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[ISW] 러시아의 공세 캠페인 평가, 2024년 9월 5일

by Summa posted Sep 06, 2024
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```html 러시아군의 도네츠크 주 서부 공세 강화

주요 요점:

  • 러시아군은 최근 도네츠크 시 서쪽과 남서쪽에 있는 우크라이나의 광범위한 돌출부를 제거하고 H-15(도네츠크 시-자포리지아 시) 고속도로까지 진격하기 위한 오랜 공세를 강화했습니다.
  • 포크로프스크 방향의 남쪽 측면에서 우흘레다르 주변의 우크라이나 방어선 서쪽 측면까지 러시아의 공세 작전이 조정된 것으로 보이며, 도네츠크 주 서부를 방어하는 우크라이나군에 대한 압력을 증가시키고 포크로프스크 방향에서 러시아의 우선 공세에 대한 추가 이득을 위한 조건을 마련하는 것이 목표일 가능성이 큽니다.
  • 러시아군은 도네츠크 시의 남서쪽과 서쪽에서 비교적 강화된 공세 작전을 수행하고 있으며, 우흘레다르 근처에서 러시아 공세 작전이 강화된다고 해서 단기적으로 도네츠크 주 서부의 다른 지역에서 러시아 공세 속도가 감소할 것이라고 예상할 수는 없습니다.
  • 러시아군은 포크로프스크 돌출부의 남쪽 측면을 넓히기 시작한 직후 우흘레다르 근처에서 공세 작전을 강화했으며, 이는 러시아군이 포크로프스크 방향의 남쪽 측면, 도네츠크 시 바로 서쪽, 0-0532 고속도로를 따라, 그리고 우흘레다르 근처에서 상호 강화되는 공세 작전을 수행하려는 의도가 있음을 시사합니다.
  • 러시아군은 쿠라호베와 우흘레다르를 점령하여 러시아군이 H-15 고속도로까지 더 빠르게 전술적 이득을 얻을 수 있도록 하려고 할 가능성이 크지만, 러시아군은 도네츠크 주 서부의 광범위한 우크라이나 돌출부를 제거하기 위해 이러한 정착지를 점령하려는 계획을 활용하는 데 어려움을 겪을 가능성이 큽니다.
  • 러시아군 사령부는 포크로프스크에 대한 공세에 계속 우선순위를 두고 있으며, 도네츠크 주 서부에서 강화된 노력을 보조적인 노력으로 취급할 가능성이 큽니다. 러시아군 사령부는 이 보조적인 노력이 성공 여부에 관계없이 도네츠크 주 서부에 우크라이나군을 고정시키고 포크로프스크 방어를 강화하기 위한 우크라이나의 재배치를 방지하려고 할 것입니다.
  • 러시아 대통령 블라디미르 푸틴은 쿠르스크 주에 대한 우크라이나의 침공이 전역 작전에 미치는 영향을 계속해서 축소하고 있으며, 쿠르스크 침공에 대한 크렘린의 지연되고 무질서한 대응이 도네츠크 주에서 러시아가 더욱 진격하기 위한 수용 가능한 대가라는 것을 러시아 국민에게 계속해서 설득하려고 노력하고 있습니다.
  • 쿠르스크 주에 대한 우크라이나의 침공은 전역에 영향을 미쳤으며, 이러한 영향은 포크로프스크 공세가 끝난 후에도 러시아의 공격 및 방어 능력에 영향을 미칠 가능성이 큽니다.
  • 푸틴의 정보 노력은 쿠르스크 주에 우크라이나가 계속 존재하는 것이 포크로프스크를 러시아가 점령하는 대가로 용인될 수 있다고 러시아 국민을 설득하기 위한 것으로 보입니다.
  • 도네츠크 주에서의 러시아의 공세 작전은 푸틴이 도네츠크 주에서의 진격을 극적으로 묘사하려는 노력에도 불구하고 우크라이나 전역에서 전선이 곧바로 붕괴될 것이라는 것을 예고하지 않습니다.
  • 러시아군은 최근 쿠피얀스크 남동쪽의 차시브 야르와 헤르손 방향으로 진격했으며, 우크라이나군은 최근 하르키우 시 북쪽의 위치를 되찾았습니다.
  • 러시아군은 점령한 우크라이나에서 동원된 러시아 군인을 전선으로 강제로 재배치하여 러시아의 암호화된 동원 노력을 지원하고 있습니다.

