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[ISW] 러시아의 공세 캠페인 평가, 2024년 10월 6일

by Summa posted Oct 07, 2024
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Key Takeaways

주요 요점:

  • 러시아군은 2023년 10월 아브디이프카를 점령하기 위한 공세 작전을 시작한 이후 포크로프스크 라이온에서 최소 5개 사단 규모의 장갑차량과 전차를 잃은 것으로 알려졌으며, 2024년 여름 도네츠크 주 서부에서 러시아의 공세 작전이 강화되면서 추가로 손실을 입었다.
  • 러시아군 사령부는 러시아 국방 산업 생산의 제약, 러시아의 소련 시대 차량 비축량의 한계, 기계화된 기동을 통한 작전적으로 중요한 영토적 진전을 이루지 못한 러시아군의 실패 등을 감안할 때 앞으로 몇 개월 내지 몇 년 동안 현재 수준의 차량 손실을 감수하거나 수용할 의지나 능력이 없을 수 있다.
  • 우크라이나 당국은 우크라이나군에 대한 러시아의 전쟁 범죄를 계속 기록하고 처벌하고 있다.
  • 러시아 당국은 10월 5일 크렘린과 러시아 국방부(MoD)를 비판한 적이 있는 러시아 텔레그램 채널 서틴스의 관리자를 체포한 것으로 알려졌다.
  • 러시아군은 최근 포크로프스크 남동쪽으로 진격했다.
### 분류: 군사 ### 관련된 주요국가: 러시아, 우크라이나 ### 향후 전망: 러시아군은 앞으로 몇 개월 내지 몇 년 동안 현재 수준의 차량 손실을 감수하거나 수용할 의지나 능력이 없을 수 있다. 이는 러시아 국방 산업 생산의 제약, 러시아의 소련 시대 차량 비축량의 한계, 기계화된 기동을 통한 작전적으로 중요한 영토적 진전을 이루지 못한 러시아군의 실패 등을 감안할 때이다.

[원문]

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Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment

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Angelica Evans, Davit Gasparyan, Nicole Wolkov, Riley Bailey,

and George Barros


October 6, 2024, 10:45am ET

Click here to see ISW's interactive map of the Russian invasion of Ukraine. This map is updated daily alongside the static maps present in this report.


Click here to see ISW’s 3D control-of-terrain topographic map of Ukraine. The use of a computer (not a mobile device) is strongly recommended for accessing this data-heavy tool.


Click here to access ISW’s archive of interactive time-lapse maps of the Russian invasion of Ukraine. These maps complement the static control-of-terrain maps that ISW produces daily by showing a dynamic frontline.


Click here to see ISW's interactive map of Ukraine's incursion into Kursk Oblast.

Russian forces have reportedly lost at least five divisions’ worth of armored vehicles and tanks in Pokrovsk Raion since beginning their offensive operation to seize Avdiivka in October 2023 and during intensified Russian offensive operations in western Donetsk Oblast in Summer 2024. An open-source X (formerly Twitter) user tracking visually confirmed Russian vehicle and equipment losses in Ukraine stated on October 4 that the user has confirmed that Russian forces have lost 1,830 pieces of heavy equipment in Pokrovsk Raion since October 9, 2023. The X user stated that Russian forces have lost a total of 539 tanks (roughly a division and a half's worth of Russian tanks) and 1,020 infantry fighting vehicles (roughly four to five mechanized infantry divisions’ worth of vehicles) during offensive operations in Pokrovsk Raion and specified that Ukrainian forces destroyed 381 of the 539 Russian tanks and 835 of the 1,020 armored vehicles. The X user noted that Russian forces have also lost 26 infantry mobility vehicles, 22 multiple launch rocket systems (MLRS), 11 towed artillery systems, and 92 unarmored trucks. The X user noted that he confirmed that Russian forces lost 25 tanks and 59 armored vehicles (roughly two battalions' worth of mechanized equipment) in Pokrovsk Raion since September 6, 2024. Russian forces launched an intensified four-month-long offensive operation to seize Avdiivka in October 2023 and later continued assaults west of Avdiivka and west and southwest of Donetsk City in spring and summer 2024, and the user's data should reflect Russian vehicle losses accrued during these offensive efforts. The X user’s assessment based on visually confirmed vehicle losses is likely conservative given that not all Russian vehicle losses are visually documented. The actual number of Russian vehicle losses in the Pokrovsk area is likely higher than reported.


