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[ISW] 이란 업데이트, 2025년 2월 18일

by Summa posted Feb 19, 2025
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Key Takeaways: 요약

요약

  • 시리아 민주군(SDF)-다마스쿠스 협상: 시리아 민주군(SDF) 사령관은 2월 17일에 SDF와 시리아 북동부를 통치하는 기관이 군대를 시리아 국방부에 합병하기로 합의했다고 밝혔습니다. SDF와 시리아 임시 정부 간의 협상에는 여전히 몇 가지 미해결 문제가 있는 것으로 보이지만, 양측은 서로 건설적으로 교류하고 있는 것으로 보입니다.
  • SDF 협상 입장: SDF 사령관 마즐룸 압디는 내부 SDF 라이벌, 외부 쿠르드 라이벌, 오랜 적 및 동맹으로부터 다마스쿠스 정부와 통합하라는 엄청난 압력을 받고 있습니다. 이러한 압력은 SDF가 점차 요구를 완화하도록 밀어붙이는 것으로 보입니다. 압디는 아마도 다마스쿠스와의 주요 갈등을 피하고 자신의 입지를 공고히할 기회를 보는 것으로 보이지만, 그는 아마도 통합에 대한 미해결 문제를 감안할 때 시리아 군과의 통합이 위험하다는 것을 인식하고 있을 것입니다.
  • 이라크 금융 시스템과 이란 지원 민병대: 이라크 중앙은행은 돈세탁과 밀수를 막기 위해 5개의 국내 은행의 미국 달러 거래를 금지했다고 합니다. 이라크 중앙은행은 미국의 압력을 받아 이러한 은행을 금지했을 수 있습니다.
### 분류: 중동 정세 ### 관련된 주요국가: 시리아, 이라크, 미국 ### 향후 전망: SDF와 시리아 정부 간의 협상은 계속될 것으로 예상되며, 양측은 서로에게 더 많은 양보를 할 것으로 예상됩니다. 이라크 중앙은행은 이란 지원 민병대의 자금 조달을 차단하기 위해 추가 조치를 취할 것으로 예상됩니다.

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NOTE: CTP-ISW is adjusting its Middle Eastern coverage to focus more closely on Iran and the Axis of Resistance in Iraq, Syria, and Yemen. CTP-ISW is also reducing its coverage of the Gaza Strip, the West Bank, and Lebanon. This refocusing is in response to the continued expansion of the Iranian nuclear program and the risk of an escalation in the coming months, as well as the Israeli defeats of Hamas and Hezbollah. We will cover and assess Axis of Resistance activities in the Palestinian territories and Lebanon at a less granular level moving forward. We will continue to publish analysis on other key US interests in the region, such as the defeat of ISIS and Syrian stability. We will also continue to adjust our Middle Eastern coverage and make those adjustments clear in response to regional dynamics and priorities, just as we did immediately after Hamas' October 7 attack on Israel and the fall of the Assad Regime.

A Syrian Defense Forces (SDF) commander stated that the SDF and the governing body in northeast Syria agreed to merge their forces into the Syrian Defense Ministry on February 17. A commander within the Northern Democratic Brigade—a faction of the SDF—said that the SDF, the Autonomous Administration of North and East Syria (AANES), and the Syrian Democratic Council (SDF) agreed to merge SDF and AANES-affiliated security forces into the Syrian army after discussion on February 17 about negotiations with Damascus. The SDF reportedly agreed to several conditions, including to remove non-Syrian fighters from the SDF’s ranks. SDF commander Mazloum Abdi said in a February 18 interview with Kurdish media that the Syrian government also requested that the SDF transfer certain security issues to the Syrian state, including control over ISIS prisons. Abdi said that the SDF was "open to cooperation" in these fields but did not explicitly specify whether the SDF had agreed to the conditions. Non-Syrian fighters within the SDF likely primarily refer to foreign Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK) fighters operating within northern Syria. Abdi recently confirmed that these fighters had come to Syria to support the SDF’s fight against ISIS and reportedly agreed to expel non-Syrian Kurds from Syria if the SDF, Turkey, and Turkish-backed forces reached a ceasefire in northern Syria. Turkey, which has worked with the Syrian government to pressure the SDF to disarm, has long demanded that the SDF expel PKK members from its ranks, although it has often conflated the two and has also, in effect called for the SDF’s destruction.


