Iran agreed to “high-level” talks with the United States in Oman on April 12, but it is very unlikely to agree to some of the reported US demands. Iranian Foreign Affairs Minister Abbas Araghchi and US Special Envoy to the Middle East Steve Witkoff will lead the negotiations. US President Donald Trump stated on April 7 that the US and Iran will hold “direct” talks on April 12, while Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei rejected direct negotiations multiple times in recent months. Araghchi published an English-language op-ed in Western media on April 8 that emphasized that talks will be “indirect” and compared the proposed format to the indirect Russia-Ukraine talks mediated by the United States and the indirect US-Iran nuclear talks mediated by the European Union in 2021. Some reported US demands include significant limits to Iran’s uranium enrichment, a decrease in support to Iran’s proxies and partners in the Axis of Resistance, and limits to Iran’s drone and missile program. Some senior US officials also indicated that the United States seeks a deal that would fully dismantle Iran’s nuclear program, something that Iranian officials have stated is unacceptable. To accept these demands would require Iran to abandon key components of its regional strategy and severely limit Iran’s deterrence against the United States and Israel. Iran has long anchored its regional strategy on the development of proxies and partners, and it has only abandoned key partners like Bashar al Assad in the face of military defeat.
Iran may be conducting an information campaign to prepare to argue that it is already adhering to some US demands in the negotiations. Iranian officials have recently told Western media outlets that Iran is distancing itself from various proxies in the Axis of Resistance, namely the Houthis and Iranian-backed Iraqi militias. Iranian officials could calculate that launching this information campaign will enable them to successfully argue that Iran is stepping back its support for its proxies. This campaign is a continuation of a long-running Iranian campaign in which Iran denies its support for many of its proxies. Iran, for example, denies that it violates the UN arms embargo to Yemen despite clear evidence that Iran ships weapons to the Houthis. Iran similarly obfuscates its role in the Axis of Resistance despite its clear leadership role — including its ability to direct some groups to do Tehran’s bidding. Iran and its partners and proxies have continued to state publicly in Arabic and Farsi that they will support one another while simultaneously denying their close relationships in English to Western outlets.
Turkey and Israel have reportedly held talks to discuss opening a deconfliction line to avoid potential conflict over Israeli strikes in Syria, according to two unspecified Western officials. Another unspecified source "familiar with Turkish-Israeli tensions” told Middle East Eye on April 7 that the talks between Turkey and Israel began after Israel struck Tiyas Airbase in Homs Province. Israel has struck Tiyas Airbase on March 21, March 24, and April 2. Israeli officials called the strikes a “warning” to Turkey. Reuters reported on April 7 that Turkey has evaluated establishing airbases at Tiyas and at least two other Syrian bases. The unspecified Western officials said that Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu told his Turkish counterparts that Israel had a “limited window” to strike Tiyas before Turkey positioned assets there, which would make the base “off-limits” to Israeli strikes. The Turkish Defense Ministry denied that it held talks with Israel on April 8. An open line of communication between Turkey and Israel could possibly prevent a potential stand-off between the two parties, particularly one that may be triggered if Israel continues to strike Syrian bases and Turkey continues to develop plans to base its forces in Syria. One of the unspecified sources said that Netanyahu maintained that Israel insists on a fully demilitarized southern Syria, which would preclude Turkey from forming a presence there. The Turkish government is unlikely to halt plans to establish Turkish presence at Syrian bases like Tiyas or Palmyra. Turkish officials have maintained that doing so is critical to Turkey’s counter-ISIS efforts.
US Central Command (CENTCOM) has targeted several mid-ranking commanders responsible for the frontline in Hudaydah Governorate, which could impact the Houthis’ ability to coordinate attacks on international shipping and react to major ground attacks. CENTCOM conducted an airstrike on April 2 targeting al Fazah, Hudaydah Governorate, southwest of Houthi-controlled territory in Yemen near the Red Sea, reportedly killing at least 70 Houthi fighters. Several mid-ranking Houthi military and intelligence officials reportedly died in the airstrike, including the al Tuhayta Axis Commander Najib Kashri. The Tuhayta area is south of Hudaydah and close to the frontline between Houthi and pro-Yemeni government forces. CENTCOM strikes eliminating mid-level commanders along this frontline could create opportunities for pro-government forces to exploit if the CENTCOM strikes were to be coordinated with pro-government forces. These strikes and their possible impacts on the frontline are notable in the context of CNN reporting on April 6 that the Yemeni Government is preparing for a ground offensive against the Houthis, citing unspecified regional diplomatic sources. These mid-level commanders will be quickly replaced, however. The Tuhayta area is also probably important for Houthi smuggling efforts and drone and missile operations. CENTCOM reportedly targeted the Houthis’ Red Sea Coastal Region Commander Abu Taleb in this airstrike as well. Abu Taleb’s status remains unknown.
CENTCOM also reportedly conducted an unspecified number of airstrikes targeting 13 Houthi military officials meeting at Sheikh Saleh al Suhaili’s house in the eastern suburbs of Sanaa City, according to local sources. Houthi media reported that the airstrikes killed at least four people and injured 25, but did not name the casualties. Suhaili’s brother is close to the founder of the Houthi movement, Hussein al Houthi, and is himself reportedly affiliated with the Houthis internal security apparatus and the Houthis’ smuggling operations. Suhaili has also previously hosted former Iranian Ambassador to the Houthis and Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps Quds Force member Hassan Irloo in the same house when Irloo was ambassador between 2019 and 2021.
Key Takeaways:
- Iranian Nuclear Negotiations: Iran agreed to “high-level” talks with the United States in Oman on April 12, but it is very unlikely to agree to some of the reported US demands. Iranian Foreign Affairs Minister Abbas Araghchi and US Special Envoy to the Middle East Steve Witkoff will lead the negotiations. Iran may be conducting an information campaign to prepare to argue that it is already adhering to some US demands in the negotiations.
- Iran, Russia, and China Cooperation: Iran continues to coordinate with China and Russia on nuclear issues ahead of talks with the United States, further illustrating the interaction between major US adversaries.
- Turkey and Israel in Syria: Turkey and Israel have reportedly held talks to discuss opening a deconfliction line to avoid potential conflict over Israeli strikes in Syria, according to two unspecified Western officials.
- US Air Campaign in Yemen: US Central Command (CENTCOM) has targeted several mid-ranking commanders responsible for the frontline in Hudaydah governorate, which could impact the Houthis’ ability to coordinate attacks on international shipping and react to major ground attacks.
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