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[ISW] 러시아의 공세 캠페인 평가, 2025년 4월 9일

by Summa posted Apr 10, 2025
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Key Takeaways

주요 요점:

  • 러시아군은 수미-쿠르스크 주 경계 지역에서 계속해서 약간씩 진격하고 있지만, 이 지역의 러시아군 집단은 가까운 시일 내에 수미 시에 대한 주요 공세 작전을 개시할 수 없을 가능성이 높습니다.
  • 러시아군 사령부는 수미 주에 국경을 따라 완충 지대를 형성하려고 시도하고 있지만, 러시아군 사령관은 앞으로 수미 주와 수미 시를 향해 더욱 진격할 의도를 가질 수 있습니다.
  • 러시아는 쿠르스크 주에서 계속해서 북한군을 활용하고 있지만, ISW는 아직 북한군이 우크라이나에서 전투 부대로 활동하고 있다는 징후를 관찰하지 못했습니다.
  • 시르스키는 현재 우크라이나에 맞서 싸우고 있는 러시아군 병력이 623,000명이라고 밝혔습니다.
  • 시르스키는 또한 우크라이나의 전술 및 장거리 드론 역량을 더욱 발전시키기 위한 노력에 대해서도 언급했습니다.
  • 중화인민공화국(PRC)은 우크라이나에서 중국인이 러시아군과 함께 싸우고 있다는 우크라이나의 보도에 대해 군인을 파견하지 않았다고 부인했습니다.
  • 우크라이나군은 토레츠크와 포크로프스크 근처에서 진격했습니다.
  • 러시아군은 쿠피얀스크, 리만, 토레츠크, 포크로프스크, 자포리자주 서부 지역에서 진격했습니다.
  • 러시아 연방 정부와 러시아 연방 주체는 재향군인의 재활과 재통합에 점점 더 집중하고 있습니다.

분류: 군사 관련된 주요국가: 러시아, 우크라이나, 중국 향후 전망: 러시아군은 수미 주에서 계속해서 진격할 가능성이 높지만, 가까운 시일 내에 수미 시에 대한 주요 공세 작전을 개시할 수 없을 가능성이 높습니다. 러시아군 사령부는 수미 주에 국경을 따라 완충 지대를 형성하려고 시도하고 있지만, 러시아군 사령관은 앞으로 수미 주와 수미 시를 향해 더욱 진격할 의도를 가질 수 있습니다.

[원문]

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Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment

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Angelica Evans, Grace Mappes, Davit Gasparyan, Anna Harvey, and Frederick W. Kagan with Nate Trotter and William Runkel


April 9, 2025, 7:00pm ET

Click here to view our Russia-Ukraine interactive maps.


Click here to view our special reports since 2025.

Click here to read the latest "Russian Occupation Update," a new product line tracking activities in Russian-occupied areas of Ukraine.

Russian forces continue to marginally advance in the Sumy-Kursk Oblast border area, but the Russian force grouping in the area will likely be unable to launch a major offensive operation against Sumy City in the near term without receiving significant reinforcements. Ukrainian Commander-in-Chief General Oleksandr Syrskyi stated during an interview with Ukrainian outlet LB UA published on April 9 that Russian forces have intensified assaults in "all main directions" and begun offensive operations in Sumy and Kharkiv oblasts. ISW has observed gradual but consistent Russian gains and attacks along the Volodymyrivka-Zhuravka-Novenke line (north to northeast of Sumy City) in northern Sumy Oblast and ongoing Russian efforts to push Ukrainian forces from remaining positions south of Sudzha in southern Kursk Oblast since early March 2025. Russian forces made rapid advances in Kursk Oblast in early March 2025 as the United States temporarily paused intelligence sharing with Ukraine, but Russian gains slowed as Ukrainian forces retreated into Sudzha and later resumed use of HIMARS long-range strike systems. Russian forces pushed Ukrainian forces from Sudzha in mid-March 2025 but have continued to attack the remaining Ukrainian positions in Kursk Oblast while starting attacks into northern Sumy Oblast over the past month.