The Russian military command may not be willing or able to accept the current scale and rate of vehicle loss in the coming months and years given the constraints in Russia's defense industrial production, limits to Russia’s Soviet-era vehicle stockpiles, and the Russian military's failure to achieve operationally significant territorial advances through mechanized maneuver. Russian forces expended a significant number of armored vehicles during the first weeks of their offensive effort to seize Avdiivka in October 2023 and later limited their armored vehicle usage while fighting within Avdiivka's administrative boundaries. Russian forces appear to have limited their armored vehicle use in the area immediately west of Avdiivka in recent months, although Russian forces have simultaneously intensified their offensive operations west and southwest of Donetsk city and frequently conduct largely unsuccessful platoon- and company-sized mechanized assaults in the area. Russian forces have conducted several battalion-sized mechanized assaults in western Donetsk Oblast since July 2024, the majority of which resulted in significant armored vehicle losses in exchange for marginal territorial advances. The commander of a Ukrainian bridge operating in the Donetsk direction recently reported that Russian forces are losing up to 90 percent of the vehicles used in mechanized assaults in the Donetsk direction. The British International Institute for Strategic Studies (IISS) think tank previously estimated that Russian forces were losing over 3,000 armored fighting vehicles annually as of February 2024, although Russia's current rate of armored vehicle losses may be higher given that the X user's data notably does not account for Russian equipment losses throughout the entire frontline. Russian forces have only advanced about 40 km in the Avdiivka/Pokrovsk operational direction since October 2023 and a loss of over five divisions’ worth of equipment for such tactical gains is not sustainable indefinitely without a fundamental shift in Russia‘s capability to resource its war.


Russian forces have likely accumulated a large amount of equipment for these assaults, although the medium- to long-term constraints of Russia's armored vehicle stocks and production rates alongside mounting equipment losses may force the Russian military to rethink the benefit of intensified mechanized activity in this sector over Russia's longer-term war effort in Ukraine. The Russian military command's willingness to pursue limited tactical advances in exchange for significant armored vehicle losses will become increasingly costly as Russian forces burn through finite Soviet-era weapons and equipment stocks in the coming months and years. Russia will likely struggle to adequately supply its units with materiel in the long term without transferring the Russian economy to a wartime footing and significantly increasing Russia's defense industrial production rates — a move that Russian President Vladimir Putin has sought to avoid thus far.


Key Takeaways:


  • Russian forces have reportedly lost at least five divisions’ worth of armored vehicles and tanks in Pokrovsk Raion since beginning their offensive operation to seize Avdiivka in October 2023 and during intensified Russian offensive operations in western Donetsk Oblast in Summer 2024.


  • The Russian military command may not be willing or able to accept the current scale and rate of vehicle loss in the coming months and years given the constraints in Russia's defense industrial production, limits to Russia’s Soviet-era vehicle stockpiles, and the Russian military's failure to achieve operationally significant territorial advances through mechanized maneuver.


  • Ukrainian officials continue to document and prosecute Russian war crimes committed against Ukrainian forces.


  • Russian authorities reportedly arrested the administrator of the Russian Telegram channel Thirteenth, who has previously criticized the Kremlin and Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD), on October 5.


  • Russian forces recently advanced southeast of Pokrovsk.

Click here to read the full assessment

Interactive Map of Hundreds of Known Russian Military Objects in Range of ATACMS

Click here to read the major report from Drs. Kimberly and Frederick W. Kagan, "Ukraine and the Problem of Restoring Maneuver in Contemporary War."

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ISW is a tax-exempt organization under section 501(c)(3) of the Internal Revenue Code. Donations are tax-deductible to the extent permitted by law.

The Institute for the Study of War (ISW) is a non-partisan, non-profit, public policy research organization. ISW advances an informed understanding of military affairs through reliable research, trusted analysis, and innovative education. We are committed to improving the nation's ability to execute military operations and respond to emerging threats in order to achieve US strategic objectives.



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