Hayat Tahrir al Sham (HTS) is confronting small pockets of locally organized fighter cells in areas under its control. Some of these groups are led by known Assad regime officials who have military experience and control pre-existing militias. HTS-led forces have successfully confronted and suppressed these isolated incidents of resistance in a way that mirrors the Assad regime’s counter-revolutionary approach at the start of the Syrian Civil War in 2011-2012. The HTS-led forces have deployed tanks and used attack helicopters and drones to target pro-regime forces in coastal Syria. These deployments have enabled HTS-led forces to swiftly confront small groups of regime remnants. The organization, coordination, size, and spread of these opposition groups do not currently appear to strain HTS-led forces‘ bandwidth. An increase in pro-Assad activity coupled with an ISIS resurgence in HTS-held areas would very likely present HTS with a bandwidth problem, however, and thus impede future efforts to suppress dissent.
A pro-Assad group is attempting to coordinate and expand attacks targeting HTS-led forces but has yet to demonstrate any ability to do so. The “Syrian Popular Resistance” announced in late December 2024 the launch of armed resistance against the HTS-led interim government. The group has since claimed on multiple occasions that its fighters have attacked and killed interim government forces. It remains unclear whether the group has had any real involvement in these attacks, however. The “Syrian Popular Resistance” claimed on January 13 that it killed over 35 HTS-led forces in western Homs near the Lebanon-Syria border in coordination with fighters from Hermel, Lebanon. Some security analysts attributed the clashes to Lebanese Hezbollah or smugglers, omitting mention of the ”Syrian Popular Resistance.” The interim government gave no comment on the clashes, which would be surprising if opposition fighters had indeed killed 35 HTS-led fighters. The “Syrian Popular Resistance” also claimed to be affiliated with a former Syrian regime officer who led an attack taking interim government forces hostage in Latakia on January 14. The militia leader did not mention the ”Syrian Popular Resistance” in a video he posted shortly after the attack. That the perpetrators of these attacks do not independently acknowledge any affiliation with the "Syrian Popular Resistance” suggests that this coordinating body is largely aspirational at this time. The formation of an opposition group that operates under the Syrian Popular Resistance would likely strain the interim government’s bandwidth and make them less effective in responding to anti-HTS resistance.
Israel and Hamas have reportedly made progress toward a ceasefire-hostage agreement but have yet to solve a key outstanding issue. An unspecified Palestinian official told the BBC on January 14 that the final draft of the ceasefire agreement allows Israel to maintain an 800-meter-long buffer zone along the Gaza Strip’s eastern and northern boundaries. Israel’s ability to establish such a buffer zone was reportedly a significant point of disagreement between Israel and Hamas. Israel and Hamas have yet to solve another key outstanding issue--the withdrawal of the Israel Defense Forces (IDF) from the Netzarim and Philadelphi corridors--however.
Unspecified Arab officials told the Wall Street Journal on January 14 that senior Hamas military commander in the Gaza Strip, Mohammad Sinwar, has “agreed in principle” to the terms of the final ceasefire draft. Sinwar may be making autonomous decisions about the ceasefire agreement without consulting Hamas central leadership. The Wall Street Journal reported on January 13 that Sinwar has begun operating autonomously and ignoring the Hamas decision to make decisions through a leadership council. It is unclear how Sinwar would implement the terms of a ceasefire agreement given that he lacks sufficient command-and-control across the northern and southern halves of the Gaza Strip.
US Secretary of State Antony Blinken warned Israel on January 14 that Hamas has recruited “almost as many new militants as it has lost.” Blinken stated that Hamas’ new recruitment effort is a “recipe for an enduring insurgency and perpetual war.” The Wall Street Journal similarly reported on January 13 that senior Hamas military commander in the Gaza Strip Mohammad Sinwar has begun recruiting Gazans by targeting funerals and prayer gatherings and offering food, aid, and medical assistance in return for service. These new recruits are not capable of successfully operating in organized military units given that Hamas has lost adequate safe areas to train new recruits. Current Israeli military operations are designed to prevent the regeneration of Hamas by denying Hamas the sanctuary to conduct training programs, particularly in the northern Gaza Strip. The IDF is preventing the reconstitution of Hamas units by isolating Hamas’ forces in the north and denying them safe areas there by conducting repeated raids. These raids gradually attrit Hamas fighters and make it impossible for Hamas to train new recruits in a way that would make them competent and capable of fighting against the IDF.
The IDF has successfully achieved two key operational-level objectives: the isolation of Hamas military forces in the northern Strip and the destruction of Hamas’ military organization. Hamas fighters are now operating as small fighting cells and not organized military units that Hamas had in the early days of the war. The IDF’s operational success in the Gaza Strip obscures the strategic insufficiency of IDF operations if the Israeli government desires to destroy Hamas fully. Sinwar and his close commanders will almost certainly begin to rebuild Hamas after any IDF withdrawal, though such an effort will take years of patient reconstitution.
Key Takeaways:
- Syria: Small pockets of locally organized, armed resistance against HTS have emerged in Syria. The expansion of such resistance would strain the bandwidth of HTS-led forces and impede any efforts to suppress this resistance.
- Iraq: KRG President Nechirvan Barzani met with prominent Sunni politicians in Baghdad, which is consistent with early indications that Kurdish and Sunni parties are trying to build a political coalition ahead of the Iraqi parliamentary elections in October 2025.
- Gaza Strip: Israel and Hamas made significant progress toward a ceasefire-hostage agreement. They appear to have yet to resolve disagreement over whether the IDF would withdraw from the Netzarim and Philadelphi corridors, however.
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