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[ISW] 러시아의 공세 캠페인 평가, 2024년 8월 29일

by Summa posted Aug 30, 2024
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Key Takeaways

주요 요점:

  • 러시아군은 현재 포크로프스크를 점령하기 위한 공세 작전의 일환으로 두 가지 즉각적인 전술적 노력을 추진하고 있습니다. 포크로프스크 동쪽의 노보흐로디브카-흐로디브카 노선을 따라 미르노흐라드를 점령하고 포크로프스크 외곽까지 진격하는 전술적 노력과 포크로프스크 남동쪽의 셀리도베-우크라인스크-히르닉 노선을 따라 포크로프스크 방향으로 러시아의 돌출부를 확대하고 우크라이나의 반격에 대한 취약성을 제거하는 또 다른 전술적 노력이 있습니다.
  • 러시아군은 이러한 준비 노력이 좌절되더라도 포크로프스크에서 도시 전투를 시작할 수 있지만, 러시아군 사령부는 포크로프스크 자체를 점령하기 위한 더 많은 자원이 필요한 노력을 시작하기 전에 이러한 전술적 노력을 모두 달성하는 것을 목표로 할 것입니다.
  • 러시아 당국은 쿠르스크주에 대한 우크라이나의 침공에 대응하여 새로운 자원봉사 영토 방어 부대를 창설하고 있습니다. 이는 러시아 대통령 블라디미르 푸틴이 사회적 불만의 위험이나 동부 우크라이나에서 진행 중인 러시아의 공세 작전을 방해할 수 있는 대규모 재배치로 인해 동원을 더욱 심각하게 대응하지 않으려는 의지를 강조합니다.
  • 우크라이나군은 최근 수자 북쪽으로 약간 진격했고, 러시아군은 8월 29일에 쿠르스크주의 일부 지역을 탈환했습니다.
  • 우크라이나 참모본부는 8월 29일에 우크라이나 F-16 전투기가 대규모 러시아 드론 및 미사일 공격을 방어하다 추락했다고 보고했습니다.
  • 러시아 당국은 8월 29일에 전 러시아 국방부 차관 육군 대장 파벨 포포프를 대규모 사기 혐의로 체포하고 기소했습니다.
  • 러시아 대통령 블라디미르 푸틴은 몽골이 로마 규정에 서명한 국가이고 몽골이 국제형사재판소(ICC)에서 푸틴에 대한 체포 영장을 집행할 법적 의무가 있음에도 불구하고 몽골을 공식 방문할 예정입니다.
  • 우크라이나 참모본부는 8월 29일에 우크라이나군이 8월 27일부터 28일 밤에 로스토프주에 있는 아틀라스 정유 공장과 키로프주에 있는 제니트 석유 저장소를 공격했다고 확인했습니다.
  • 러시아군은 최근 쿠피얀스크, 토레츠크, 포크로프스크, 도네츠크 시 근처에서 진격했습니다.
  • 러시아 정부는 계속해서 피고인들이 군 복무 계약을 체결할 수 있는 경로를 확대하고 있습니다.
### 분류: * 군사 * 정치 * 외교 ### 관련된 주요국가: * 러시아 * 우크라이나 * 몽골 ### 향후 전망: * 러시아군은 포크로프스크를 점령하기 위한 노력을 계속할 것이다. * 우크라이나군은 러시아의 공세를 저지하고 반격을 시도할 것이다. * 러시아와 우크라이나 간의 전쟁은 장기화될 가능성이 있다.

[원문]

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Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment

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Riley Bailey, Angelica Evans, Grace Mappes, Davit Gasparyan, and George Barros


August 29, 2024, 8:50pm ET

Click here to see ISW's interactive map of the Russian invasion of Ukraine. This map is updated daily alongside the static maps present in this report.


Click here to see ISW’s 3D control-of-terrain topographic map of Ukraine. The use of a computer (not a mobile device) is strongly recommended for accessing this data-heavy tool.


Click here to access ISW’s archive of interactive time-lapse maps of the Russian invasion of Ukraine. These maps complement the static control-of-terrain maps that ISW produces daily by showing a dynamic frontline.


Click here to see ISW's interactive map of Ukraine's incursion into Kursk Oblast.

Click here to read the major new report from Drs. Kimberly and Frederick W. Kagan, "Ukraine and the Problem of Restoring Maneuver in Contemporary War."

