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[ISW] 이란 업데이트, 2024년 12월 14일

by Summa posted Dec 15, 2024
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시리아 상황 요약

주요 요점:

  • HTS가 시리아에서 권력을 통합하다: 하야트 타흐리르 알샴(HTS) 지도자 아부 모하메드 알 졸라니는 아사드 이후 시리아 정부에서 HTS 아래 정치 및 안보 권력을 통합하고 있다. 졸라니는 HTS 동맹국을 시리아 구원 임시 정부에 계속 통합하여 주요 민간 및 안보 서비스에 대한 통제권을 확보했다. HTS가 이끄는 임시 정부는 또한 헌법에 규정된 사법 제도 외부에서 전 정권 관리들에 대한 법적 구제책을 추진하는 것으로 보인다.
  • 시리아 민주군: 시리아 민주군(SDF) 사령관 마즐룸 압디는 아사드 정권 붕괴 이후 두 가지 실존적 위협에 직면한 가운데 SDF의 쿠르드족 기반을 보존하고 통합하려 하고 있다.
  • 시리아의 종교적 및 종파적 긴장: 이란의 일부 세력은 시리아의 사이다 제이나브 신사의 지위에 대해 경각심을 갖거나 경각심을 조성하려 하고 있다. 이러한 경각심은 현재 시리아 정보 공간에 반영되지 않고 있다. 이란 정권은 아사드 정권 붕괴 이후 시아파 성지의 안전에 대한 상충되는 보고서에서 예증된 바와 같이 시리아의 HTS가 이끄는 임시 정부에 접근하는 방법에 대한 명확한 전략을 세운 것으로 보이지 않는다.
  • 시리아의 이스라엘: 이스라엘 군 라디오 특파원은 12월 14일에 이스라엘 국방군(IDF)이 시리아 전역에서 최소 20개의 전 시리아 아랍군(SAA) 목표물을 공격했다고 보도했다. HTS 지도자 아부 모하메드 알 졸라니는 12월 14일에 이스라엘이 이란을 시리아에 진입하는 "구실"로 사용했지만 HTS는 "이스라엘과 갈등에 돌입할 의도가 없다"고 덧붙였다.
  • 시리아의 러시아: 러시아가 시리아에서 군사 자산을 철수하고 있다는 보고가 계속되면서 러시아의 지속적인 시리아 군사적 존재에 대한 전망은 불분명하다. 우크라이나 주요 군사 정보국(GUR)은 12월 14일에 "수백 명"의 러시아 군인이 불특정 인물의 공격을 받을까봐 두려워서 홈스 주에서 흐메이밈 공군 기지에 도달할 수 없다고 밝혔다.
  • 시리아의 헤즈볼라: 레바논 헤즈볼라 사무총장 나임 카셈은 시리아에서 헤즈볼라의 무기 공급 경로를 복원하기 위해 다마스쿠스의 HTS가 이끄는 임시 정부와 협력 관계를 발전시키려 하고 있다.

분류: 시리아 내전 관련 주요국가: 시리아, 이란, 러시아 향후 전망: HTS가 이끄는 임시 정부와 아사드 정권 사이의 갈등이 심화될 것으로 예상된다. 이는 시리아 내전을 장기화시키고 인도적 위기를 악화시킬 수 있다.

[원문]

Iran Update

Alexandra Braverman, Johanna Moore, Siddhant Kishore,

Ben Rezaei, Christina Harward, and Brian Carter


Information Cutoff: 2:00 pm ET

Click here to view ISWCTP's Gaza Control-of-Terrain map and here for our interactive control-of-terrain map of Syria.


Click here to view ISW's complete portfolio of interactive maps.

Hayat Tahrir al Sham (HTS) leader Abu Mohammed al Jolani is consolidating political and security power under HTS in a post-Assad Syrian government. HTS-led forces assumed control of Daraa City and the Nassib border crossing from the Southern Operations Room on December 14. Jolani and Southern Operations Room leaders met on December 11 to discuss coordination in military and civil affairs. It is notable that these Syrian groups have agreed to cooperate with HTS despite historical animosity with HTS’s predecessor and al Qaeda affiliate Jabhat al Nusra in the mid-2010s.


