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[ISW] 이란 업데이트, 2024년 12월 15일

by Summa posted Dec 16, 2024
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주요 사항

주요 사항

  • 시리아에서 HTS 통제 확대: 하야트 타흐리르 알샴(HTS)은 시리아의 분산된 무장 단체에 대한 안보 통제를 계속 통합하고 있습니다.
  • 미국 항공모함 배치: 하야트 타흐리르 알샴(HTS)은 시리아의 분산된 무장 단체에 대한 안보 통제를 계속 통합하고 있습니다.
  • 시리아의 이스라엘: 이스라엘 군 당국자들은 시리아 내 더 깊은 곳에서 작전을 위한 계획을 승인했지만 아직 이를 실행하지 않았습니다. 이스라엘군은 12월 15일에 쿠네이트라와 다라아 주의 마을에서 계속 작전을 수행했습니다.
  • 시리아에 대한 이라크의 반응: 이란이 지원하는 바드르 기구 사무총장 하디 알 아메리는 12월 12일에 "시리아에서 일어난 일은 터키인의 이마에 부끄러운 얼룩"이라고 말했습니다. 이라크군과 인민 동원군(PMF)은 이라크-시리아 국경을 따라 안보를 강화하고 있습니다.

분류: 안보, 정치 관련된 주요 국가: 시리아, 이스라엘, 이라크 향후 전망: HTS는 시리아에서 영향력을 확대하기 위해 계속 노력할 것입니다. 이스라엘은 시리아 내에서 작전을 확대할 가능성이 있습니다. 이라크는 이라크-시리아 국경을 따라 안보를 강화하기 위해 계속 노력할 것입니다.

[원문]

Iran Update

Andie Parry, Annika Ganzeveld, Kelly Campa, Ria Reddy, Katherine Wells, and Brian Carter


Information Cutoff: 2:00 pm ET

Click here to view ISWCTP's Gaza Control-of-Terrain map and here for our interactive control-of-terrain map of Syria.


Click here to view ISW's complete portfolio of interactive maps.

Russia’s withdrawal from bases in northern Syria and its loss of influence in Syria will likely expose the US-backed Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF) to continued Turkish attacks in northern Syria. Russia has withdrawn from a series of bases in the Manbij and Kobani areas in northern Syria amid the ongoing Turkish-backed offensive against the SDF. Russia will probably withdraw from its last sizeable base in northern Syria, Qamishli, because Turkey and the groups on the ground in Syria—including HTS and the Syrian National Army (SNA)—do not appear to be prepared to allow Russia to remain there. Unspecified actors reportedly agreed to allow Russia to remain in Tartus and Hmeimim but did not mention Qamishli. The Turkish defense minister also offered to ”support” Russia’s consolidation at Hmeimim and Tartus, suggesting Turkey would not support other Russian bases. Russia's presence across northern Syria had previously enabled Russia to oppose and block Turkish-backed offensives in Tel Rifaat and Manbij, two areas that Turkish-backed forces have captured in recent days. The loss of Russia’s physical presence and influence in northern Syria means that the primary barrier against a Turkish or Turkish-backed operation to seize even more SDF-controlled areas—or a Turkish attempt to destroy the SDF outright—no longer exists.


Turkey will likely continue to back the SNA’s ground operation against the SDF to destroy the SDF. The Turkish foreign minister said on December 13 that Turkey’s strategic objective in Syria is to ”destroy” the SDF, meaning that any ceasefire between the SDF and Turkish-backed groups is presumably temporary. It is unclear when large-scale operations will resume, however. Turkish-backed fighters have also executed injured SDF fighters at hospitals in northern Syria and reportedly looted civilian areas in Manbij. These crimes risk triggering ethnically motivated violence and upsetting Syria’s current relative stability, especially if Turkish-backed fighters enter Kurdish areas and begin killing Kurdish civilians.


The SDF’s fight against Turkey and its proxies will render it unable to support US policy objectives in Syria. The SDF is the key US partner in Syria against ISIS. Only the SDF is capable of conducting competent counter-ISIS operations in the areas it controls, given that HTS and other groups are currently preoccupied with securing newly controlled areas. The SDF also controls al Hol IDP camp and a network of prisons that contain thousands of ISIS supporters and fighters. Turkish violence—including the threat of ethnically motivated killing—would almost certainly cause the SDF to mobilize its forces against Turkish-backed groups. The SDF cannot conduct offensive operations against ISIS while contending with the threat from Turkey and its allies in Syria. It is unclear if the SDF would be able to secure these key facilities if it faces a severe threat from Turkish-backed forces to Kurdish civilian areas.


More Key Takeaways:


  • Expanding HTS Control in Syria: Hayat Tahrir al Sham (HTS) continues to consolidate security control over disparate armed groups in Syria.


  • US Carrier Deployment: Hayat Tahrir al Sham (HTS) continues to consolidate security control over disparate armed groups in Syria.


  • Israel in Syria: Israeli military officials approved plans for operations further into Syria but have not implemented them. Israeli forces continued to operate in villages in Quneitra and Daraa provinces on December 15.


  • Iraqi Reactions to Syria: Iranian-backed Badr Organization Secretary General Hadi al Ameri stated on December 12 that “what happened in Syria is a stain of shame on the foreheads of the Turks.” The Iraqi Army and Popular Mobilization Forces (PMF) are continuing to bolster security along the Iraq-Syria Border.

Click Here to Read the Full Report

ISW–CTP has launched an interactive control of terrain map of Syria in response to the Syrian opposition offensive in northwestern Syria that began on November 27. It represents our medium-confidence assessment. We will continue to refine this control of terrain (CoT) assessment over the coming days, weeks, and months to increase our confidence levels.

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The Institute for the Study of War (ISW) is a non-partisan, non-profit, public policy research organization. ISW advances an informed understanding of military affairs through reliable research, trusted analysis, and innovative education. We are committed to improving the nation's ability to execute military operations and respond to emerging threats in order to achieve US strategic objectives.



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