Several trends have placed Syria on a trajectory that is increasingly likely to lead to ethno-sectarian conflict. Social media reports have alleged that individuals affiliated with Hayat Tahrir al Sham (HTS) have killed and kidnapped Alawites and other Syrians accused of being Assad regime officials. These killings and kidnappings have taken place outside of formal and documented judicial processes, which may significantly heighten sectarian tension between the majority and empowered Sunni and the minority Alawites. Some of the Alawites targeted are almost certainly Assad regime officials who can and should be prosecuted for war crimes and crimes against humanity in fair and transparent tribunals. Failure to prosecute criminals fairly and transparently risks degrading community trust and encouraging tit-for-tat retaliatory violence between ethnic and sectarian groups.
The HTS-led government and transitional government leader Ahmed al Shara has attempted to assuage the Alawite's fears by highlighting the ways HTS and the interim government aims to protect minorities, but he has made only limited concrete, unambiguous steps. The interim government has established a reconciliation program under which former regime elements are granted amnesty in exchange for disarmament and registering with the interim government. The terms of this amnesty have not been publicly discussed, and the lists could be used by sectarian actors to target former regime elements in the coastal areas, who would be predominantly Alawite. The interim government began targeting “criminal gang leaders” who did not hand over weapons and settle with the interim government in Latakia on December 25.
An old video surfaced on December 25 showing Sunni fighters desecrating a major Alawite shrine in Aleppo, which could increase Alawite fears. The Interim Interior Ministry said that that the video was taken at least three weeks ago and that republishing such clips is intended to stir up strife among the Syrian people at this sensitive stage of government creation. The original source of the Alawite shrine video remains unknown at this time. The video spurred Alawite demonstrations on December 25 in several Syrian cities. Some reportedly pro-Assad protesters called for violence and other demonstrators used what at least one anti-Assad media outlet described as "sectarian language." Alawite community leaders in Latakia called for HTS-led security forces to establish security and disarm former regime elements amid the protests, which suggests genuine concern among community leaders about former regime activity. The HTS-led military operations department sent military reinforcements to Homs, Hama, Damascus, and Latakia and imposed curfews in response to the unrest. A violent HTS crackdown on protests in Alawite areas of Syria could dramatically accelerate sectarian tension and trigger serious violence. HTS has previously violently cracked down on protesters challenging Shara’s rule in Idlib. The newly appointed Syrian intelligence chief (see below) played a major role in that crackdown.
Pro-Assad fighters separately “ambushed” and killed 14 HTS-led interior ministry officers in Khirbet al Maaza on December 26.
Iran is also making remarks that risk stoking sectarian tension. Senior Iranian officials, including the supreme leader, have repeatedly suggested that the Syrian youth will “rise up” in Syria. The Iranian supreme leader compared these “Syrian youth” to the Iraqi militia groups that systematically hunted down and killed Sunni civilians in Baghdad as part of a campaign of sectarian cleansing in Iraq. Core HTS fighters from Jabhat al Nusra and al Qaeda in Iraq, like Shara, are intimately familiar with the Iraqi context and would presumably read “Syrian youth” as a much more sectarian call than it immediately appears. Sectarian Iranian remarks would provide an opening for Sunni sectarian elements in Syria to portray all Alawites and Shia as pro-Iranian proxies to justify a violent crackdown.
Syrian Foreign Affairs Minister Asaad Hassan al Shaibani responded to these Iranian statements. He warned Iran against “spreading chaos in Syria” and stated that Syria will hold Iran “accountable for the repercussions of [its] latest remarks,” likely referring to ongoing rhetoric from senior Iranian officials suggesting that Syrian youth will “rise up” in Syria.
Key Takeaways:
- Conflict in Syria: Several trends have placed Syria on a trajectory that is increasingly likely to lead to ethno-sectarian conflict. There is already an ongoing ethnic conflict between the Kurdish-majority Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF) and the Turkish-backed Syrian National Army (SNA). These trends include killings, arrests, and kidnappings that appear to occur outside of a transparent judicial process for trying war criminals, provocative protests and sectarian imagery on social media, and Iranian provocation.
- HTS Government Formation: The HTS-led interim government appointed former al Qaeda in Iraq and Jabhat al Nusra member Anas Hasan Khattab as head of the General Intelligence Service on December 26.
- SNA-SDF Fighting: The Turkish-backed SNA engaged the US-backed SDF in contested territory southeast of Manbij and likely pushed SDF forces east towards Tishreen Dam. Syrian media reported that the SDF advanced on a new axis into SNA-controlled territory east of Aleppo, likely to relieve pressure on the Tishreen Dam area by forcing the SNA to redeploy its forces to respond to a new threat.
- Turkey: The Turkish Ministry of Defense announced in a statement on December 26 that Turkey supports a “unified Syrian army,” likely referring to a Syrian army that excludes the SDF.
- Iraq in Syria: The pro-Iran Iraqi National Intelligence Service director implied to HTS leader Ahmad al Shara on December 26 that Iraq would consider intervening or allowing Iraqi militias to intervene in Syria if unspecified instability threatened Iraq.
- Israel in Syria: The IDF continued to operate in villages in Quneitra and Daraa Provinces.
- Yemen: The IDF conducted airstrikes targeting port and energy infrastructure in Houthi-controlled areas of Yemen on December 26.
| 
[ISW] 이란 업데이트, 2024년 12월 27일
[ISW] 이란 업데이트, 2024년 12월 20일