메뉴 건너뛰기

군사국방

국방뉴스

[ISW] 이란 업데이트, 2025년 2월 27일

by Summa posted Feb 28, 2025
?

단축키

Prev이전 문서

Next다음 문서

크게 작게 위로 아래로 댓글로 가기 인쇄
?

단축키

Prev이전 문서

Next다음 문서

크게 작게 위로 아래로 댓글로 가기 인쇄

Key Takeaways: PKK, SDF, Iran, Iraq, and Syria

주요 요점:

  • PKK와 시리아 민주군(SDF): 미국이 지원하는 SDF 사령관 마즐룸 압디는 PKK 지도자 압둘라 오잘란이 무장 해제하고 해산하라는 요구를 거부했습니다. 터키 관리들은 이전에 오잘란이 PKK에 무장 해제와 해산을 요구하면 SDF가 하야트 타흐리르 알샴(HTS)이 이끄는 임시 정부에 무장 해제하고 통합하는 데 동의하도록 압력을 받을 것이라고 암시했습니다.
  • SDF-다마스쿠스 협상: SDF 사령관은 시리아 임시 정부가 SDF와 시리아 쿠르드족이 임시 정부에 통합되는 동안 SDF 영토와 시리아 쿠르드족을 보호하겠다는 보장을 제공하지 않았기 때문에 오잘란의 요구를 거부했을 가능성이 큽니다. SDF는 임시 정부가 안보 보장과 SDF와 시리아 쿠르드족에 대한 추가적인 분권화 보장을 제공하면 무장 해제하고 임시 정부에 통합하는 데 동의할 수 있습니다.
  • 시리아에 대한 이란과 이라크의 견해: 이란은 이라크 연방 정부에 시리아 임시 정부와의 관계 정상화를 피하도록 압력을 가하고 있을 가능성이 큽니다. 이란과 연합한 일부 이라크 행위자들은 이라크와 시리아 간의 관계 정상화와 시리아에서의 터키의 영향력에 반대합니다. 이러한 이유 중 일부는 이란의 이익과 일치합니다.

분류: 국제 정치, 중동 정세 관련된 주요국가: 터키, 시리아, 이란 향후 전망: SDF와 시리아 임시 정부 간의 협상은 SDF가 임시 정부에 통합되는 조건에 대한 합의에 도달할 수 있는지 여부에 따라 향후 몇 주 동안 계속될 것입니다. 이란은 이라크 연방 정부에 시리아 임시 정부와의 관계 정상화를 피하도록 계속 압력을 가할 것입니다.

[원문]

Support ISW

Andie Parry, Carolyn Moorman, Katherine Wells, Ben Rezaei, Alexandra Braverman, Annika Ganzeveld, and Brian Carter


Information Cutoff: 2:00pm ET

Click here to view ISWCTP's Gaza Control-of-Terrain map and here for our interactive control-of-terrain map of Syria.


Click here to view ISW's complete portfolio of interactive maps.

US-backed Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF) Commander Mazloum Abdi rejected a call from Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK) leader Abdullah Ocalan to disarm and dissolve. Ocalan, who is imprisoned in Turkey, said that “all groups must lay [down] their arms” and called on PKK leaders to hold a conference to dissolve the PKK. Abdi replied that Ocalan’s statement “is only for the PKK [and is not] related to us in Syria.” Abdi stated that peace between the PKK and Turkey would strip Turkey of any justification for continuing attacks against Kurdish groups in Syria, however. The chairperson of the Democratic Union Party (PYD), which dominates the SDF, separately stated that “if the reasons for carrying weapons disappear, we will lay them down,” implying that the SDF will not disarm until Turkey and the Turkish-backed Syrian National Army (SNA) cease attacks on the SDF in northeastern Syria.


