Iran will likely attempt to use nuclear negotiations with the United States to delay a potential strike on its nuclear facilities and the imposition of snapback sanctions. Axios reported on April 11 that Iran may propose that Iran and the United States first negotiate an “interim deal” prior to beginning negotiations on a comprehensive nuclear agreement. Iran and the P5+1 (the United States, the United Kingdom, China, France, Russia, and Germany) reached an interim deal in 2013 that froze elements of Iran’s nuclear program in exchange for temporary sanctions relief prior to further negotiations that led to the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) in 2015. US President Donald Trump reportedly set a 60-day deadline to reach a new nuclear agreement, which will begin on April 12. Trump previously warned on March 30 that ‘there will be a bombing’ if Iran does not agree to a new nuclear deal.
Iran may calculate that an interim deal with the United States could delay or prevent the imposition of snapback sanctions by European JCPOA signatories. The E3 (France, Germany, and the United Kingdom) threatened to impose snapback sanctions on Iran in June 2025 if a new nuclear deal was not reached. The June snapback deadline coincides with Trump’s reported 60-day deadline for reaching a new nuclear deal. Snapback sanctions are a mechanism established by the JCPOA that allows current signatories to reimpose sanctions on Iran within thirty days in the event of “significant non-performance by Iran of JCPOA commitments.” The United States cannot unilaterally trigger snapback sanctions as it withdrew from the JCPOA in 2018. The snapback sanction mechanism is set to expire in October 2025.
Senior Iranian officials persuaded Iranian Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei to approve negotiations with the United States in March 2025 to avoid being forced to fight a “two-front war” against the United States and the Iranian people. The New York Times reported on April 11 that Iranian President Masoud Pezeshkian, Judiciary Chief Gholam Hossein Mohseni Ejei, and Parliament Speaker Mohammad Bagher Ghalibaf met with Khamenei in March to convince Khamenei to change his position on negotiations, citing two unspecified senior Iranian officials familiar with the meeting. Khamenei repeatedly and explicitly rejected negotiations with the United States in February and March 2025. Pezeshkian, Ejei, and Ghalibaf reportedly warned Khamenei that rejecting negotiations may trigger a strike on Iranian nuclear facilities that could escalate into a ”two-front war,” which reportedly convinced Khamenei to approve indirect negotiations with the United States in late March. The three stressed that a two-front war could worsen Iran's economy and stoke internal unrest, which may pose a threat to regime stability. The Iranian rial hit a record low—at that time—after Khamenei categorically rejected negotiations with the United States for the first time on February 7. Khamenei reportedly ultimately agreed to a two-step process that starts with indirect talks and potentially moves to direct talks. Khamenei laid out conditions for negotiations, stating that Iran was willing to negotiate on its nuclear program, including its uranium enrichment, but Iran's missile program was off-limits. Khamenei also appointed his close advisors, Kamal Kharazi, Ali Larijani, and Mohammad Forouzandeh, to manage negotiations with the United States along with the Iranian foreign ministry, according to four unspecified Iranian officials speaking to The New York Times.
Khamenei agreed to these negotiations as a means to preserve regime stability rather than solely a desire to improve his economy. Khamenei reportedly only decided to approve negotiations after he was convinced that a failure to accept negotiations could lead to a war that, in combination with a poor economic situation, would seriously threaten the regime’s stability. The negotiations buy Khamenei more time to address regime stability, even if negotiations ultimately fail and the United States or Israel strike Iran.
Key Takeaways:
- Nuclear Negotiations with Iran: Iran will likely attempt to use nuclear negotiations with the United States to delay a potential strike on its nuclear facilities and the imposition of snapback sanctions.
- Iranian Negotiation Calculus: Senior Iranian officials persuaded Iranian Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei to approve negotiations with the United States in March 2025 to avoid being forced to fight a “two-front war” against the United States and the Iranian people. Khamenei agreed to these negotiations as a means to preserve regime stability rather than solely a desire to improve his economy.
- Iranian Red Lines in Negotiations: An IRGC-affiliated outlet reported that Iran will emphasize its red lines—no threats, no excessive demands, and no discussion of its defense sector—and signal readiness for "continued negotiations" if the United States acts in good faith during negotiations.
- Iran in Iraq: Saudi outlet Asharq al Awsat reported on April 10 that Iranian Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei told Iranian-backed Iraqi militias in late 2024 to prepare to defend unidentified Iranian interests if negotiations with the United States “falter.” Iran also deployed a “small Iranian team” to ensure Iraqi militias respond as directed, illustrating the degree of coordination between Iran and its proxies and partners in Iraq.
- Syrian Government and Security Forces: An armed group in Daraa Province has only nominally integrated into government security forces and continues to pursue its parochial interests, which demonstrates the political challenges Damascus faces as it attempts to exert its control over Syria’s armed groups. Recent violence in Daraa Province and other reports also demonstrate the mixed reliability of the General Security Service, the Syrian transitional government’s gendarmerie.
- Truth and Reconciliation in Syria: President Ahmed al Shara extended the mandate of a commission to investigate violence on the Syrian coast by three more months. The success of the commission will be determined by the government’s ability to prosecute the perpetrators of the violence, regardless of their sect. The commission has reported that unspecified groups are intimidating Western Syrian residents. This intimidation indicates that either insurgents retain significant influence in the countryside or the Sunni groups responsible for sectarian violence have continued to intimidate civilians.
- US Deployments in the Middle East: The US military deployed a Patriot battalion from the Indo-Pacific to the Middle East. An open-source analyst also published satellite imagery of two US-flagged oil tankers at Diego Garcia Island on April 10.
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