메뉴 건너뛰기

군사국방

국방뉴스

[ISW] 이란 업데이트, 2025년 1월 21일

by Summa posted Jan 22, 2025
?

단축키

Prev이전 문서

Next다음 문서

크게 작게 위로 아래로 댓글로 가기 인쇄
?

단축키

Prev이전 문서

Next다음 문서

크게 작게 위로 아래로 댓글로 가기 인쇄

```html 요약

요약

  • 가자지구: 하마스는 지원품 배포를 조정하고 가자지구 북부로 가자 주민들의 이동을 용이하게 했는데, 이는 하마스가 15개월간의 전쟁 이후에도 어느 정도의 통치권을 유지하고 있음을 보여줍니다. 이러한 임무는 하마스를 가자지구의 사실상 통치 기관으로 만들었지만, 적어도 특정 지역에서는 그렇습니다. 위에 나열된 활동(지원품 배포 및 보호, 귀환자 "감시")은 하마스가 10월 7일 이전처럼 가자 정부를 운영하고 있다는 것을 나타내지는 않습니다.
  • IDF 사임: IDF 참모총장과 남부 사령관은 모두 1월 21일에 사임했습니다. 두 장교 모두 하마스의 10월 7일 이스라엘 침공을 막지 못한 것에 대한 책임을 졌다고 말했습니다.
  • 시리아 민주군: 미국이 지원하는 SDF는 아랍 부족 세력과 잠재적인 터키와의 별도의 생존을 위한 싸움에 맞서면서 자원과 대역폭 제약에 직면해 있습니다. SDF에 대한 아랍 부족의 공격은 터키 또는 터키가 지원하는 공세에 대항하는 SDF의 능력을 위태롭게 할 수 있습니다.
  • 이라크 민병대 무장 해제: 이란이 지원하는 이라크 민병대인 하라카트 헤즈볼라 알 누자바의 정치국 책임자는 1월 19일에 이라크 대 아야톨라 알리 알 시스타니가 "솔직하게 또는 직접적으로" 무장 해제를 요청할 경우에만 해당 단체가 무장 해제할 것이라고 주장했습니다. 하라카트 헤즈볼라 알 누자바 지도자 아크람 알 카아비는 이전에 이 민병대가 시스타니가 아닌 이란 최고 지도자 알리 하메네이로부터 정치적, 종교적 지시를 받는다고 말했습니다. 하라카트 헤즈볼라 알 누자바가 하메네이로부터 지시를 받는다는 카아비의 이전 성명은 아사디가 시스타니의 권위를 언급한 것과 일치하지 않습니다.
  • 이라크 정치: "공식 출처"는 이라크 언론에 시아 조정 프레임워크가 책임 및 정의 위원회를 정치 후보자를 심사할 사법 기관으로 대체하는 법안을 지지한다고 말했습니다.
  • 시리아의 러시아: 러시아는 HTS가 이끄는 임시 정부와 시리아에서 러시아 군 자산을 철수하기로 합의했을 수 있습니다. HTS가 이끄는 임시 정부는 또한 타르투스 항구에서 러시아의 투자와 재정적 참여를 중단했습니다.

분류: 국제정세, 중동정세 관련된 주요국가: 이스라엘, 이라크, 시리아 향후 전망: 가자지구에서 하마스의 통치력 강화, 이라크에서 민병대의 무장 해제, 시리아에서 러시아의 철수 등이 예상됨.
```

[원문]

Support ISW

Carolyn Moorman, Siddhant Kishore, Kelly Campa, Johanna Moore, Ria Reddy, Ben Rezaei, Katherine Wells, Avery Borens, and Brian Carter



Information Cutoff: 2:00 pm ET

Click here to view ISWCTP's Gaza Control-of-Terrain map and here for our interactive control-of-terrain map of Syria.


Click here to view ISW's complete portfolio of interactive maps.

Hamas coordinated the distribution of aid and facilitated the movement of Gazans to the northern Gaza Strip, which demonstrates that Hamas retains some degree of governing authority after 15 months of war. The Associated Press reported that Hamas has patrolled aid convoy routes, coordinated the distribution of humanitarian aid, and monitored the return of Gazans to Jabalia in the northern Gaza Strip after the ceasefire went into effect. Some Gazans began to return from IDF-designated humanitarian zones to the northern Gaza Strip on January 19, and the IDF announced on January 21 that it would soon allow Gazans to return from the southern Gaza Strip to the northern Gaza Strip.