The Russian military command is likely attempting to form a buffer zone along the international border in Sumy Oblast, although Russian commanders may intend to press further into Sumy Oblast and towards Sumy City in the future. ISW previously assessed that Russian forces would not attempt to advance further into northern Sumy Oblast or attack Sumy City so long as Ukrainian forces maintained their salient in Kursk Oblast. Recent Russian attacks into northern Sumy Oblast indicate that the Russian military command may attempt to capitalize on the collapse of the Ukrainian Kursk Oblast salient in order to create a buffer zone in Sumy Oblast or launch an offensive on Sumy City. Russian President Vladimir Putin asked Russian Chief of the General Staff Army General Valery Gerasimov during a visit to a Russian command post in Kursk Oblast on March 12 to "think in the future about creating a security zone" along the Ukrainian-Russian international border. Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov suggested that Russia form a similar buffer zone in Kharkiv Oblast in order to justify the Russian offensive into northern Kharkiv Oblast in March 2024, and Putin's statement indicates that the Russian military command is either considering or actively working towards creating a buffer zone in northern Sumy Oblast.


Putin likely intends to use a buffer zone in northern Sumy Oblast and an offensive towards Sumy City to justify expanding his claims over Ukrainian territory. Russian officials are currently demanding that Ukraine cede unoccupied territory in Donetsk, Zaporizhia, and Kherson oblasts as part of a future peace agreement to end the war, and Russian officials have previously claimed that Mykolaiv Oblast (which Russia occupies a miniscule part of on the Kinburn Spit) and Kharkiv Oblast (which Russian occupies limited areas of) are "historically Russian lands." Putin may intend to leverage further advances in Sumy Oblast and pressure on Sumy City to demand that Ukraine cede part of Sumy Oblast to Russia during future peace negotiations. The Russian force grouping in Kursk Oblast is unlikely to be sufficiently combat capable to seize a major Ukrainian city after eight months of combat operations unless it receives significant reinforcements from another frontline area — which would require Russia to abandon a major operational effort in another area of Ukraine and possibly leave that area vulnerable to Ukrainian forces — and is therefore unlikely. Russian forces likely intend to establish a limited and defensible "buffer zone" in northern Sumy Oblast and advance within artillery range of Sumy City in order to pressure the city and make it uninhabitable for civilians. The Russian military command may also intend to establish limited, defensible positions in northern Sumy Oblast and then transfer these forces to reinforce other operational efforts in Ukraine, although the informational and political pressure that a push on Sumy City could generate may be more enticing for Putin than advances in other frontline areas.


Key Takeaways:


  • Russian forces continue to marginally advance in the Sumy-Kursk Oblast border area, but the Russian force grouping in the area will likely be unable to launch a major offensive operation against Sumy City in the near term without receiving significant reinforcements.


  • The Russian military command is likely attempting to form a buffer zone along the international border in Sumy Oblast, although Russian commanders may intend to press further into Sumy Oblast and towards Sumy City in the future.


  • Russia continues to utilize North Korean troops in Kursk Oblast, but ISW has not yet observed indications that North Korean troops are operating as combat forces in Ukraine.


  • Syrskyi stated that there are currently 623,000 Russian military personnel fighting against Ukraine.


  • Syrskyi also spoke about Ukraine's efforts to further develop its tactical and long-range drone capabilities.


  • The People's Republic of China (PRC) denied sending military personnel to fight in Ukraine following Ukrainian reports of Chinese nationals fighting alongside Russian forces.


  • Ukrainian forces advanced near Toretsk and Pokrovsk.


  • Russian forces advanced near Kupyansk, Lyman, Toretsk, Pokrovsk, and in western Zaporizhia Oblast.


  • The Russian federal government and Russian federal subjects are increasingly focused on veteran rehabilitation and reintegration.

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