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[ISW] 러시아 공세 캠페인 평가, 2024년 11월 17일

by Summa posted Nov 18, 2024
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```html Key Takeaways: 요약

요약

  • 뉴욕타임즈(NYT)와 워싱턴포스트는 조 바이든 미국 대통령이 우크라이나군이 쿠르스크주 내 러시아와 북한 군사 목표에 대해 제한적으로 공격하는 데 미국에서 제공한 ATACMS를 사용하도록 승인했다고 보도했습니다.
  • 러시아군은 2024년 8월 이후 가장 큰 미사일 및 드론 공격으로 11월 16일부터 17일까지 우크라이나 에너지 인프라를 손상시켰습니다.
  • 러시아군은 장거리 공격 패키지를 계속 혁신하고 있으며, 11월 16일부터 17일까지의 공격 패키지에 비교적 효과가 없는 해상 발사 칼리버 순항 미사일을 우크라이나 방공을 산만하게 하고 소모시키기 위한 미끼로 포함했을 가능성이 큽니다.
  • 우크라이나군은 11월 17일 아침 우드무르트 공화국의 방산 공장을 처음으로 공격했습니다.
  • 북한은 로켓 및 포병 시스템 제공과 추가 병력 배치를 포함하여 러시아에 계속 군사 지원을 제공하고 있는 것으로 알려졌으며, 이는 단기적으로 러시아의 군사 작전에 영향을 미칠 가능성이 있지만 장기적인 이점은 제한될 가능성이 큽니다.
  • 러시아군은 우크라이나 드론의 이점과 러시아 장갑차 제약을 상쇄하기 위한 노력의 일환으로 2024-2025년 겨울 동안 도시 전투를 통해 우크라이나 최전선 도시와 마을을 점령하는 데 집중할 가능성이 큽니다.
  • 전면적인 우크라이나 항복을 요구하는 블라디미르 푸틴 러시아 대통령의 극대주의적 목표는 변함이 없지만, 크렘린과 관련된 저명한 군사 블로거는 우크라이나, 몰도바, NATO에 실제로 군사적 위협이 될 수 있는 덜 심각한 "평화 제안"으로 오랫동안 이어져 온 크렘린의 영토적 주장을 재포장하려고 하는 것으로 보입니다.
  • 압하지야 야당은 11월 17일 아슬란 브자니아 압하지야 사실상 대통령의 사임을 요구하는 시위를 계속했습니다.
  • 러시아군은 최근 쿠피얀스크, 차시브 야르, 쿠라호베, 부흘레다르 근처에서 진격했습니다.
  • 러시아 군사 블로거들은 지휘관들이 시베르스크 방향으로 러시아의 진격에 대한 허위 보고서를 제출한 후 최전선 제3연합군(CAA, 이전 제2루한스크 인민공화국군단[LNR AC]) 지휘관을 제거하는 데 보고된 역할에 대해 계속 박수를 보냈습니다.

