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[ISW] 러시아의 공세 캠페인 평가, 2025년 2월 20일

by Summa posted Feb 21, 2025
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Key Takeaways: 2023년 2월 21일

주요 요점:

  • 파이낸셜 타임즈(FT)는 2월 20일에 러시아 군 사령관들이 우크라이나 전쟁 포로(POW)를 처형하도록 부하들에게 명령을 내리는 데 가담하거나 직접 허용하고 있어 국제법을 명백히 위반하고 있다는 ISW의 오랜 평가를 뒷받침하는 조사 결과를 발표했습니다.
  • FT의 조사에 따르면 러시아 고위 사령관들도 우크라이나 전쟁 포로를 처형하라는 명령을 내리는 데 가담했을 가능성이 있습니다.
  • 우크라이나 정보국 고위 관리들은 북한군이 쿠르스크주에서 러시아군과 합동 작전을 수행하고 있으며 새로운 전투 역량을 습득하고 있다고 보고했습니다.
  • 미국의 러시아 및 우크라이나 특별 대표인 키스 켈로그는 2월 20일에 키예프에서 우크라이나 대통령 볼로디미르 젤렌스키와 회담했습니다.
  • 크렘린은 중화인민공화국(PRC)이 우크라이나 전쟁에 대한 입장에서 PRC가 공개적으로 메시지를 전달하려는 것보다 더 가깝게 묘사하려고 시도할 가능성이 큽니다.
  • 우크라이나군은 최근 포크로프스크 근처에서 진격했고 러시아군은 최근 포크로프스크와 벨리카 노보실카 근처에서 진격했습니다.
  • 러시아는 글라이드 폭탄 생산을 늘리고 순항 미사일을 현대화하고 있는 것으로 알려졌습니다.
분류: 군사, 정치 관련된 주요국가: 러시아, 우크라이나, 북한 향후 전망: 러시아는 계속해서 우크라이나에 대한 공격을 가할 것으로 예상되며, 우크라이나는 계속해서 저항할 것으로 예상됩니다. 북한은 러시아와의 관계를 강화할 것으로 예상되며, 미국은 우크라이나에 대한 지원을 계속할 것으로 예상됩니다.

[원문]

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Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment

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Grace Mappes, Davit Gasparyan, Nicole Wolkov, Christina Harward, Karolina Hird, and George Barros


February 20, 2025, 6:30pm ET

Click here to view our Russia-Ukraine interactive maps.


Click here to view our special reports since 2024.


Click here to read a new special report by ISW Russia Analyst Christina Harward: "Russia's Weakness Offers Leverage."

The Financial Times (FT) published an investigation on February 20 supporting ISW's long-held assessment that Russian military commanders are either complicit in or directly enabling subordinates to execute Ukrainian prisoners of war (POWs) in clear violation of international law. The FT investigation provided additional details and analysis following a significant increase in the number of credible reports of Russian forces executing Ukrainian POWs in 2024 compared to the first two years of the war. FT and experts from the Center for Information Resilience analyzed footage of the executions and used the soldiers' uniforms to confirm that Russian forces were conducting the executions. FT conducted an investigation into footage of a Russian soldier shooting six unarmed Ukrainian POWs and identified the possible perpetrator as a soldier in a "Storm" penal detachment of the 30th Motorized Rifle Brigade (2nd Combined Arms Army [CAA], Central Military District [CMD]), but noted that the situation warrants further investigation to confirm this soldier's involvement. FT reported that the 30th Motorized Rifle Brigade has been fighting near Pokrovsk since Fall 2024, which is consistent with ISW's observations. FT noted that Ukrainian frontline units are often the primary source of execution reports and drone footage of executions. FT noted, however, that tracking these executions is challenging because the Ukrainian units do not always relay reports of Ukrainian POW executions to their commanders. FT noted that Ukrainian prosecutors sometimes find out about the executions based on footage published online. FT interviewed the cofounders of a project reportedly affiliated with Ukrainian military intelligence who stated that many Ukrainian units do not publish information about executions "because it has become routine" and that there are likely hundreds of instances of POW executions beyond the "dozens" recorded so far.


FT's investigation suggests that more senior Russian commanders may also be complicit in issuing orders to execute Ukrainian POWs. Ukrainian officials opened investigations into 43 executions with 109 victims in 2024, and FT analyzed footage of 30 of these instances with 133 victims. The FT investigation found that Russian forces across the frontline — particularly in eastern Ukraine and Zaporizhia Oblast - are executing Ukrainian POWs, not just a few isolated "rogue [Russian] units." Global Rights Compliance President Wayne Jordash, who is assisting Ukrainian investigations into POW executions, told the FT that Russia is pursuing a "strategy of criminality" in Ukraine, including by torturing, sexually assaulting, and otherwise abusing residents in occupied Ukraine, and that the POW executions are also part of this criminality campaign. Jordash stated that Russian executions of Ukrainian POWs function to degrade Ukraine's military and security apparatus, leaving Ukraine more vulnerable to aggression.


Jordash noted that international law states that individuals who fail to prevent war crimes are also culpable for said war crimes and that government officials calling for POW executions are violating international law. Jordash mentioned specific instances of senior Russian leaders, including Security Council Deputy Chairperson Dmitry Medvedev and Chechen Republic Head Ramzan Kadyrov, explicitly calling for Russian forces to execute Ukrainian POWs. Jordash highlighted that Russian President Vladimir Putin praised the Russian 155th Naval Infantry Brigade (Pacific Fleet) for its actions in combat, which is notable because the 155th Naval Infantry Brigade is has been linked to the beheading of Ukrainian POWs and execution of Ukrainian drone operators in October 2024. Forbes attributed beheadings of Ukrainian POWs in August 2024 and summary executions in October 2024 in Kursk Oblast to the 155th Naval Infantry Brigade. Putin awarded the 30th Motorized Rifle Brigade the "Guards" honorific title in July 2024. FT reported that Putin held highly publicized meetings with two unspecified participants of the Kremlin's "Time of Heroes" veterans program who reportedly executed POWs near Robotyne, Zaporizhia Oblast in May 2024. The Wall Street Journal (WSJ) recently reported that there is a culture of torture and abuse of Ukrainian POWs detained in Russian penal colonies, and taken together these reports suggest that Russian decisionmakers in higher echelons of the chain of command may be implicitly encouraging, explicitly ordering, or failing to stop Russian executions and other abuses of Ukrainian POWs in a system that seems to incentivize such abuses.



Key Takeaways:


  • The Financial Times (FT) published an investigation on February 20 supporting ISW's long-held assessment that Russian military commanders are either complicit in or directly enabling subordinates to execute Ukrainian prisoners of war (POWs) in clear violation of international law.


  • FT's investigation suggests that more senior Russian commanders may also be complicit in issuing orders to execute Ukrainian POWs.


  • Senior Ukrainian intelligence officials reported that North Korean forces are conducting joint operations with Russian forces in Kursk Oblast and are gaining new combat capabilities.


  • US Special Representative for Russia and Ukraine Keith Kellogg met with Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky in Kyiv on February 20.


  • The Kremlin is likely attempting to portray the People's Republic of China (PRC) as more aligned with its stance on the war in Ukraine than the PRC is willing to publicly message.


  • Ukrainian forces recently advanced near Pokrovsk, and Russian forces recently advanced near Pokrovsk and Velyka Novosilka.


  • Russia is reportedly increasing its production of glide bombs and modernizing its cruise missiles.

Click Here to Read the Full Report

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