분류:

  • 군사
  • 국제 관계

관련된 주요국가:

  • 러시아
  • 우크라이나
  • 미국

향후 전망:

  • 러시아군은 도네츠크 주 서부에서 공세를 계속 강화할 것으로 예상되며, 우크라이나군은 이에 맞서 방어를 강화할 것입니다.
  • 러시아군이 포크로프스크를 점령하면 도네츠크 주에서 더욱 진격할 수 있을 것이며, 우크라이나군은 이를 막기 위해 노력할 것입니다.
  • 러시아와 우크라이나 간의 전쟁은 장기화될 것으로 예상되며, 양측 모두 많은 사상자를 낼 것입니다.
```

[원문]

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Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment

Support ISW

Riley Bailey, Angelica Evans, Davit Gasparyan, Nicole Wolkov, and Frederick W. Kagan


September 5, 2024, 8:30pm ET

Click here to see ISW's interactive map of the Russian invasion of Ukraine. This map is updated daily alongside the static maps present in this report.


Click here to see ISW’s 3D control-of-terrain topographic map of Ukraine. The use of a computer (not a mobile device) is strongly recommended for accessing this data-heavy tool.


Click here to access ISW’s archive of interactive time-lapse maps of the Russian invasion of Ukraine. These maps complement the static control-of-terrain maps that ISW produces daily by showing a dynamic frontline.


Click here to see ISW's interactive map of Ukraine's incursion into Kursk Oblast.

Click here to read the major new report from Drs. Kimberly and Frederick W. Kagan, "Ukraine and the Problem of Restoring Maneuver in Contemporary War."

Russian forces have recently intensified their longstanding offensive effort to eliminate the broad Ukrainian salient west and southwest of Donetsk City and advance up to and along the H-15 (Donetsk City-Zaporizhzhia City) highway. Apparently coordinated Russian offensive operations from the southern flank of the Pokrovsk direction to the western flank of the Ukrainian defense around Vuhledar likely aim to increase pressure on Ukrainian forces defending in western Donetsk Oblast and set conditions for further gains in Russia's prioritized offensive effort in the Pokrovsk direction. Russian forces have recently significantly intensified their offensive operations near Vuhledar as of September 1 (southwest of Donetsk City) and have so far made marginal tactical gains in the area. Geolocated footage published on September 5 indicates that Russian forces recently advanced into central Prechystivka (west of Vuhledar) during a roughly company-sized mechanized assault. Additional geolocated footage published on September 5 shows reported elements of the Russian 40th Naval Infantry Brigade (Pacific Fleet, Eastern Military District [EMD]) raising a Russian flag in northwestern Prechystivka, indicating that Russian forces have likely seized the settlement. Russian milbloggers claimed that Ukrainian forces have withdrawn from Zolota Nyva (immediately west of Prechystivka) and that Russian forces are continuing to advance in the area. Geolocated footage published on September 5 indicates that Russian forces recently advanced immediately east of Vuhledar near the Pivdennodonbaska Mine No. 1. A Ukrainian open-source account published additional footage showing Russian forces conducting several platoon-sized mechanized assaults near Makarivka (south of Velyka Novosilka and west of Vuhledar) and Prechystivka in recent days. The Ukrainian account stated that elements of the Russian 60th Motorized Rifle Brigade (5th Combined Arms Army [CAA], EMD), 394th Motorized Rifle Regiment (127th Motorized Rifle Division, 5th CAA, EMD), and 218th Tank Regiment (127th Motorized Rifle Division, 5th CAA, EMD) attacked near Makarivka and that elements of the 40th Naval Infantry Brigade, 5th Tank Brigade (36th CAA, EMD), 37th Motorized Rifle Brigade (36th CAA, EMD), and 430th Motorized Rifle Regiment (likely a mobilized unit) are attacking near Prechystivka. Russian President Vladimir Putin acknowledged the intensified Russian offensive operations in the area during a speech at the Eastern Economic Forum in Vladivostok, Primorsky Krai on September 5, claiming that the Russian Eastern Grouping of Forces (responsible for the front roughly from Vuhledar to Hulyaipole) seized "a triangle" of territory five to seven kilometers deep on September 3.


