Riley Bailey, Grace Mappes, Nicole Wolkov, Davit Gasparyan, and George Barros

August 24, 2024, 8:20pm ET

Click here to see ISW's interactive map of the Russian invasion of Ukraine. This map is updated daily alongside the static maps present in this report.

Click here to see ISW’s 3D control-of-terrain topographic map of Ukraine. The use of a computer (not a mobile device) is strongly recommended for accessing this data-heavy tool.

Click here to access ISW’s archive of interactive time-lapse maps of the Russian invasion of Ukraine. These maps complement the static control-of-terrain maps that ISW produces daily by showing a dynamic frontline.

NEW | Click here to see ISW's interactive map of Ukraine's incursion into Kursk Oblast.

Click here to read the major new report from Drs. Kimberly and Frederick W. Kagan, "Ukraine and the Problem of Restoring Maneuver in Contemporary War."

Ukrainian long-range strikes against Russian military targets within Russia’s rear are crucial for degrading Russian military capabilities throughout the theater, and the lifting of restrictions on Ukraine's use of Western-provided weapons would allow Ukrainian forces to strike a wide range of significant targets undergirding Russia’s war effort. An unnamed senior Biden administration national security official reportedly stated that Ukrainian strikes with Western-provided weapons against targets within Russia would not be effective because the Russian military has redeployed military aircraft from Russian airbases near Ukraine — but this assessment ignores how Russian forces are leveraging sanctuary space in deep rear areas within Russia for a wide array of infrastructure besides airfields to support military operations against Ukraine. Politico reported on August 23 that an unnamed senior Biden administration national security official stated that Russian officials have moved some targets out of range of Western-provided Storm Shadow and ATACMS missiles and that Ukrainian forces only have a limited supply of these missiles. An unnamed administration official also reportedly stated that Russian forces have moved 90 percent of the aircraft that conduct glide bomb strikes from Russian airspace away from airfields within range of Storm Shadow and ATACMS missiles. ISW has observed confirmation of redeployments of Russian aircraft to airfields out of range of Western-provided long-range weapons; and the reported decreased Russian aviation activity throughout the theater is consistent with reports that Russian forces have been redeploying aviation assets.

The redeployment of Russian air assets from Russian air bases in range of ATACMS does not remove the utility of using ATACMS against other Russian military targets, however. ISW assesses that there are at least 250 military and paramilitary objects in Russia within range of ATACMS missiles that the United States has provided Ukraine. The United States currently prohibits Ukrainian forces from using ATACMS missiles to strike military targets in Russia, however, and only allows strikes using US-provided HIMARS equipped with GMLRS — at maximum permitting Ukraine to strike only 20 out of the 250 objects it could strike with ATACMS. Only 17 of these 250 objects are airfields, and it is unlikely that the Russian military has redeployed assets away from all the other 233 objects to the same degree as it has reportedly done with aviation assets.

Key Takeaways:

• Ukrainian long-range strikes against Russian military targets within Russia’s rear are crucial for degrading Russian military capabilities throughout the theater, and the lifting of restrictions on Ukraine's use of Western-provided weapons would allow Ukrainian forces to strike a wide range of significant targets undergirding Russia’s war effort.

• An unnamed senior Biden administration national security official reportedly stated that Ukrainian strikes with Western-provided weapons against targets within Russia would not be effective because the Russian military has redeployed military aircraft from Russian airbases near Ukraine — but this assessment ignores how Russian forces are leveraging sanctuary space in deep rear areas within Russia for a wide array of infrastructure besides airfields to support military operations against Ukraine.

• The redeployment of Russian air assets from Russian air bases in range of ATACMS does not remove the utility of using ATACMS against other Russian military targets, however.

• Ukrainian forces do not have to strike every single Russian military and paramilitary object in Russia within range of Western-provided weapons to start generating significant operational pressures on the Russian military.

• Recent successful Ukrainian strikes against Russian military targets within ATACMS range with Ukraine’s own domestically produced precision weapons demonstrate that Ukraine still has a requirement to conduct strikes that lifting the US restrictions could help fill.

• Some US officials assess that the Russian military will likely need to redeploy significant forces from Ukraine and/or operational reserves to repel Ukrainian forces from Russian territory.

• Ukrainian forces continued offensive operations within their salient in Kursk Oblast on August 24, and neither Russian nor Ukrainian forces made any significant claimed advances.

• Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky commented on some of the objectives of the Ukrainian operation into Kursk Oblast on August 24.

• Ukraine and Russia conducted their first prisoner of war (POW) exchange since the Ukrainian incursion into Kursk Oblast.

• Russian forces recently advanced near Toretsk and Pokrovsk.

• Kursk Oblast officials announced the creation of the BARS-Kursk volunteer detachment on August 24 and stated that the detachment will fight solely within Kursk Oblast.

Click here to read the full assessment.

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