Russia may be providing drone and missile technology to North Korea in exchange for North Korean troops fighting in Kursk Oblast. Japanese outlet NHK, citing multiple sources familiar with Russia–North Korea relations, reported on February 8 that Russia has agreed to assist North Korea in developing and mass-producing various types of drones in exchange for North Korean forces supporting Russia’s war effort against Ukraine. NHK noted that Russia remains reluctant to help North Korea develop nuclear weapons, fearing that North Korean nuclear tests could further strain relations with the United States and complicate relations with the People’s Republic of China (PRC), however. Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky noted on February 8 that Russia is specifically spreading modern technology to North Korea, including drone technology, and told Reuters on February 7 that thousands of North Korean troops have returned to active combat in Kursk Oblast after a brief pause. A Ukrainian brigade operating in Kursk Oblast published a video on February 8 reportedly showing North Korean forces conducting assaults alongside Russian forces in Kursk Oblast. South Korean sources recently reported that Russia withdrew North Korean troops from the battlefield in Kursk Oblast in mid-January 2025, possibly for rest and reconstitution or to rethink how Russia is using these troops. ISW assesses that North Korea is using the war in Ukraine as a testing ground for its own military capabilities. Reuters reported on February 6 that North Korean ballistic missiles fired by Russian forces since December 2024 have demonstrated significantly improved accuracy, likely an example of North Korean capability enhancement gained through the North Korea-Russia alliance.
Russia continues to expand its military capabilities, indicating that the Kremlin has no immediate interest in negotiations or a lasting peace with Ukraine. Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky, citing Ukrainian intelligence, reported on February 8 that Russian forces are forming new military divisions, building additional defense-industrial base (DIB) facilities, planning to increase military personnel by over 100,000 soldiers, and deepening military cooperations with North Korea. Then–Russian Defense Minister Sergei Shoigu announced in January 2023 that Russia would create 14 new military divisions, but ISW is unable to assess whether Zelensky is referring to these previously announced plans or the creation of additional new divisions. ISW also cannot verify the status of the formation of the 14 divisions Shoigu previously announced. Zelensky highlighted that Russia's force-generation, restructuring, and defense-production efforts make it clear that Putin is not interested in negotiations with Ukraine and seeks to continue Russia’s war. Such Russian plans suggest that Russia, not Ukraine, is the party refusing good-faith negotiations and actively pushing for protracted war rather than peace, while also setting conditions to prepare for a potential broader conflict with NATO. Russian officials and information space have frequently framed the war in Ukraine as a part of a larger confrontation with the West.
The Russian command may be redeploying forces from the Kurakhove direction towards Toretsk in order to facilitate Russian offensive operations against Kostyantynivka in Spring or Summer 2025. A Russian source claimed that the Russian military command is redeploying elements of the 102nd and 103rd motorized rifle regiments, 163rd Tank Regiment, and 381st Artillery Regiment (all of the 150th Motorized Rifle Division) and elements of the 96th regiment (possibly also part of the 150th Motorized Rifle Division, although ISW has not previously observed reports of this unit operating in Ukraine) from the Kurakhove direction to the Toretsk direction. ISW has not observed confirmation or other reporting on this alleged redeployment. Another Russian source claimed that elements of the 102nd and 103rd motorized rifle regiments are operating near Dachne as of February 8, however. A redeployment of elements of the 8th CAA to the Toretsk direction- in conjunction with intensified Russian efforts in the Chasiv Yar direction in recent weeks- would indicate that the Russian command may intend to prioritize advances towards Kostyantynivka and pressuring Ukraine's fortress belt in 2025, as ISW previously assessed.
Key Takeaways:
- Russia may be providing drone and missile technology to North Korea in exchange for North Korean troops fighting in Kursk Oblast.
- Russia continues to expand its military capabilities, indicating that the Kremlin has no immediate interest in negotiations or a lasting peace with Ukraine.
- The Russian command may be redeploying forces from the Kurakhove direction towards Toretsk in order to facilitate Russian offensive operations against Kostyantynivka in Spring or Summer 2025.
- The Baltic States cut ties with the Soviet-era power grid that connected them to Belarus and Russia on February 8 as part of efforts to achieve full energy independence from Russia and further integrate their energy infrastructure with the European Union (EU).
- Ukrainian forces recently advanced near Chasiv Yar, and Russian forces recently advanced near Kupyansk, Lyman, and Toretsk.
- The Kremlin continues efforts to incentivize Russian citizens to serve in the military.
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[ISW] 러시아의 공세 캠페인 평가, 2025년 2월 6일