Turkish officials previously signaled that they believed a call to the PKK from Ocalan to disarm and dissolve would pressure the SDF into agreeing to disarm and integrate into the Hayat Tahrir al Sham (HTS)-led interim government. This belief reflects misplaced Turkish thinking that the entire SDF would be responsive to PKK direction. Abdi’s response to Ocalan’s call furthermore suggests that Abdi views himself as a Syrian Kurdish leader, not a transnational Kurdish separatist leader, and that he prioritizes protecting the SDF and Syrian Kurds from human rights abuses and political marginalization over pursuing larger Kurdish separatist goals. Abdi has consistently rejected the idea of SDF-held territory in northeastern Syria seceding from the Syrian state but has advocated for a federalist system.


Abdi likely rejected Ocalan’s call in part because the Syrian interim government has not provided guarantees to the SDF that it would protect SDF territory and Syrian Kurds during the integration of the SDF into the interim government. The interim government has insisted that the SDF completely disarm and join the new Syrian army as individuals. Abdi has emphasized that he would want the SDF to join the new Syrian army as a “military bloc,” however. The integration of the SDF into the Syrian Ministry of Defense as individuals would involve dismantling current SDF formations and building new formations in the Syrian Army that include relatively small numbers of SDF fighters sprinkled among multi-ethnic, theoretically apolitical units loyal to the national army. This process would inevitably force the SDF to halt its operations against Turkey and the Turkish-backed Syrian National Army (SNA) in northeastern Syria in order to deconstruct its own forces. The interim government has not provided guarantees to the SDF that it would prevent Turkey or the SNA from advancing into SDF-held territory or committing crimes against Kurds in northeastern Syria while the SDF integrates into the Defense Ministry. Some of the SNA factions that are fighting the SDF are sanctioned for committing serious human rights abuses against Kurds during the Turkish-backed operation to seize Afrin, northwestern Syria, in 2019.


The interim government appears to have double standards for the integration of the SNA and SDF into the Defense Ministry. The SNA has begun integrating its forces into the Defense Ministry in recent weeks. The rate of SNA attacks and activity against the SDF in northeastern Syria has not decreased, however, indicating that either the interim government has not yet integrated the SNA factions as individuals or alternatively has allowed SNA factions to integrate into the Defense Ministry as blocs. The SNA would have to stop fighting, deconstruct its forces, and then rebuild its forces as new, multi-ethnic, theoretically apolitical units loyal to the Defense Ministry chain of command to integrate as individuals and fully dissolve themselves.


The SDF could agree to disarm and integrate into the interim government if the interim government provides security guarantees and additional assurances on decentralization to the SDF and Syrian Kurds. The SDF could become more willing to disarm and dissolve if all armed factions, including the SNA, enter the Syrian Defense Ministry as individuals. The integration of individual SNA fighters into new Syrian army units that are not associated with the SNA could reduce the risk that the SDF currently perceives from the SNA. The interim government has announced the integration of former armed groups into the interim government, but these groups appear to have been integrated in name only. The interim government will likely need to make identical demands for all armed factions and secure some sort of political agreement and ceasefire with the SDF if it wants the SDF to integrate into the interim government.


Key Takeaways:


  • PKK and the Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF): US-backed SDF Commander Mazloum Abdi rejected a call from PKK leader Abdullah Ocalan to disarm and dissolve. Turkish officials previously signaled that they believed a call to the PKK from Ocalan to disarm and dissolve would pressure the SDF into agreeing to disarm and integrate into the Hayat Tahrir al Sham (HTS)-led interim government.


  • SDF-Damascus Negotiations: The SDF commander likely rejected Ocalan’s call in part because the Syrian interim government has not provided guarantees to the SDF that it would protect SDF territory and Syrian Kurds during the integration of the SDF into the interim government. The SDF could agree to disarm and integrate into the interim government if the interim government provides security guarantees and additional assurances on decentralization to the SDF and Syrian Kurds.


  • Iran and Iraqi Views on Syria: Iran is likely pressuring the Iraqi federal government to avoid normalizing ties with the Syrian interim government. Some Iranian-aligned Iraqi actors oppose normalization between Iraq and Syria and Turkish influence in Syria for their own reasons. Some of these reasons align with Iranian interests.