분류: 군사, 정치 관련된 주요국가: 미국, 러시아, 우크라이나 향후 전망: 러시아와 우크라이나 간의 전쟁은 계속될 것으로 예상되며, 러시아는 우크라이나의 영토를 더 많이 점령하려고 할 것입니다. 미국과 유럽 연합은 우크라이나에 계속 군사 및 재정 지원을 제공할 것입니다.
```

[원문]

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Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment

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Nicole Wolkov, Christina Harward, Angelica Evans, Davit Gasparyan, Grace Mappes, and Frederick W. Kagan


November 17, 2024, 4:30pm ET

Click here to view our Russia-Ukraine interactive maps.


Click here to view our special reports since 2024.

The New York Times (NYT) and Washington Post reported that US President Joe Biden has authorized Ukrainian forces to use US-provided ATACMS in limited strikes against Russian and North Korean military targets within Kursk Oblast. The NYT and Washington Post reported on November 17 that unspecified US officials expect Ukrainian forces to initially conduct strikes against Russian and North Korean forces within Kursk Oblast and that the Biden Administration could expand this authorization to use ATACMS against targets elsewhere in Russia in the future. The US officials stated that the US authorized these limited Ukrainian strikes in response to the deployment of North Korean forces to the battlefield in Kursk Oblast to deter North Korea from deploying more forces to Russia. The US officials stated that the partial lifting of restrictions aims to generate a "specific and limited" battlefield effect and will not change the course of the war. French outlet Le Figaro reported on November 17 that France and the United Kingdom (UK) have authorized Ukrainian forces to use French and UK-provided SCALP/Storm Shadow missiles to strike within Russia. Le Figaro did not state if France and the UK had authorized Ukraine's SCALP/Storm Shadow usage only within Kursk Oblast. The partial lifting of restrictions on Ukraine's use of Western-provided long-range weapons against military objects within Kursk Oblast will not completely deprive Russian forces of their sanctuary in Russian territory, as hundreds of military objects remain within ATACMS range in other Russian border regions. ISW continues to assess that Russian forces will benefit from any partial sanctuary if Western states continue to impose restrictions on Ukraine's ability to defend itself and that the US should allow Ukraine to strike all legitimate military targets within Russia's operational and deep-rear within range of US-provided weapons – not just those in Kursk Oblast.


Russian forces damaged Ukrainian energy infrastructure during the largest missile and drone strike since August 2024 on the night of November 16 to 17. The Ukrainian Air Force reported that Russian forces launched 90 Shahed and strike drones of an unspecified type (possibly referring to decoy drones) from Primorsko-Akhtarsk, Krasnodar Krai and Kursk and Oryol oblasts. The Ukrainian Air Force reported that Russian forces launched 120 missiles, including one Zirkon 3M22 hypersonic cruise missile, eight Kh-47M2 Kinzhal aeroballistic missiles, 101 Kh-101 and Kalibr cruise missiles, one Iskander-M ballistic missile, four Kh-22/Kh-31P cruise/anti-radiation missiles, and five Kh-59/69 cruise missiles. The Ukrainian Air Force reported that Ukrainian forces shot down 42 drones and one Zirkon, seven Kinzhal, 85 Kalibr and Kh-101, two Kh-22/31P, and five Kh-59/69 missiles. Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky stated that Ukrainian F-16 pilots shot down roughly 10 aerial targets during the strike. The Ukrainian Air Force reported that 41 drones were "lost" in Ukrainian airspace, likely due to Ukrainian electronic warfare (EW) interference, and that two drones flew into Russian and Russian-occupied Ukrainian airspace. The Ukrainian Air Force noted that air defense was active in almost all Ukrainian oblasts. Ukrainian state electricity transmission operator Ukrenergo stated that Russian strikes damaged energy facilities in several oblasts and noted that energy recovery work is ongoing in Odesa, Volyn, and Rivne oblasts. Ukrainian officials reported that a Russian missile strike caused a fire at an infrastructure facility in Ivano-Frankivsk Oblast, damaged critical infrastructure in Rivne Oblast, and targeted energy infrastructure in Odesa Oblast. Private Ukrainian energy enterprise DTEK stated that Russian strikes seriously damaged an unspecified DTEK thermal power plant (TPP) and noted that this was the eighth mass strike on a DTEK energy facility in 2024. Ukrainian Energy Minister Herman Halushchenko stated that the strikes caused power outages in many areas of Ukraine. International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) Director General Rafael Mariano Grossi stated that Russian strikes on Ukrainian energy facilities forced Ukrainian authorities to reduce the energy production levels of several nuclear power plants (NPPs). Grossi reported that Russian strikes damaged several electrical substations that are connected to the Khmelnytskyi, Rivne, and Pivdennoukrainsk NPPs, although the strikes did not damage the NPPs themselves. Grossi stated that six out of the nine reactors at the Khmelnytskyi, Rivne, and Pivdennoukrainsk NPPs are currently operating at reduced capacity. Ukrainian state railway company Ukrzaliznytsia reported that Russian forces struck a railway depot in Dnipropetrovsk Oblast and that Russian strikes de-energized sections of several railway lines in southern, western, and northeastern Ukraine. Ukrainian officials reported that Russian strikes also damaged civilian infrastructure in Kyiv, Mykolaiv, Rivne, and Odesa oblasts.


Key Takeaways:


  • The New York Times (NYT) and Washington Post reported that US President Joe Biden has authorized Ukrainian forces to use US-provided ATACMS in limited strikes against Russian and North Korean military targets within Kursk Oblast.


  • Russian forces damaged Ukrainian energy infrastructure during the largest missile and drone strike since August 2024 on the night of November 16 to 17.


  • Russian forces continue to innovate their long-range strike packages and likely included relatively ineffective sea-launched Kalibr cruise missiles in the November 16 to 17 strike package as decoys to distract and exhaust Ukrainian air defenses.


  • Ukrainian forces struck a defense industrial factory in the Udmurt Republic for the first time on the morning of November 17.


  • North Korea reportedly continues to provide military support to Russia, including the provision of rocket and artillery systems and potential additional troop deployments, which is likely to impact Russia's military operations in the short term, but its long-term benefits likely remain limited.


  • Russian forces will likely focus on seizing frontline Ukrainian towns and cities during Winter 2024-2025 through urban combat amid efforts to offset Ukrainian drone advantages and possible Russian armored vehicle constraints.


  • Russian President Vladimir Putin's maximalist objectives demanding full Ukrainian capitulation remain unchanged, but a prominent Kremlin-affiliated milblogger appears to be trying to repackage longstanding Kremlin territorial claims to southern Ukraine as less severe "peace proposals" that would actually militarily threaten Ukraine, Moldova, and NATO.


  • Abkhazian oppositionists continued protests on November 17 calling for the resignation of the de facto Abkhazian President Aslan Bzhania.


  • Russian forces recently advanced near Kupyansk, Chasiv Yar, Kurakhove, and Vuhledar.


  • Russian milbloggers continued to applaud their reported role in removing frontline 3rd Combined Arms Army (CAA, formerly 2nd Luhansk People's Republic Army Corps [LNR AC]) commanders after the commanders submitted false reports about Russian advances in the Siversk direction.


Click Here to Read the Full Report

Interactive Map of Hundreds of Known Russian Military Objects in Range of ATACMS

Click here to read the major report from Drs. Kimberly and Frederick W. Kagan, "Ukraine and the Problem of Restoring Maneuver in Contemporary War."

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