and Ukrainian forces lack the capability to conduct individual decisive war-winning operations and must instead conduct multiple successive operations with limited operational objectives that are far short of victory, but that in aggregate can achieve strategic objectives.

• It is too early to assess the outcomes and operational significance of the Ukrainian incursion into Russia and the ongoing Russian offensive effort in eastern Ukraine. The significance of these operations will not emerge in isolation, moreover, but they will matter in so far as they relate to a series of subsequent Russian and Ukrainian campaigns over time.

• Russian President Vladimir Putin and the Russian military command likely view maintaining the theater-wide initiative as a strategic imperative to win a war of attrition against Ukraine, and both the Ukrainian incursion in Kursk Oblast and the Russian offensive effort in eastern Ukraine will impact whether Russian forces can retain the initiative in the short-term.

• Ukrainian officials have indicated that Ukraine's operation in Kursk Oblast does not have long-term territorial objectives but instead aims to generate theater-wide operational and strategic pressures on Russian forces.

• The Ukrainian operation in Kursk Oblast has already generated theater-wide operational and strategic pressures on Russian forces, and subsequent phases of fighting within Russia will likely generate even greater pressures on Putin and the Russian military.

• Russian forces will not be able to retain the initiative throughout eastern Ukraine indefinitely, and the culmination of Russian offensive operations will present Ukrainian forces with opportunities to contest the initiative further.

• The Russian offensive operation to seize Pokrovsk is emblematic of the Russian approach to the war in Ukraine that embraces positional warfare for gradual creeping advances and seeks to win a war of attrition.

• Ukraine's incursion into Kursk Oblast illustrates how Ukrainian forces can use maneuver warfare to offset Russian manpower and materiel advantages.

• It is simply too early to draw dispositive conclusions about the lasting effects that the two very different Russian and Ukrainian efforts will have on the course of the war.

• ISW offers these observations about the Ukrainian incursion in Kursk Oblast and the months-long Russian offensive effort in eastern Ukraine to provide a balanced framework for assessing the significance of the current Russian and Ukrainian operations on the course of the entire war, which will remain uncertain for the foreseeable future.

• Russia and Ukraine were reportedly planning to meet in Qatar in August 2024 to discuss a possible moratorium on Ukrainian and Russian strikes on energy infrastructure, but Russia temporarily postponed the summit after the start of the Ukrainian operation in Kursk Oblast.

• Russia remains uninterested in any broader, meaningful negotiations regardless of Russia's willingness to entertain or agree to a possible moratorium on energy infrastructure strikes.

• Russia is almost certainly only considering a possible moratorium on energy strikes due to Ukraine's months-long strike campaign against Russian oil refineries — demonstrating a secondary effect of Ukraine's strike campaign.



• Ukrainian forces advanced within Chasiv Yar, and Russian forces recently marginally advanced near Kreminna, Pokrovsk, and Donetsk City.

• The Russian government continues efforts to use the "Time of Heroes" program to integrate trusted Russian military veterans into Russian government roles.

Click here to read the full assessment.

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