Russian forces are conducting relatively intensified offensive operations elsewhere southwest and west of Donetsk City, and the intensification of Russian offensive operations near Vuhledar likely does not presage decreased Russian offensive tempo elsewhere in western Donetsk Oblast in the near-term. A Ukrainian airborne brigade operating southwest of Donetsk City published footage on September 4 of Ukrainian forces repelling a reinforced company-sized Russian mechanized assault comprised of four tanks and 17 armored combat vehicles near Kostyantynivka. Russian forces intensified both the regularity and size of mechanized assaults west and southwest of Donetsk City in late July 2024 and have since routinely conducted relatively large mechanized assaults in the area — although these assaults have only resulted in marginal tactical gains. Russian forces appeared to initially intensify offensive operations southwest of Donetsk City in late July in order to achieve their longstanding tactical objective of cutting the 0-0532 (Kostyantynivka-Vuhledar) highway, but have since continued large mechanized assaults in the area after achieving this objective. Intensified Russian efforts to exploit gains in the Pokrovsk direction and Russian redeployments in response to the Ukrainian incursion into Kursk Oblast have yet to disrupt the Russian offensive tempo west and southwest of Donetsk City, however. Continued large and costly Russian mechanized assaults suggest that the Russian military command has tasked elements of both the Eastern and Southern Grouping of Forces in the area with a wider operational objective.


Key Takeaways:


  • Russian forces have recently intensified their longstanding offensive effort to eliminate the broad Ukrainian salient west and southwest of Donetsk City and advance up to and along the H-15 (Donetsk City-Zaporizhzhia City) highway.


  • Apparently coordinated Russian offensive operations from the southern flank of the Pokrovsk direction to the western flank of the Ukrainian defense around Vuhledar likely aim to increase pressure on Ukrainian forces defending in western Donetsk Oblast and set conditions for further gains in Russia's prioritized offensive effort in the Pokrovsk direction.


  • Russian forces are conducting relatively intensified offensive operations elsewhere southwest and west of Donetsk City, and the intensification of Russian offensive operations near Vuhledar likely does not presage decreased Russian offensive tempo elsewhere in western Donetsk Oblast in the near-term.


  • Russian forces intensified offensive operations near Vuhledar shortly after starting to widen the southern flank of the Pokrovsk salient, suggesting that Russian forces intend to conduct mutually reinforcing offensive operations along the southern flank of the Pokrovsk direction, immediately west of Donetsk City, along the 0-0532 highway, and near Vuhledar.


  • The Russian military command likely aims for the intended seizure of Kurakhove and Vuhledar to allow Russian forces to make more rapid tactical gains up to and along the H-15 highway, although Russian forces will likely face challenges in leveraging the envisioned seizure of these settlements to eliminate the broad Ukrainian salient in western Donetsk Oblast.


  • The Russian military command continues to prioritize the offensive effort on Pokrovsk and will likely treat the intensified effort in western Donetsk Oblast as a secondary effort. The Russian military command likely intends for this secondary effort, regardless of its success, to fix Ukrainian forces in western Donetsk Oblast and prevent Ukrainian redeployments to reinforce the defense of Pokrovsk.


  • Russian President Vladimir Putin continues to downplay the theater-wide operational impacts of the Ukrainian incursion into Kursk Oblast and continues efforts to convince the Russian people that the Kremlin's delayed and disorganized response to the Kursk incursion is an acceptable price to pay for further Russian advances in Donetsk Oblast.


  • The Ukrainian incursion into Kursk Oblast has had theater-wide impacts and these impacts will likely continue to affect Russian offensive and defensive capabilities beyond the culmination of the Pokrovsk offensive.


  • Putin's informational efforts are likely intended to convince the Russian public that an ongoing Ukrainian presence in Kursk Oblast is tolerable in exchange for the Russian seizure of Pokrovsk.


  • Russian offensive operations in Donetsk Oblast do not portend the imminent collapse of the frontline throughout Ukraine, despite Putin's efforts to portray the advances in Donetsk Oblast as dramatic.


  • Russian forces recently advanced near Chasiv Yar, southeast of Kupyansk, and in the Kherson direction and Ukrainian forces recently regained positions north of Kharkiv City.


  • Russian forces continue to forcibly redeploy mobilized Russian military personnel from occupied Ukraine to frontline positions to bolster Russia's crypto-mobilization efforts.

Click here to read the full assessment.

NEW | Interactive Map of Hundreds of Known Russian Military Objects in Range of ATACMS

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