Katherine Wells, Ben Rezaei, Kelly Campa, Carolyn Moorman, Siddhant Kishore, Johanna Moore, Annika Ganzeveld and Brian Carter

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NOTE: CTP-ISW is adjusting its Middle Eastern coverage to focus more closely on Iran and the Axis of Resistance in Iraq, Syria, and Yemen. CTP-ISW is also reducing its coverage of the Gaza Strip, the West Bank, and Lebanon. This refocusing is in response to the continued expansion of the Iranian nuclear program and the risk of an escalation in the coming months, as well as the Israeli defeats of Hamas and Hezbollah. We will cover and assess Axis of Resistance activities in the Palestinian territories and Lebanon at a less granular level moving forward. We will continue to publish analysis on other key US interests in the region, such as the defeat of ISIS and Syrian stability. We will also continue to adjust our Middle Eastern coverage and make those adjustments clear in response to regional dynamics and priorities, just as we did immediately after Hamas' October 7 attack on Israel and the fall of the Assad Regime.

The British ambassador to Israel stated on February 25 that the E3 (the United Kingdom, France, and Germany) has given Iran until the end of June 2025 to conclude a new nuclear deal and prevent the imposition of snapback sanctions. It is very unlikely that Iran will conclude a deal with the E3 and the United States by June 2025, given that such a deal would require Iran to completely change its current policy on negotiations. The JCPOA snapback mechanism allows JCPOA signatories to reimpose UN Security Council sanctions on Iran in the event of “significant non-performance by Iran of JCPOA commitments.” The snapback mechanism expires in October 2025. The JCPOA itself will also effectively expire in October 2025, which means that Iran and the E3 would essentially have to draft a new agreement from scratch. It is very unlikely that Iran, the E3, and the United States would be able to draft such an agreement by June 2025 given that the negotiations that resulted in the JCPOA lasted for years. A new deal would also require Iran to completely change its stance on negotiations. Iranian Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei categorically rejected nuclear negotiations with the United States in a speech on February 7. Iranian officials who previously supported and were involved in negotiations with the United States have since then echoed Khamenei’s rejection of negotiations. The conclusion of a nuclear deal by June 2025 would require Khamenei to reverse his policy on negotiations, which he is unlikely to do.

The International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) previously passed a censure resolution proposed by the E3 in November 2024 that requires the IAEA to produce a “comprehensive report” on Iranian nuclear activities by spring 2025. CTP-ISW previously assessed that the IAEA report would almost certainly confirm Iranian noncompliance with the JCPOA and lay the foundation for the E3 to reimpose snapback sanctions in early March 2025. IAEA Director General Rafael Grossi stated on February 14 that the IAEA Board of Governors will not discuss the “comprehensive report” in its March 2025 meeting, however.

Key Takeaways:

• Iranian Nuclear Program: The British ambassador to Israel stated on February 25 that the E3 (the United Kingdom, France, and Germany) has given Iran until the end of June 2025 to conclude a new nuclear deal and prevent the imposition of snapback sanctions. It is very unlikely that Iran will conclude a deal with the E3 and the United States by June 2025, given that such a deal would require Iran to completely change its current policy on negotiations. Iran has continued to prepare for an Israeli strike on Iran.

• Iranian Threats Against the United States: A senior Iranian military commander threatened on February 24 that Iran could attack US and allied interests in the Middle East in response to a potential Israeli attack on Iran. Iran retains a large number of short-range ballistic missiles that it could use to strike US bases in the Middle East. The October 2024 IDF strikes on Iran severely degraded Iran’s long-range missile production capabilities and Iranian strikes targeting Israel depleted Iran’s stockpile of long-range ballistic missiles, but Iran still retains very large stockpiles of short-range ballistic missiles.

• Syrian Constitution: The attendees of the two-day Syrian National Dialogue Conference issued a statement consistent with the interim government’s stated goals at the end of the conference on February 25. The National Dialogue Conference, and the conference’s final statement, do not appear to impact who will comprise the future constitutional committee. The interim government likely designed the conference and statement to legitimize the constitutional committee and its decisions.

• Israel in Syria: Protests have broken out across Syria in response to Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu's recent demand to demilitarize southern Syria. These protests may expand because the interim government has few means to satisfy the protesters’ concerns. The expansion of the protests would risk destabilizing the interim government during a very difficult transition.

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