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[ISW] 이스라엘-하마스 전쟁(이란) 업데이트, 2024년 9월 2일

by Summa posted Sep 03, 2024
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중동 주요 국가들의 최근 동향

주요 사항:

  • 이란: 마수드 페제쉬키안 행정부는 서방과의 핵 협상 의지를 계속해서 표명하고 있습니다. 이란 언론은 9월 2일 아바스 아라그치 외무장관이 마지드 타흐트 라반치를 정무 담당 외무부 차관으로 임명했다고 보도했습니다. 아라그치는 이 글을 쓰는 시점까지 라반치의 임명을 공식적으로 발표하지 않았습니다. 라반치는 2015년 핵 합의를 체결하는 데 도움을 준 전 대통령 하산 로하니 하에서 이란 핵 협상 팀의 일원이었습니다.
  • 러시아-이란 관계: 이란은 우크라이나 침공을 지원하기 위해 "임박하게" 러시아에 탄도 미사일을 제공할 것으로 예상됩니다.
  • 이란의 보복: 이란 국방대학교 이스마일 아마디 모가담 준장은 9월 2일 이스라엘을 불안 상태로 유지하는 것이 "군사 공격보다 못하지 않다"고 말했습니다. 모가담은 이란의 지휘 체계에 속하지 않지만 그의 발언은 이스라엘에 대한 "심리전"을 사용하는 장점을 논의하는 이란의 방위 및 안보 분야에서 진행 중인 더 큰 대화를 대표합니다.
  • 정전 협상: 하마스는 9월 2일 인질 선전을 공개했는데, 이는 하마스가 정전 협정에서 하마스에 더 유리한 조건을 만들고 이스라엘 국가를 약화시킬 수 있다고 계산한 국내 이스라엘 압력을 증가시키려는 의도였을 가능성이 큽니다.
  • 정전 협상에 대한 이스라엘의 반응: 이스라엘의 정치 및 군사 지도자들은 하마스가 가자지구에서 6명의 이스라엘 인질을 처형한 후 9월 1일 정전-인질 거래에 대한 최선의 경로에 대해 논쟁했습니다.
  • 정전 협상에 대한 하마스의 반응: 하마스의 수석 협상가인 칼릴 알 하야는 9월 1일 정전-인질 회담의 진행 상황에 대해 부정적으로 말하고 하마스의 극대주의적 협상 입장을 재천명했습니다.

분류: 중동 정세 관련 주요 국가: 이란, 러시아, 이스라엘 향후 전망: 이란과 서방 국가들 간의 핵 협상 재개 가능성, 러시아-우크라이나 전쟁의 전개, 이스라엘과 하마스 간의 정전 협상 진행 상황에 주목 필요

[원문]

Iran Update

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Andie Parry, Annika Ganzeveld, Katherine Wells,

Johanna Moore, Kathyrn Tyson, and Brian Carter


Information Cutoff: 2:00pm ET

The Masoud Pezeshkian administration is continuing to signal its willingness to pursue nuclear negotiations with the West. Iranian media reported on September 2 that Foreign Affairs Minister Abbas Araghchi appointed Majid Takht Ravanchi as deputy foreign affairs minister for political affairs. Araghchi has not officially announced Ravanchi’s appointment at the time of this writing. Ravanchi was part of the Iranian nuclear negotiating team under former President Hassan Rouhani that helped conclude the 2015 Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) between Iran and the P5+1. The P5+1 is composed of the five permanent members of the UN Security Council plus Germany. Ravanchi also served as the Iranian ambassador to the UN between April 2019 and August 2022. Pezeshkian’s appointment of Araghchi—who himself played a prominent role in the nuclear negotiations under Rouhani—as Iranian foreign affairs minister and Araghchi’s appointment of Ravanchi as his political deputy underscores the Pezeshkian administration’s serious intent to resume nuclear negotiations with the West. International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) Director General Rafael Grossi separately stated that Pezeshkian has indicated to him “a potential for renewed dialogue aimed at ensuring the peaceful nature of Iran’s nuclear activities” during an interview with Saudi-owned al Arabiya on September 2. Grossi previously indicated on August 30 that Pezeshkian had agreed to a bilateral meeting in the “near future.” It is unclear to what extent Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei will permit the Pezeshkian administration to pursue nuclear negotiations with the West, although Khamenei has expressed support in recent weeks for engaging in negotiations in order to remove international sanctions on Iran.