These tasks make Hamas the de facto governing body in the Gaza Strip, at least in certain areas. The activities listed above—distribution and protection of aid and “monitoring” returnees—do not indicate that Hamas runs a Gazan government like it did prior to October 7. Hamas does appear to function as a proto-government that can provide and distribute basic services and goods while controlling the population, which would be consistent with an insurgent organization that seeks to re-exert control over the Gaza Strip. It is notable in this context that Hamas is the sole actor in the Gaza Strip capable and willing to undertake this relatively broad spectrum of tasks. Hamas therefore appears to be prepared to reemerge as the sole authority in the Gaza Strip, even though the IDF destroyed its government structure. Hamas will likely begin to use its small, insurgent-like cells of fighters to reimpose its control over the population and other armed groups, including criminal elements.


Hamas announced that it will release four female Israeli hostages on January 25. Hamas previously announced that it would release the next group of hostages on January 26. The ceasefire agreement requires Hamas to release three hostages every Saturday during the first phase of the ceasefire-hostage deal and 14 hostages on the last day of the first phase. Hamas released three Israeli hostages on the first day of the ceasefire on January 19.


The IDF chief of staff and Southern Command commander both resigned on January 21. Both officers said that they took responsibility for failing to prevent Hamas’ October 7 attack into Israel. Herzi Halevi will officially leave as chief of staff on March 6, four days after the first phase of the Israel-Hamas ceasefire agreement ends. Halevi stated that the IDF has not fully destroyed Hamas’ governance and military capabilities or returned Israeli hostages held in the Gaza Strip. Halevi called for an external committee to investigate the IDF’s failure on October 7. IDF Southern Command Commander Major General Yaron Finkelman also resigned on January 21. Finkelman cited his failure to protect Israel on October 7. The IDF Southern Command is responsible for areas of southern Israel, including the area along the Israel-Gaza Strip border.


Key Takeaways:


  • Gaza Strip: Hamas coordinated the distribution of aid and facilitated the movement of Gazans to the northern Gaza Strip, which demonstrates that Hamas retains some degree of governing authority after 15 months of war. These tasks make Hamas the de facto governing body in the Gaza Strip, at least in certain areas. The activities listed above—distribution and protection of aid and “monitoring” returnees—do not indicate that Hamas runs a Gazan government like it did prior to October 7, however.


  • IDF Resignations: The IDF chief of staff and Southern Command commander both resigned on January 21. Both officers said that they took responsibility for failing to prevent Hamas’ October 7 attack into Israel.


  • Syrian Democratic Forces: The US-backed SDF faces resource and bandwidth constraints as it contends with separate and possibly existential fights with Arab tribal forces and a potential Turkish. The Arab tribal attacks against the SDF may imperil the SDF’s ability to defend against a Turkish or Turkish-backed offensive.


  • Iraqi Militia Disarmament: The head of Iranian-backed Iraqi militia Harakat Hezbollah al Nujaba’s political bureau claimed on January 19 that the group would disarm only if Iraqi Grand Ayatollah Ali al Sistani “frankly or directly” requested its disarmament. Harakat Hezbollah al Nujaba leader Akram al Kaabi has previously said that this militia takes its political and religious direction from Iranian Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei instead of Sistani. Kaabi’s previous statement that Harakat Hezbollah al Nujaba takes direction from Khamenei is inconsistent with Asadi’s invocation of Sistani’s authority.


  • Iraqi Politics: An “official source” told Iraqi media that the Shia Coordination Framework supports legislation that would replace the Accountability and Justice Commission with a judicial body that would vet political candidates.


  • Russia in Syria: Russia may have reached an agreement with the HTS-led interim government to evacuate Russian military assets from Syria. The HTS-led interim government also suspended Russian investment and financial involvement in the port of Tartus.

Click Here to Read the Full Report

Website | Jobs & Internships


Follow ISW on social media:


Facebook | X | YouTube | Instagram | LinkedIn | Threads | Bluesky

Donate online or by sending a check to the Institute for the Study of War at 1400 16th Street NW, Suite #515, Washington, DC, 20036. Please consider including the Institute for the Study of War in your estate plans.


ISW is a tax-exempt organization under section 501(c)(3) of the Internal Revenue Code. Donations are tax-deductible to the extent permitted by law.


The Institute for the Study of War (ISW) is a non-partisan, non-profit, public policy research organization. ISW advances an informed understanding of military affairs through reliable research, trusted analysis, and innovative education. We are committed to improving the nation's ability to execute military operations and respond to emerging threats in order to achieve US strategic objectives.



  1. [공지] 참조 사이트

    Date2023.12.14 BySumma
    read more
  2. [ISW] 이란 업데이트, 2025년 1월 21일

    Date2025.01.22 Category국방뉴스 BySumma
    Read More
Board Pagination Prev 1 Next
/ 1
위로