The factors seemingly driving Iran to delay its direct attack on Israel are temporary. These factors will disappear with time, which would increase the likelihood of an Iranian attack on Israel. These factors include ongoing ceasefire-hostage talks between Israel and Hamas, the US-Israeli deterrent posture, and internal Iranian coordination and planning. These factors are not mutually exclusive; the delay in Iran’s retaliation for Israel's killing of Hamas political leader Ismail Haniyeh could be caused by any combination of these factors. Iranian officials have suggested that Iran is delaying its retaliation to account for ceasefire-hostage talks. US President Joe Biden likewise said that he expected Iran to delay or indefinitely postpone an attack on Israel if a ceasefire-hostage deal was reached. The United States explicitly communicated to Iran that Israel would mount a major military response to an Iranian attack targeting Israel, while Israel has practiced aerial refueling fighter jets to simulate “long-range flights deep into enemy territory.” Iran lastly seeks to calibrate its attack on Israel in order to establish deterrence while avoiding a major war. Iran could also use the delay to plan and coordinate the strike with other, external partners and stakeholders both inside and outside the Axis of Resistance. The factors described here will not persist indefinitely, meaning that Iran will have fewer reasons to continue delaying the attack over time.
The implication by US officials that the US deterrent posture in the Middle East decreases the risk of an Iranian attack would simultaneously imply that changing or removing the US deterrent posture increases the risk of an Iranian attack. The Pentagon deputy press secretary said that the arrival of the USS Abraham Lincoln carrier strike group (CSG) to the Middle East sends a “very powerful message of deterrence,” adding that she cannot predict how long the Abraham Lincoln CSG will stay in the region but that the United States is “well-postured” to defend Israel. It is far from clear that the Abraham Lincoln CSG or the arrival of other US military assets--including F22 stealth fighters and the USS Georgia guided missile submarine--the region deterred Iran, however. To the extent that Iranian calculus is, in fact, affected by the US military posture in the region, the Pentagon’s statements imply that changing or removing that posture would increase the likelihood of an Iranian attack.
Maintaining the US deterrent posture in the region is possible but would be tantamount to a shift in US global priorities that is inconsistent with the 2022 National Defense Strategy (NDS). The 2022 NDS identifies China as the “most comprehensive and serious challenge to US national security,” Russia as an “acute threat,” and Iran as only a “persistent” threat. Two of the four NDS defense priorities are “deterring strategic attacks against the United States” and its partners and “deterring aggression, while being prepared to prevail in conflict when necessary, prioritizing” the challenges posed by China and Russia. Maintaining the current deterrent posture in the Middle East indefinitely would mean de-facto deprioritizing establishing deterrence vis-a-vis China or Russia. There are currently no US CSGs in the Western Pacific as of August 23, 2024, for example, while two CSGs are in the Middle East.
Key Takeaways:
- Iranian Retaliation: The factors seemingly driving Iran to delay its direct attack on Israel are temporary. These factors will disappear with time, which would increase the likelihood of an Iranian attack on Israel. These factors include ongoing ceasefire-hostage talks between Israel and Hamas, the US-Israeli deterrent posture, and internal Iranian coordination and planning.
- Deterring an Iranian Retaliation: The implication by US officials that the US deterrent posture in the Middle East decreases the risk of an Iranian attack would simultaneously imply that changing or removing the US deterrent posture increases the risk of an Iranian attack. To the extent that Iranian calculus is affected by the US military posture in the region, recent statements by Pentagon officials imply that changing or removing that posture would increase the likelihood of an Iranian attack. Maintaining the US deterrent posture in the region is possible but would be tantamount to a shift in US global priorities that is inconsistent with the 2022 National Defense Strategy (NDS).
- Hamas External Operations: Palestinian sources told Israeli media that Hamas has decided to begin targeting Israeli civilians abroad, possibly due to Hamas’ decreasing ability to conduct attacks into Israel.
- Gaza Strip Ceasefire: Unspecified Hamas officials said that Hamas has rejected multiple elements of the latest US bridging proposal.
- Iraq: Some Iranian-backed Iraqi militias told Iraqi Prime Minister Mohammad Shia al Sudani that they would refrain from attacking US forces for the moment, according to an adviser to the Iraqi federal government speaking to Lebanese media.
- Iran: Unknown gunmen shot and killed the deputy police chief for security of Khash City, Sistan and Baluchistan Province, Iran, on August 23.
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