Click Here to Read the Full Report

Website | Jobs & Internships


Follow ISW on social media:


Facebook | X | YouTube | Instagram | LinkedIn | Threads | Bluesky

Donate online or by sending a check to the Institute for the Study of War at 1400 16th Street NW, Suite #515, Washington, DC, 20036. Please consider including the Institute for the Study of War in your estate plans.


ISW is a tax-exempt organization under section 501(c)(3) of the Internal Revenue Code. Donations are tax-deductible to the extent permitted by law.


The Institute for the Study of War (ISW) is a non-partisan, non-profit, public policy research organization. ISW advances an informed understanding of military affairs through reliable research, trusted analysis, and innovative education. We are committed to improving the nation's ability to execute military operations and respond to emerging threats in order to achieve US strategic objectives.



  1. [공지] 참조 사이트

    Date2023.12.14 BySumma
    read more
  2. [ISW] 이란 업데이트, 2025년 5월 1일

    Date2025.05.02 Category국방뉴스 BySumma
    Read More
  3. [ISW] 이란 업데이트, 2025년 4월 30일

    Date2025.05.01 Category국방뉴스 BySumma
    Read More
  4. [ISW] 이란 업데이트, 2025년 4월 11일

    Date2025.04.12 Category국방뉴스 BySumma
    Read More
  5. [ISW] 이란 업데이트, 2025년 4월 4일

    Date2025.04.05 Category국방뉴스 BySumma
    Read More
  6. [ISW] 이란 업데이트, 2025년 3월 26일

    Date2025.03.27 Category국방뉴스 BySumma
    Read More
  7. [ISW] 이란 업데이트, 2025년 3월 20일

    Date2025.03.21 Category국방뉴스 BySumma
    Read More
  8. [ISW] 이란 업데이트, 2025년 3월 19일

    Date2025.03.20 Category국방뉴스 BySumma
    Read More
  9. [ISW] 이란 업데이트, 2025년 3월 17일

    Date2025.03.18 Category국방뉴스 BySumma
    Read More
  10. [ISW] 이란 업데이트, 2025년 3월 12일

    Date2025.03.13 Category국방뉴스 BySumma
    Read More
  11. [ISW] 이란 업데이트, 2025년 3월 11일

    Date2025.03.12 Category국방뉴스 BySumma
    Read More
  12. [ISW] 이란 업데이트, 2025년 3월 10일

    Date2025.03.11 Category국방뉴스 BySumma
    Read More
  13. [ISW] 이란 업데이트, 2025년 3월 5일

    Date2025.03.06 Category국방뉴스 BySumma
    Read More
  14. [ISW] 이란 업데이트, 2025년 2월 27일

    Date2025.02.28 Category국방뉴스 BySumma
    Read More
  15. [ISW] 이란 업데이트, 2025년 2월 24일

    Date2025.02.25 Category국방뉴스 BySumma
    Read More
  16. [ISW] 이란 업데이트, 2025년 2월 21일

    Date2025.02.22 Category국방뉴스 BySumma
    Read More
  17. [ISW] 이란 업데이트, 2025년 2월 20일

    Date2025.02.21 Category국방뉴스 BySumma
    Read More
  18. [ISW] 이란 업데이트, 2025년 2월 19일

    Date2025.02.20 Category국방뉴스 BySumma
    Read More
  19. [ISW] 이란 업데이트, 2025년 2월 18일

    Date2025.02.19 Category국방뉴스 BySumma
    Read More
  20. [ISW] 이란 업데이트, 2025년 2월 16일

    Date2025.02.17 Category국방뉴스 BySumma
    Read More
  21. [ISW] 이란 업데이트, 2025년 2월 13일

    Date2025.02.14 Category국방뉴스 BySumma
    Read More
Board Pagination Prev 1 2 3 Next
/ 3
위로