There still appear to be several outstanding issues in negotiations between the SDF and the Syrian interim government, but both parties appear to be engaging with one another constructively. Abdi said that there are still disagreements between Damascus and the SDF, though the two parties have continued to prepare suitable preconditions for negotiations. Abdi or the Syrian government have not yet publicly agreed on the specific mechanisms of the SDF’s integration into the Defense Ministry. Abdi’s demand that the SDF integrate as a "bloc" was one of the main sticking points of negotiations in the past two months, and it is unclear if either side has relaxed their views on this issue. Abdi’s public congratulations to Syrian Interim President Ahmed al Shara on assuming the presidency and invitation for Shara to visit northeastern Syria suggests that the SDF continues to be willing to engage positively with the Syrian government.


The Lebanese Armed Forces (LAF) backfilled the IDF in numerous positions along the southeastern Lebanese border on February 18, in accordance with the ceasefire deadline. The IDF withdrew from at least ten southeastern Lebanese towns on February 18. Lebanese and Israeli media reported that the IDF withdrew from Yaroun, Maroun al Ras, Mhaibib, Blida, Mays al Jabal, Houla, Markaba, Odaisseh, and Kfar Kila. The LAF backfilled the IDF in all of these towns. The IDF recently announced it would withdraw most of its forces from southern Lebanon on February 18 but keep Israeli troops stationed on five strategically significant hills. This includes Shaked Ridge, south of Blida, and Tzivoni Ridge, near Houla, in southeastern Lebanon.


The Israel Defense Forces (IDF) remains at seven semi-permanent positions in Quneitra and Daraa provinces in southern Syria. Israeli media reported on February 18 that the IDF has seven outposts that serve as “operational hubs” in Syria. Syrian media reported that Israeli forces entered al Asbah and al Asha in Quneitra Province on February 17.


Syrian Interim Foreign Affairs Minister Asaad al Shaibani advocated for other countries to lift financial sanctions on Syria at the al Ula Conference on Emerging Market Economies in Saudi Arabia on February 16. The conference explored possible technical assistance from the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund (IMF) to integrate Syria’s central bank back into the international financial system. The IMF’s Managing Director said that the IMF began communicating with Syrian officials to understand how to rebuild Syria’s connection to international finance at the al Ula conference. Shaibani met with Saudi Minister of Finance Mohammed bin Abdullah al Jadaan on the sidelines of the conference.


Key Takeaways:


  • Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF)-Damascus Negotiations: A Syrian Defense Forces (SDF) commander stated that the SDF and the governing body in northeast Syria agreed to merge their forces into the Syrian Defense Ministry on February 17. There still appear to be several outstanding issues in negotiations between the SDF and the Syrian interim government, but both parties appear to be engaging with one another constructively.



  • SDF Negotiating Position: SDF Commander Mazloum Abdi is under tremendous pressure from internal SDF rivals, external Kurdish rivals, longtime enemies, and his allies to integrate with the Damascus government. This pressure appears to be pushing the SDF to gradually moderate its demands. Abdi probably sees an opportunity to avoid a major conflict with Damascus and solidify his own position, though he presumably recognizes that integration with the Syrian army is fraught with risk given the outstanding issues regarding integration.


  • Iraqi Financial System and Iranian-backed Militias: The Iraqi Central Bank reportedly banned five local banks from US dollar transactions to combat money laundering and smuggling. The Iraqi Central Bank may have banned these banks under US pressure.

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