Jolani has continued to integrate HTS allies into the interim Syrian Salvation Government, securing control over key civil and security services. Jolani met with Nour al Dink al Zink commander Ahmed Rizk on December 14 to discuss the role of “revolutionary cadres” in the future Syrian government and the restructuring of the Syrian Defense Ministry. Rizk and his group have long fought alongside HTS in northwestern Syria. Syrian media reported on December 10 that the HTS-controlled interim government also plans to reorganize the Syrian Arab Army (SAA). Reorganization within the Syrian army and Syrian Defense Ministry supports reconciliation with former regime elements but also creates opportunities to appoint HTS loyalists and gain control over the government bureaucracy.


Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF) Commander General Mazloum Abdi is attempting to preserve and unify the SDF’s Kurdish base as the group faces two existential threats in the wake of the fall of the Assad regime. Abdi argued that Kurdish unity was critical to address threats currently facing their community. Arab communities in Deir ez Zor and Raqqa have begun defecting from the SDF and calling for an end to SDF rule in Arab areas. The combination of these events threaten to unravel the fragile Kurdish-Arab coalition that the United States helped establish. Turkey is simultaneously threatening to destroy the SDF. Turkish Foreign Minister Hakan Fidan threatened on December 13 to “eliminate” the SDF, Kurdistan Workers Party (PKK), and People’s Defense Units (YPG). Abdi added that unity and dialogue among the Kurds is critical for participating in the development of the new Syrian government. CTP-ISW assessed that Abdi intends to negotiate its role in a future Syrian government, likely to prevent further unrest within Arab populations and militias under the SDF.


HTS leader Abu Mohammed al Jolani stated on December 14 that Israel used Iran as a “pretext” to enter Syria but he added that HTS has “no intention of entering into conflict with Israel.” IDF Chief of Staff Herzi Halevi reiterated on December 14 that the IDF has no intention of interfering in Syrian domestic affairs or ”ruling” Syria. Halevi added that the IDF is only operating in Syria to ensure the safety of Israel. An IDF company commander in the 603rd Combat Engineering Battalion (7th Armored Brigade) stated that the IDF advanced 10 kilometers into Syria.


The prospects for Russia's continued military presence in Syria remain unclear as reports that Russia is evacuating its military assets from Syria continue. Ukraine's Main Military Intelligence Directorate (GUR) stated on December 14 that "hundreds" of Russian soldiers cannot reach Hmeimim Air Base from Homs Governorate out of fear that Russian forces will come under fire from unspecified actors. The GUR stated that the Russian Ministry of Defense's (MoD) Africa Corps arrived in Syria to protect Russian forces moving towards Russia's bases on the western coast and that Russian Colonel Dmitry Motrenko is negotiating with military contingents in Syria from other unspecified states in order to secure guarantees of "immunity" for Russian soldiers waiting at the Tiyas Air Base west of Palmyra. The GUR also stated that roughly 1,000 Russian personnel left Damascus on December 13 in a column heading towards the Port of Tartus and Hmeimim Air Base, and ISW observed footage on December 13 of Russian military convoys moving from Damascus and other areas in southern Syria, likely towards the two main Russian bases. Reuters reported on December 14 that a "Syrian security official" stationed near Hmeimim Air Base stated that at least one cargo plane flew out of the base on December 14 bound for Libya. Syrian military and security sources reportedly stated that Russia is withdrawing some heavy equipment and senior officers from the Syrian Arab Army (SAA) to Moscow but is currently not planning to permanently pull out of the Port of Tartus or Hmeimim Air Base. A Russian milblogger posted photos and footage on December 14 purportedly showing Russian military assets still operating at the Russian helicopter base at Qamishli in northeastern Syria, and a Russian source claimed on December 14 that Russian forces have withdrawn from their base in Kobani in northern Syria.


