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[ISW] 이란 업데이트, 2025년 3월 4일

by Summa posted Mar 05, 2025
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주요 쟁점

주요 쟁점

  • 러시아-이란 협력: 미확인 소식통에 따르면 러시아가 블룸버그와의 인터뷰에서 미국과 이란 간의 중재를 제안했다고 합니다. 러시아의 중재는 이란의 핵 활동과 저항 축에 대한 지원을 포함할 것으로 알려졌습니다. 그러나 러시아가 이러한 중재를 통해 미국의 이익을 보호하는 데 도움이 될지는 확실하지 않습니다. 특히 이란이 저항 축을 지원하는 것과 관련하여 그렇습니다.
  • 러시아-이란 협력: 러시아 무기 전문가들이 2024년에 최소 두 번 이란을 방문하여 확대되는 군사 협력에 대해 논의한 것으로 보입니다. 러시아 무기 전문가들은 2024년 4월에 이란과 이스라엘 간의 공습 교환에 따른 러시아제 방공 시스템의 피해를 평가하기 위해 이란을 방문했을 수 있습니다.
  • 이라크 의회 선거: 이라크 법치 연합의 수장인 누리 알 말리키는 2025년 10월 의회 선거에서 이라크 시아 민족주의 성직자 무크타다 알 사드르의 시아 국민 운동이 참여하는 것을 지지한다고 합니다. 이는 모하마드 시아 알 수다니 총리의 정치적 영향력을 약화시키기 위한 것입니다.

분류: 국제 정치, 중동 관련 주요 국가: 러시아, 이란, 이라크 향후 전망: 러시아와 이란 간의 협력은 미국의 이익에 부정적인 영향을 미칠 수 있습니다. 특히 이란이 저항 축을 지원하는 것과 관련하여 그렇습니다. 이라크 의회 선거에서 무크타다 알 사드르의 시아 국민 운동이 참여하면 모하마드 시아 알 수다니 총리의 정치적 영향력이 약화될 수 있습니다.

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Russia offered to mediate between the United States and Iran, according to unspecified sources speaking to Bloomberg. Russian mediation would reportedly cover Iranian nuclear activities and support for the Axis of Resistance. It is far from clear that Russia would help secure US interests through this mediation, however, especially regarding Iranian support for the Axis of Resistance. Russia has cooperated extensively with the Axis of Resistance over the past decade. This cooperation has included working with Iran and Iranian-backed militias to attack US forces in the Middle East. Russian and Iranian-backed forces conducted a combined attack on US forces in Syria in 2018, for example. Russia also supported the Axis of Resistance against Israel throughout the October 7 War. The Kremlin provided targeting intelligence to the Houthis to support attacks on international shipping and US vessels in the Red Sea and Gulf of Aden. Moscow and Tehran signed a strategic cooperation agreement in January 2025, underscoring further their close collaboration and their alignment in working to erode US global influence.


Russia’s support for the Axis of Resistance does not necessarily mean that Russia has leverage over its behavior. Russia has historically been the dominant partner in the Russo-Iranian relationship, but this relationship has become more balanced in recent years, particularly since the Russian invasion of Ukraine in February 2022. Russia relies heavily on Iranian military support, such as drones, to sustain its war against Ukraine. These shifting dynamics have made Iran a more equal partner in its strategic partnership with Russia. Moscow trying to coerce Tehran into curbing its regional activities would risk damaging their partnership, which is critical to sustaining Russia’s war against Ukraine.


Russian weapons experts traveled to Iran at least twice in 2024, likely to discuss their growing military cooperation. Reuters reported on March 4 that seven senior Russian weapons experts, including one with a background in advanced weapons development and one with a background in missile testing, traveled to Iran in April and September 2024. A senior Iranian defense ministry official stated that unspecified Russian missile experts conducted multiple visits to Iranian missile production sites, including at least two underground missile facilities, in 2024. The September 2024 visit notably occurred days after Iran began sending short-range ballistic missiles to Russia. The Israel Defense Forces (IDF) struck Iranian mixing equipment used to produce solid fuel for ballistic missiles in October 2024, which could disrupt Iranian ballistic missile shipments to Russia in the near future.


The Russian weapons experts may have traveled to Iran in April 2024 to assess damage to Russian-made air defenses following an exchange of strikes between Iran and Israel. The visit occurred five days after the IDF struck the tombstone engagement radar of a Russian-made S-300 air defense system in Iran. The strike rendered the S-300 inoperable by destroying its ability to track and engage targets.


The IDF conducted its deepest incursion into Syria yet since the IDF launched ground operations in southern Syria in December 2024. Syrian media reported on March 3 that Israeli forces raided a former Syrian Arab Army (SAA) base on Tell al Mal, Quneitra Province. Syrian media reported that Israeli bulldozers destroyed infrastructure in the base. The IDF reportedly used helicopters during the raid, presumably to deploy an assault force. Tell al Mal is around 16 kilometers from the 1974 disengagement zone. Syrian media reported that Israeli forces separately patrolled Ruwaihaniya, Quneitra Province, on March 4.


Key Takeaways:


  • Russo-Iranian Cooperation: Russia offered to mediate between the United States and Iran, according to unspecified sources speaking to Bloomberg. Russian mediation would reportedly cover Iranian nuclear activities and support for the Axis of Resistance. It is far from clear that Russia would help secure US interests through this mediation, however, especially regarding Iranian support for the Axis of Resistance.


  • Russo-Iranian Cooperation: Russian weapons experts traveled to Iran at least twice in 2024, likely to discuss their growing military cooperation. The Russian weapons experts may have traveled to Iran in April 2024 to assess damage to Russian-made air defenses following an exchange of strikes between Iran and Israel.


  • Iraqi Parliamentary Elections: Iraqi State of Law Coalition head Nouri al Maliki reportedly supports the participation of Iraqi Shia nationalist cleric Muqtada al Sadr’s Shia National Movement in the October 2025 parliamentary elections in order to diminish Prime Minister Mohammad Shia al Sudani’s political influence.

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