The precise nature of the recent Israeli strikes into Iran has partially obscured the serious damage these strikes inflicted on critical Iranian defense and military infrastructure. These strikes could disrupt Iranian ballistic missile production and leave Iran more vulnerable to future strikes, however. The Israel Defense Forces (IDF) conducted precise and calculated strikes targeting Iranian military and defense industrial infrastructure to avoid collateral damage and casualties. The result of these precise strikes is that the damage to Iranian military infrastructure appears minimal. The Israeli strikes could disrupt Iran’s ability to manufacture advanced ballistic missiles and leave Iran more vulnerable to future strikes, however. Commercially available satellite imagery published on October 28 shows that the IDF likely struck a Ghadir radar site approximately 15 kilometers north of Ahvaz, Khuzestan Province. The Ghadir radar system, along with the Russian-made S-300, is an important component of the Iranian integrated air defense system. The Ghadir radar system can reportedly detect ballistic missiles from a distance of 1,100 kilometers and aircraft from a distance of 600 kilometers.
Commercially available satellite imagery published on October 29 separately shows damage to the Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps (IRGC) Shahroud Missile Facility in Semnan Province, which is used to build solid-propellant ballistic missiles and launch Space Launch Vehicles (SLV) into orbit. The IRGC previously launched the Soraya and Chamran-1 satellites into orbit from the Shahroud Missile Facility using the Ghaem-100 SLV in January and September 2024, respectively. A missile expert told AP News on October 29 that the IRGC Shahroud Missile Facility is likely involved in “solid propellant mixing and casting operations.” The same missile expert reported on October 28 that the Taksaz Industrial Innovators Engineering Company (TIECO) factory that Israel struck on October 25 in Tehran has designed and developed “mixers for high-viscosity materials” since the early 1990s. The expert noted that the company could use this technology to produce solid-propellant mixers. The fact that Israel targeted mixing equipment used to make solid fuel highlights that Israel sought to degrade Iran’s ability to produce advanced ballistic missiles, such as those that Tehran has used to attack Israel directly. Unspecified Israeli sources previously told Axios that Iran will likely need at least a year to acquire new mixing equipment.
Qatari Foreign Ministry spokesperson Majed Mohammed al Ansari claimed on October 29 that ceasefire-hostage negotiations have made progress. CIA Director Bill Burns, Mossad Director David Barnea, and Qatari Prime Minister Qatar Mohammed bin Abdulrahman al Thani reportedly discussed a 28-day pause in fighting in the Gaza Strip during which Hamas will release eight Israeli hostages in exchange for Israel releasing ”dozens” of Palestinian prisoners, according to three unspecified Israeli officials cited by Axios.
Israel and Lebanon are reportedly “in advanced stages” of reaching a ceasefire agreement. Senior Israeli officials speaking to Ynet said on October 29 that the deal would begin with a 60-day “acclimation period” ceasefire during which mediators would consider a “new mechanism” to supervise southern Lebanon and prevent Hezbollah from rebuilding military infrastructure there. The IDF would withdraw most of its forces from southern Lebanon and only remain in certain areas where it still needs to destroy Hezbollah infrastructure. This deal appears to attempt to more successfully implement UNSCR 1701, which prohibits Lebanese Hezbollah military activity in southern Lebanon. To enforce UNSCR 1701 the Lebanese Armed Forces (LAF) would deploy thousands of additional soldiers to southern Lebanon. UNIFIL forces would be increased and bolstered by additional French, German, and British troops. The plan proposes that Israel retains the right to take “prolonged action” in Lebanon to remove Hezbollah threats that Lebanese and international forces fail to address. Lebanese Prime Minister Najib Mikati announced on October 24 that his government plans to recruit more LAF troops and possibly deploy 8,000 soldiers to southern Lebanon. The agreement would finally include a ban on military imports to Lebanon to prevent Hezbollah from rearming. Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu’s Office has previously insisted that the Israel Defense Forces (IDF) be allowed to engage in “active enforcement” near the Israel-Lebanon border and to maintain “freedom of operation” in Lebanese airspace. Israeli media did not include Israeli access to Lebanese airspace in their most recent reporting about the proposal.
Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu held a security meeting with senior military officials on October 29 to discuss the possible ceasefire terms. Hezbollah has not commented on the negotiations and has not indicated if it would accept the deal. Hezbollah had previously made stopping its operations against Israeli forces contingent on halting Israeli operations in the Gaza Strip. Hezbollah’s new Secretary General Naim Qassem indicated on October 8 that the group may be open to a ceasefire that is not linked to the Gaza Strip. A successful implementation of the above ceasefire framework that pushes Hezbollah fighters and infrastructure north of the Litani River would reduce the threat of a Hezbollah October 7–7-style offensive into northern Israel. The terms would likely be insufficient to stop rocket fire into Israel due to the range of Hezbollah’s rocket and missile arsenal, however.
Key Takeaways:
- Israeli Strike on Iran: The precise nature of the recent Israeli strikes into Iran has partially obscured the serious damage these strikes inflicted on critical Iranian defense and military infrastructure. These strikes could disrupt Iranian ballistic missile production and leave Iran more vulnerable to future strikes, however.
- Israeli Retaliation Against Iran and Hezbollah: Israeli media reported on October 28 that Israel is planning to retaliate separately against Iran for the October 19 Lebanese Hezbollah drone attack that targeted Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu.
- Hezbollah’s New Leader: Hezbollah’s Shura Council appointed Naim Qassem as the new Hezbollah secretary general, on October 29. Qassem’s October 15 speech offers insights into his strategy and vision of the war. Qassem viewed Hezbollah’s war with Israel as existential and said that he believes the United States and Israel seek to shape Lebanon and “run it as they wish.”
- Israeli Ground Operations in Lebanon: Israeli forces have advanced at least four kilometers into southern Lebanon towards the southeastern outskirts of Khiam. Khiam’s terrain provides an expansive view of northern Israel and would enable Hezbollah artillery observers to support indirect fire attacks into Israel.
- Lebanon Ceasefire: Israel and Lebanon are reportedly “in advanced stages” of reaching a ceasefire agreement. This deal appears to attempt to more successfully implement UNSCR 1701, which prohibits Lebanese Hezbollah military activity in southern Lebanon.
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