The complex nature of the interim Syrian government is likely resulting in conflicting reports about whether Russia is engaged in talks with Syrian opposition groups. Hayat Tahrir al Sham (HTS) controls the Syrian interim government, but HTS and the interim government do not yet have complete control over the disparate groups that helped overthrow the Assad regime. Russian Deputy Foreign Affairs Minister Mikhail Bogdanov stated on December 12 that Russia has established contacts with HTS. Reuters reported on December 14 that a Russian source stated that discussions between Russia and the interim Syrian government are ongoing. A "senior rebel official close to the new interim administration" told Reuters, however, that the issue of Russia's military presence in Syria and Russia's previous agreements with the Assad regime are "not under discussion" and that talks at an unspecified time in the future will address this matter. The official reportedly stated that the "Syrian people will have the final say." Kremlin newswire TASS reported on December 13 that Mohammed Sabra, a Syrian politician who represented the Syrian opposition's High Negotiations Committee at the 2016 Geneva peace talks on the Syrian Civil War, similarly stated that there should be a referendum in the future to allow the Syrian people to approve any foreign military presence in Syria. It is unclear if Reuter's "senior rebel official close to the new interim administration" who denied talks between Russia and the interim government is a member of HTS or another Syrian opposition group. It remains unclear if Russia is in contact with all the Syrian opposition groups necessary to guarantee the short- and long-term safety of its military bases and select opposition groups may be unaware that Russia is in discussion with other groups. Russian state media has notably not differentiated between different opposition groups when reporting on the situation in Syria, possibly as part of efforts to present the interim government as more united so as to increase the legitimacy of any agreements Russia reaches with one or some of the groups.


Key Takeaways:


  • HTS Consolidates Power in Syria: Hayat Tahrir al Sham (HTS) leader Abu Mohammed al Jolani is consolidating political and security power under HTS in a post-Assad Syrian government. Jolani has continued to integrate HTS allies into the interim Syrian Salvation Government, securing control over key civil and security services. The HTS-led interim government also appears to be pursuing legal recourse against former regime officials outside of a constitutionally-bound justice system.


  • Syrian Democratic Forces: Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF) Commander General Mazloum Abdi is attempting to preserve and unify the SDF’s Kurdish base as the group faces two existential threats in the wake of the fall of the Assad regime.


  • Religious and Sectarian Tension in Syria: Some elements in Iran are either alarmed or trying to generate alarm over the status of the Sayyida Zeinab shrine in Syria. This alarm is not being reflected in the Syrian information space at this time. The Iranian regime does not appear to have assumed a clear strategy for how to approach the HTS-led interim government in Syria, as exemplified by the contradicting reports regarding the safety of Shia holy sites following the fall of the Assad regime.


  • Israel in Syria: An Israeli Army Radio correspondent reported on December 14 that the Israel Defense Forces (IDF) struck at least 20 former Syrian Arab Army (SAA) targets across Syria. HTS leader Abu Mohammed al Jolani stated on December 14 that Israel used Iran as a “pretext” to enter Syria but he added that HTS has “no intention of entering into conflict with Israel.”


  • Russia in Syria: The prospects for Russia's continued military presence in Syria remain unclear as reports that Russia is evacuating its military assets from Syria continue. Ukraine's Main Military Intelligence Directorate (GUR) stated on December 14 that "hundreds" of Russian soldiers cannot reach Hmeimim Air Base from Homs Governorate out of fear that Russian forces will come under fire from unspecified actors.


  • Hezbollah in Syria: Lebanese Hezbollah Secretary General Naim Qassem is seeking to develop a working relationship with the HTS-led interim government in Damascus in order to restore Hezbollah’s weapons supply route in Syria.

Click Here to Read the Full Report

ISW–CTP has launched an interactive control of terrain map of Syria in response to the Syrian opposition offensive in northwestern Syria that began on November 27. It represents our medium-confidence assessment. We will continue to refine this control of terrain (CoT) assessment over the coming days, weeks, and months to increase our confidence levels.

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