Russian forces are currently pursuing two immediate tactical efforts as part of their ongoing offensive operation to seize Pokrovsk — a tactical effort along the Novohrodivka-Hrodivka line east of Pokrovsk to seize Myrnohrad and advance up to Pokrovsk's outskirts, and another tactical effort along the Selydove-Ukrainsk-Hirnyk line southeast of Pokrovsk aimed at widening Russia's salient in the Pokrovsk direction and eliminating vulnerabilities to Ukrainian counterattacks. The Russian military command likely views both of these tactical efforts as desired prerequisites for launching an intensified offensive effort against Pokrovsk itself. Ukrainian Commander-in-Chief General Oleksandr Syrskyi stated on August 29 that the most intense battles in the Pokrovsk direction are ongoing on the eastern outskirts of Hrodivka (east of Pokrovsk), southwest of Hrodivka near Krasnyi Yar, within Novohrodivka (southeast of Pokrovsk), and immediately east of Selydove near Mykhailivka (southeast of Pokrovsk). ISW has observed Russian gains in these areas in recent days, but Russian milbloggers have claimed that Russian forces have made more significant tactical gains in the Pokrovsk direction than what observed visually confirmed evidence currently supports. Russian milbloggers claimed that Russian forces advanced up to the southeastern outskirts of Myrnohrad (immediately east of Pokrovsk) and have begun small arms battles with Ukrainian forces in the town, although a Ukrainian military observer described the Russian forces operating in the town as sabotage and reconnaissance groups. Russian milbloggers claimed that Russian forces have advanced in much of eastern Selydove and have reached the center of the town. Russian milbloggers also claimed that Russian forces are fighting on the northeastern outskirts of Ukrainsk (southeast of Pokrovsk), seized Memryk (immediately northeast of Ukrainsk), and entered Halitsynivka (immediately east of Ukrainsk).


Russian forces appear to be attempting to maintain their rate of advance along the Novohrodivka-Hrodivka line to quickly seize Myrnohrad and reach the outskirts of Pokrovsk. The reported Russian advance from Novohrodivka to Myrnohrad's outskirts likely aims to bypass what Russian sources have characterized as major Ukrainian defensive positions northwest and west of Hrodivka. Russian forces recently enveloped Ukrainian positions southeast of Pokrovsk along the Karlivske Reservoir and prompted Ukrainian forces to withdraw from limited positions in the area. Russian forces likely hope to achieve a similar effect by trying to envelop Ukrainian positions between Myrnohrad and Hrodivka, although it remains unclear if Russian forces can maintain their relatively rapid rate of advance through the comparatively larger town of Myrnohrad and its surroundings. Russian forces may attempt to fight directly through Ukrainian defensive positions along the Novohrodivka-Hrodivka line, despite the higher costs, in order to maintain their rate of advance and try to seize Myrnohrad more quickly. Russian efforts to seize Myrnohrad do not preclude Russian forces from advancing up to the eastern outskirts of Pokrovsk, and the Russian military will likely pursue these tactical goals in tandem.


Reported Russian advances into Selydove and in the direction of Ukrainsk and Hirnyk likely aim to eliminate a relatively large Ukrainian salient on the southern edge of the wider Russian salient in the Pokrovsk direction that could threaten Russia's offensive effort in the area. Ukrainian positions east of the Selydove-Ukrainsk-Hirnyk line offer Ukrainian forces opportunities to threaten the Russian rear in the Pokrovsk direction, and the Russian military command is likely concerned about Ukrainian counterattacks and fires disrupting Russian offensive efforts as Russian forces deploy logistics, artillery elements, and force concentrations westward into the forward part of the salient to support the intensified effort on Pokrovsk itself. The Russian military command also likely aims to expand and stabilize the southern flank of the Russian salient in the area in order to prevent Ukrainian forces from threatening the gains Russia has made in its 2024 offensive effort once Russian offensive operations in the Pokrovsk direction culminate. The Russian salient is roughly 21 kilometers wide at its base from the Ukrainian salient east of the Selydove-Ukrainsk-Hirnyk line to Ukrainian positions north of Avdiivka along the H-20 (Avdiivka-Kostyantynivka) highway. Russian positions along the E-50 (Donetsk City-Pokrovsk) highway southwest of Avdiivka are roughly 13 kilometers from Avdiivka, whereas the current line of Russian advance along the Novohrodivka-Hrodivka line is 30 kilometers from Avdiivka. Significant Ukrainian counterattacks from the base of the salient towards Avdiivka could threaten to encircle the Russian force grouping deployed forward in the salient, and the Russian military command likely aims to preempt this possibility by eliminating the Ukrainian salient on the southern flank of the Pokrovsk direction.


