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[ISW] 러시아의 공세 캠페인 평가, 2025년 4월 10일

by Summa posted Apr 11, 2025
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```html Key Takeaways: 요약

Key Takeaways: 요약

  • 우크라이나의 볼로디미르 젤렌스키 대통령은 4월 9일 우크라이나가 미래의 미-우크라이나 광물 거래의 틀 안에서 미국의 대규모 무기 패키지를 구매하는 데 관심이 있다고 밝혔습니다. 이는 미래의 러시아 침공을 억제할 수 있는 안보 보장을 얻기 위한 우크라이나의 노력의 일환입니다.
  • 공개적으로 입수 가능한 공식 협정이 없음에도 불구하고 러시아가 우크라이나의 에너지 공격 협정 위반에 대한 근거 없는 비난을 지속하는 것은 러시아가 우크라이나와 미국이 이미 합의한 지상 협정을 수락할 경우 어떻게 행동할 것인지를 보여줍니다.
  • 러시아는 미국과의 양자 회담을 통해 우크라이나 전쟁에 대한 협상을 지연시키고 있으며, 이는 크렘린이 전쟁을 끝내기 위한 진지한 평화 협상에 관심이 없는 것으로 보이기 때문입니다.
  • 러시아는 소셜 미디어와 재정적 인센티브를 사용하여 중국 국민들이 자발적으로 러시아 군대에 합류하도록 모집하고 있다고 합니다.
  • 러시아군은 최근 리만 방향에서 부상한 우크라이나 전쟁 포로(POW)를 처형한 것으로 알려졌습니다.
  • 크렘린은 역사적으로 우크라이나에 대해 사용해 온 서술을 계속 사용하여 에스토니아에 대한 미래의 잠재적 침략을 정당화할 조건을 설정하고 있습니다.
  • 우크라이나군은 최근 차시브 야르 근처에서 진격했고, 러시아군은 토레츠크와 포크로프스크 근처에서 진격했습니다.
  • 러시아 내부 소식통은 러시아 당국이 전직 군인 문제를 감독할 러시아 지역 정부에 전담 직책을 준비하고 있으며, 연방 정부도 앞으로 이와 유사한 직책을 포함할 수 있다고 주장했습니다.

