Annika Ganzeveld, Johanna Moore, Andie Parry, Ben Rezaei, Katherine Wells, Ria Reddy, Alexandra Braverman, Siddhant Kishore, Carolyn Moorman, Bailey Pasternak, and Brian Carter

Information Cutoff: 2:00 pm ET

Click here to view ISW–CTP's interactive control-of-terrain map of Syria.

Click here to view ISW's complete portfolio of interactive maps.

Current Syrian interim government counterinsurgency operations are insufficient to defeat pro-Assad insurgent cells across Syria. Interim government forces launched major counterinsurgent operations in former regime strongholds between March 7 and 10. These operations have coincided with a decrease in insurgent activity but insurgent cells have continued attacks on interim government forces while expanding attacks across Tartous Province. The decrease in rate of insurgent attacks during major counterinsurgent operations is more likely due to insurgents withdrawing from an area for the duration of the operation rather than a reflection of the operation’s success in destroying cells. There have been few engagements between insurgents and Syrian government forces during these large-scale counterinsurgent operations, suggesting that the insurgents are lying low and avoiding contact. Counterinsurgency operations require that security forces maintain their presence in an area to control it and prevent insurgents from reestablishing their connections with their support base. The interim government announced Syrian forces began to withdraw from western Syria after successfully pushing insurgents out of city centers. Interim government forces established approximately 150 checkpoints to prevent the movement of fighters. Checkpoints alone will not defeat the insurgency, because checkpoints are commonly placed on major thoroughfares and not the sorts of small roads and trails that are known to local fighters and can easily bypass checkpoints. Static checkpoints also do not destroy the insurgent force and usually fail to protect the population.

The interim Syrian government has not addressed outstanding grievances within the Alawite community. Damascus will need to address these grievances to build the stability and confidence in government institutions necessary to defeat the insurgency. A unit within the interim government forces was removed from counterinsurgency operations over the weekend after committing extrajudicial killings but was not appropriately detained and reportedly proceeded to commit additional acts of violence against the civilian population. Interim Syrian President Ahmed al Shara gave a speech on March 9 in which he briefly acknowledged accusations of extrajudicial killings by HTS-led forces and promised that those who “exceeded the powers of the state” will be held accountable. Shara also appointed two Alawites and several competent, professional judges to a committee to investigate the crimes committed by government troops, which is a notable step towards ameliorating sectarian concerns. Government forces have arrested some of those responsible for extrajudicial killings. Interim government raids targeting former Assad regime members since December 2024 have fueled reports of revenge-based attacks and harassment, particularly against the Alawite community. Failure to hold perpetrators of extrajudicial killings during the recent clearing operations accountable will exacerbate fears within the community that government forces are targeting civilians.

Key Takeaways:

• Pro-Assad Insurgency: Current Syrian interim government counterinsurgency operations are insufficient to defeat pro-Assad insurgent cells across Syria. The decrease in the rate of insurgent attacks during major counterinsurgent operations is more likely due to insurgents withdrawing from an area for the duration of the operation rather than a reflection of the operation’s success in destroying cells.

• Syrian Government Response to Insurgency: The interim Syrian government has not addressed outstanding grievances within the Alawite community. Damascus will need to address these grievances to build the stability and confidence in government institutions necessary to defeat the insurgency. The government did appoint two Alawites and several competent, professional judges to investigate crimes in the coastal areas. It has also arrested some of those responsible for extrajudicial killings.

• Iranian Nuclear Negotiations: Iranian Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei reiterated his rejection of negotiations with the United States. Khamenei also addressed Iran’s economic challenges during his speech and tried to downplay the impact of sanctions. It is unlikely that new Iranian policies would outweigh the effects of US sanctions on the Iranian economy or solve the underlying issues that plague the Iranian economy.

• Energy Waivers in Iraq: The United States revoked a waiver for Iraq to import Iranian electricity as part of the US "maximum pressure" campaign against Iran. The removal of the waiver will likely threaten political stability in Iraq and damage Iran’s economy further.

• Damascus-Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF) Agreement: The US-backed Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF) and the Syrian interim government agreed to a ceasefire and political agreement on March 10. The March 10 agreement stipulates that the SDF’s military and civil organizations will integrate into the Syrian state, but it is unclear how the integration will occur in practice.

• Hezbollah: Hezbollah Secretary General Naim Qassem said on March 9 that Lebanese government efforts to establish a state monopoly on violence do not apply to Hezbollah. Qassem argued that Hezbollah serves as a “necessary” deterrent against Israeli attacks into Lebanon, which is a long-running Hezbollah claim to justify its own existence as a non-state militia in Lebanon.

Click Here to Read the Full Report

Website | Jobs & Internships

Follow ISW on social media:

Facebook | X | YouTube | Instagram | LinkedIn | Threads | Bluesky

Donate online or by sending a check to the Institute for the Study of War at 1400 16th Street NW, Suite #515, Washington, DC, 20036. Please consider including the Institute for the Study of War in your estate plans.

ISW is a tax-exempt organization under section 501(c)(3) of the Internal Revenue Code. Donations are tax-deductible to the extent permitted by law.

The Institute for the Study of War (ISW) is a non-partisan, non-profit, public policy research organization. ISW advances an informed understanding of military affairs through reliable research, trusted analysis, and innovative education. We are committed to improving the nation's ability to execute military operations and respond to emerging threats in order to achieve US strategic objectives.