Russian forces likely hope that advances in the direction of Ukrainsk and Hirnyk will mutually support ongoing offensive operations west of Donetsk City and that offensive pressure from both directions will overwhelm Ukrainian forces or prompt Ukraine to withdraw from the limited positions in the rural open areas east of Ukrainsk and Hirnyk. The area north of Krasnohorivka (west of Donetsk City) is mainly comprised of open fields with limited cover or concealment from relatively few windbreaks, and Russian advances through this terrain would likely require significant successful mechanized assaults, which Russian forces have routinely struggled to conduct. Russian forces have proven more adept at advancing from settlement to settlement with small infantry groups in the Pokrovsk direction, although it remains to be seen if Russian infantry groups can maintain their rate of advance as they approach Ukrainsk and Hirnyk.


The Russian military command likely aims to achieve both of these tactical efforts before launching the more resource-intensive effort to seize Pokrovsk itself, although Russian forces may begin urban combat in Pokrovsk regardless if progress stalls on these preparatory efforts. It remains unclear if the Russian military command intends for Russian forces to fight their way entirely through Pokrovsk in frontal urban combat, as they have through the smaller towns east and southeast of Pokrovsk, or aims to envelop or encircle the city as Russian forces previously attempted and failed to do against Bakhmut and Avdiivka.[11] The Russian military command's calculus about what preparatory actions are required for launching offensive operations on the city of Pokrovsk and how Russian forces will attempt to seize the city will likely depend on where Ukrainian forces decide to engage in significant defensive efforts. ISW will not speculate or forecast about future Ukrainian defensive efforts, however.


Key Takeaways:


  • Russian forces are currently pursuing two immediate tactical efforts as part of their ongoing offensive operation to seize Pokrovsk — a tactical effort along the Novohrodivka-Hrodivka line east of Pokrovsk to seize Myrnohrad and advance up to Pokrovsk's outskirts, and another tactical effort along the Selydove-Ukrainsk-Hirnyk line southeast of Pokrovsk aimed at widening Russia's salient in the Pokrovsk direction and eliminating vulnerabilities to Ukrainian counterattacks.


  • The Russian military command likely aims to achieve both of these tactical efforts before launching the more resource-intensive effort to seize Pokrovsk itself, although Russian forces may begin urban combat in Pokrovsk regardless if progress stalls on these preparatory efforts.


  • Russian authorities are creating new volunteer territorial defense units in response to the Ukrainian incursion into Kursk Oblast, highlighting Russian President Vladimir Putin's unwillingness to counter the incursion more seriously with a mobilization due to the risks of societal discontent or with large-scale redeployments due to possible disruptions to Russia's ongoing offensive operations in eastern Ukraine.


  • Ukrainian forces recently marginally advanced north of Sudzha as Russian forces recaptured some areas of Kursk Oblast on August 29.


  • The Ukrainian General Staff reported on August 29 that a Ukrainian F-16 fighter jet recently crashed while defending against a large-scale Russian drone and missile strike.


  • Russian authorities arrested and charged former Russian Deputy Defense Minister Army General Pavel Popov with large-scale fraud on August 29.


  • Russian President Vladimir Putin will conduct an official visit to Mongolia despite Mongolia's status as a signatory to the Rome Statue and Mongolia’s legal obligation to enforce an arrest warrant for Putin from the International Criminal Court (ICC).


  • The Ukrainian General Staff confirmed on August 29 that Ukrainian forces struck the Atlas Oil Refinery in Rostov Oblast and the Zenit Oil Depot in Kirov Oblast on the night of August 27 to 28.


  • Russian forces recently advanced near Kupyansk, Toretsk, Pokrovsk, and Donetsk City.


  • The Russian government continues to expand pathways for accused criminals to sign military service contracts.

Click here to read the full assessment.

NEW | Interactive Map: Hundreds of Known Russian Military Objects Are in Range of ATACMS

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