분류

  • 정치
  • 군사
  • 외교

관련된 주요국가

  • 우크라이나
  • 러시아
  • 미국

향후 전망

  • 러시아는 우크라이나에 대한 침공을 계속할 가능성이 높습니다.
  • 미국과 러시아 간의 긴장이 고조될 가능성이 있습니다.
  • 우크라이나 전쟁은 장기화될 가능성이 있습니다.
```

[원문]

ISW Logo

Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment

Support ISW

Daria Novikov, Christina Harward, Grace Mappes, Anna Harvey,

and Frederick W. Kagan with Nate Trotter and William Runkel


April 10, 2025, 8:20 pm ET

Click here to view our Russia-Ukraine interactive maps.


Click here to view our special reports since 2025.

Click here to read the latest "Russian Occupation Update," a new product line tracking activities in Russian-occupied areas of Ukraine.

Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky stated on April 9 that Ukraine is interested in purchasing a large package of weapons from the United States, possibly within the framework of a future US-Ukraine mineral deal, as part of Ukrainian efforts to obtain security guarantees that would deter a future Russian invasion. Zelensky stated on April 9 that Ukraine recently proposed to the United States that Ukraine purchase "30 to 50 billion" (likely USD) worth of air defense and weapons systems from the United States and that Ukraine is prepared to purchase these systems itself — either through direct payment to the United States or through the fund established by the potential US-Ukrainian minerals deal. Zelensky stated that he recently told US President Donald Trump that Ukraine wants to buy at least 10 air defense systems to "help [Ukraine] after the end of the war" and that Ukraine will consider the provision of these air defense and weapons systems as a "security guarantee." ISW continues to assess that a strong Ukrainian military backed by Western security guarantees remains the most vital component of a stable post-war European security architecture, guaranteeing a sustainable peace in Ukraine and deterring future Russian aggression.


Russia’s continued unsubstantiated accusations of Ukrainian violations of the energy strike ceasefire —despite the lack of any publicly available official ceasefire agreement — demonstrate how Russia will likely act in the event that Russia accepts the ground ceasefire to which Ukraine and the United States have already agreed. Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA) Spokesperson Maria Zakharova claimed without evidence on April 9 that Ukrainian forces struck energy infrastructure in "Russian regions" 32 times between April 4 and 7. The Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) also claimed without evidence on April 10 that Ukraine conducted 11 strikes against energy facilities in occupied Luhansk, Donetsk, Zaporizhia, and Kherson oblasts; Krasnodar Krai; and Kursk, Bryansk, and Belgorod oblasts in the past day. The Russian MoD claimed that Ukrainian forces struck energy facilities in the Russian near rear and rear in occupied Ukraine, including in Horlivka, Donetsk Oblast (roughly six kilometers from the frontline) and Holoprystanskyi Raion, Kherson Oblast (just south of the Dnipro River and inclusive of areas immediately on the east [left] bank of the Dnipro River). It is unclear if frontline energy infrastructure in the Russian near rear and rear are covered under the strikes ceasefire as the terms of the agreement have not been published. ISW continues to assess that Russian officials are using the lack of a clearly defined and public ceasefire agreement to cast Ukraine as a disingenuous participant in the peace negotiation process. Russian officials’ continued insistence that Ukraine is violating the ceasefire underscores the importance of a signed and publicly available ceasefire agreement that includes monitoring and adjudication processes -elements that will be even more important in the potential future ground ceasefire to which the United States and Ukraine have already agreed.


Russia continues to use bilateral talks with the United States to delay negotiations about the war in Ukraine, suggesting that the Kremlin remains uninterested in serious peace negotiations to end the war. The US Department of State (DoS) reported that US and Russian delegations met in Istanbul on April 10 to discuss the finalization of "an understanding to ensure the stability of diplomatic banking for Russian and US bilateral missions." The US DoS stated that the US delegation reiterated concerns about the current Russian policy prohibiting the US Embassy in Moscow from employing local staff, which the United States sees as a barrier to the embassy's stable and sustainable staffing. Kremlin Spokesperson Dmitry Peskov stated on April 10 that the Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA) and the US DoS would only discuss bilateral relations and would not discuss Ukraine. Russian Ambassador to the United States Alexander Darchiev stated on April 10 that the United States and Russia agreed to measures to facilitate the movement of diplomats and accelerate the granting of diplomatic visas. Darchiev also stated that the Russian delegation prioritized discussions about the return of confiscated Russian diplomatic property in the United States. Russia continues to use bilateral talks with the United States to discuss issues unrelated to the war in Ukraine, even as US President Donald Trump continues efforts to achieve the temporary ground ceasefire upon which both the United States and Ukraine have agreed. The talks in Istanbul suggest that Russia is using diplomatic engagements with the United States to distract from the war and to obfuscate its own disinterest in productive peace negotiations.


Key Takeaways:

  • Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky stated on April 9 that Ukraine is interested in purchasing a large package of weapons from the United States, possibly within the framework of a future US-Ukraine mineral deal, as part of Ukrainian efforts to obtain security guarantees that would deter a future Russian invasion.


  • Russia’s continued unsubstantiated accusations of Ukrainian violations of the energy strike ceasefire - despite the lack of any publicly available official ceasefire agreement – demonstrate how Russia will likely act in the event that Russia accepts the ground ceasefire to which Ukraine and the United States have already agreed.


  • Russia continues to use bilateral talks with the United States to delay negotiations about the war in Ukraine, suggesting that the Kremlin remains uninterested in serious peace negotiations to end the war.


  • Russia is reportedly using social media and financial incentives to recruit Chinese nationals to voluntarily join the Russian military.


  • Russian forces reportedly recently executed a wounded Ukrainian prisoner of war (POW) in the Lyman direction.


  • The Kremlin continues to use narratives it has historically used against Ukraine to set conditions to justify possible future aggression against Estonia.


  • Ukrainian forces recently advanced near Chasiv Yar, and Russian forces advanced near Toretsk and Pokrovsk.


  • A Russian insider source claimed that Russian authorities are preparing a dedicated position in Russian regional governments that will oversee veterans' affairs, and the federal government may include similar positions in the future.

Click Here to Read the Full Report

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The Institute for the Study of War (ISW) is a non-partisan, non-profit, public policy research organization. ISW advances an informed understanding of military affairs through reliable research, trusted analysis, and innovative education. We are committed to improving the nation's ability to execute military operations and respond to emerging threats in order to achieve US strategic objectives.



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