Hamas released hostage propaganda on September 2 that likely intended to increase domestic Israeli pressure that Hamas likely calculates could create more favorable terms for Hamas in a ceasefire agreement and weaken the Israeli state. Hamas released propaganda videos featuring six recently executed Israeli hostages on September 2 calling for a ceasefire and hostage-for-prisoner exchange. Hamas also released a graphic in Hebrew stating that Israel will only secure the release of living hostages through negotiations, not military operations. Hamas has previously released hostage propaganda during periods of unrest and during ceasefire negotiations. These videos are part of an information operation that aims to undermine Israeli public support for the ground operation in the Gaza Strip. Hamas leaders likely seek to exacerbate the tensions in the Israeli domestic sphere and cause further psychological distress by airing this propaganda. Hamas leaders may believe that the Israeli public and officials will increase pressure on Israeli Prime Minister Netanyahu to drop demands from ceasefire negotiations that Hamas dislikes, such as continued control over the Philadelphi Corridor. Maintaining Israeli control of the Philadelphi Corridor would help prevent Hamas and other Palestinian militias from rebuilding their capabilities quickly by interdicting major smuggling operations into the Gaza Strip that would accelerate Hamas’ ability to resupply itself, as CTP-ISW has previously argued.


Israeli political and military leaders argued over the best path to a ceasefire-hostage deal on September 1 after Hamas executed six Israeli hostages in the Gaza Strip. Israeli Defense Minister Yoav Gallant criticized the August 29 decision by Israel’s political-security cabinet to back Netanyahu’s proposal to maintain an IDF presence on the Philadelphi Corridor. Gallant reportedly argued in a private cabinet meeting that prioritizing IDF control over the Philadelphi Corridor for six weeks over securing the release of dozens of living hostages is the wrong decision and should be reversed. Gallant said that the IDF could retake the corridor in eight hours if it withdrew. Netanyahu argued that repealing the security cabinet’s decision would send the wrong message to Hamas and incentivize the militias to kill more Israeli hostages. Netanyahu added that the Philadelphi Corridor is Hamas’ “oxygen pipe” and a withdrawal from the corridor would restore Hamas’ rule and military capabilities. Several other members of the cabinet disagreed with Gallant’s public suggestion to reverse the August 29 cabinet decision.


Israel's national workers union announced a general strike on September 2 in support of an immediate ceasefire deal and hostage-release. Israeli media reported that hundreds of thousands of Israelis demonstrated in support of a ceasefire in major Israeli cities. The recovery of six Israeli hostages who had been executed by Hamas in the Gaza Strip on September 1 spurred the strike and protests. Ben Gurion International Airport and some schools shut down during the strike. The Israeli labor court ruled on September 2 that the strike was political and therefore illegal. The national workers union agreed to end the strike prematurely due to the court ruling. Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu reportedly condemned the protests and said that the demonstrations supported Hamas.


The Biden administration is considering submitting a new “final” ceasefire-hostage deal proposal to Israel and Hamas in the coming days, according to Axios. National Security Adviser Jake Sullivan and White House Coordinator for the Middle East and North Africa Brett McGurk told hostage family members on September 1 that the United States may present a new bridging proposal after mediators made significant progress on the specifics of the hostage-prisoner exchange component of the ceasefire deal over the last week of talks. The United States last submitted a “bridging proposal“ to Israel and Hamas on August 16. The new text is expected to include a US proposal about Israeli presence on the Philadelphi Corridor. The Israeli presence in the Philadelphi Corridor is currently a major hurdle in talks. Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu added a stipulation in July that Israeli forces would maintain control over the corridor for the first phase of the ceasefire deal, which would be six weeks long.


Key Takeaways:

  • Iran: The Masoud Pezeshkian administration is continuing to signal its willingness to pursue nuclear negotiations with the West. Iranian media reported on September 2 that Foreign Affairs Minister Abbas Araghchi appointed Majid Takht Ravanchi as deputy foreign affairs minister for political affairs. Araghchi has not officially announced Ravanchi’s appointment at the time of this writing. Ravanchi was part of the Iranian nuclear negotiating team under former President Hassan Rouhani that helped conclude the 2015 nuclear deal.


  • Russo-Iranian Relations: Iran is expected to “imminently” deliver ballistic missiles to Russia to support the Russian invasion of Ukraine.


  • Iranian Retaliation: Iranian Supreme National Defense University President Brigadier General Esmail Ahmadi Moghaddam stated on September 2 that keeping Israel in a state of anxiety is “no less than a military strike.” Moghaddam is not within the Iranian chain of command but his statements are representative of the larger ongoing public conversation in Iranian defense and security circles discussing the merits of employing ”psychological warfare” against Israel.


  • Ceasefire Negotiations: Hamas released hostage propaganda on September 2 that likely intended to increase domestic Israeli pressure that Hamas likely calculates could create more favorable terms for Hamas in a ceasefire agreement and weaken the Israeli state.


  • Israeli Reactions to Ceasefire Negotiations: Israeli political and military leaders argued over the best path to a ceasefire-hostage deal on September 1 after Hamas executed six Israeli hostages in the Gaza Strip.


  • Hamas Reactions to Ceasefire Negotiations: Hamas’ lead negotiator, Khalil al Hayya, spoke negatively about the progress of ceasefire-hostage talks and restated Hamas’ maximalist negotiation position on September 1.


Click here to read the full update.

ISW–CTP has launched an interactive map of Israeli ground operations to accompany our daily campaign assessments of the IsraelHamas war. This product complements the daily static maps that ISW-CTP produces with high-fidelity and, where possible, street-level assessments of the war in Israel.

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